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ABSTRACT 
 
I argue that Anglo-Saxon prayer was inflected by Germanic assumptions about gift-
giving and lordship and that prayer, in turn, shaped the Anglo-Saxons’ perception of the self and 
its relation with the community.  Modern studies of early prayer tend to focus on forms of 
devotion that replicate modern ideals of the self.  In Varieties of Religious Experience, William 
James defined prayer as “no mere repetition of certain sacred formulae, but the very movement 
itself of the soul, putting itself in a personal relation of contact with the mysterious power of 
which it feels the presence.”  James’ understanding of prayer reflects a post-Romantic preference 
for selfhood rooted in individualism, genuine emotional experience, and sincerity.  Yet for the 
monks Bede (d. 735) and Ælfric (d. 1010) – the Anglo-Saxon authors who address prayer most 
explicitly and extensively – prayer was fundamentally the “repetition of sacred formulae” in the 
set prayers found in the liturgy.  It was precisely this repetition that articulated a selfhood formed 
in relation to God and the larger Christian community.  Both Bede and Ælfric, I demonstrate, 
theorize prayer as a special form of gift-giving relationship between God and humans that is both 
personal and profoundly social.  For Bede, those praying conform themselves to the words of the 
prayers by interiorizing them in their thoughts and exteriorizing them in their actions, presenting 
the purified self as a return-gift to God.  For Ælfric, prayer functions like a vow: it is a 
performative statement of allegiance that both expresses the intention of those praying to serve 
God and also brings them under God’s protection.  Because prayer was both an individual and 
communal regimen practiced in some form by all levels of Anglo-Saxon society, it is a 
tremendously productive site of study for understanding Anglo-Saxon subjectivity.  This project 
thus counters a trend in recent scholarship that represents Anglo-Saxon prayer as if it were an 
overlooked forerunner of the highly individualized, affective form of prayer that develops in the 
twelfth-century with the much-heralded “discovery of the individual.” 
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Midway through Catholic Homily I.18, a Rogationtide homily explicating the parable on 
prayer in Luke 11:5-13, Ælfric says: “Ælc þæra þe geornlice bitt. 7 þære bene ne geswicð. þam 
getiðað god þæs ecan lifes.”1 (To everyone who zealously prays, and does not cease from prayer, 
to them God will grant everlasting life).2  This straightforward statement on prayer essentially 
literalizes Jesus’ metaphors of asking, seeking, and knocking as assurance that those who pray 
will be saved. 
 The simplicity of the statement and its similarity to the biblical text, however, obscure 
key questions regarding an understanding of Anglo-Saxon prayer.  In Ælfric’s understanding 
why (and perhaps, how) does God grant everlasting life in response to prayer?  Is it integral to 
the efficacy of prayer that it be offered “geornlice” (zealously) and that one “ne geswicð” (not 
cease)?  If so, why?  Is zealousness measured by numbers of prayers said, by bodily 
performance, or by some sort of interior disposition, and, in the latter case, how is this 
disposition enacted?  Is Ælfric’s focus here on the specific request or efficacious formulae?  
Regarding the language, Old English has two nearly synonymous words for the noun “prayer,” 
ben and gebed.  What does it mean that ben is used here?  How does the semantic range of 
biddan – which is different from, for instance, the modern word “to pray,” or even “to bid”3 – 
affect (or reflect) an Anglo-Saxon understanding of prayer?  And in what ways might it matter 
for reconstructing Anglo-Saxon theories of prayer that Ælfric’s audience is likely to have 
understood the “eternal life” that God gives differently from, say, the way Augustine understood 
the same concept? 
Prayer is ubiquitous in the Anglo-Saxon record.  It is represented in every kind of 
document, from sermons to saints’ lives to charters to recipes, and all of these contextualizing 
genres have something to teach us about the theory and practice of prayer in Anglo-Saxon 
                                                 
1
 Peter Clemoes, ed., Ælfric’s Catholic Homilies, the First Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 320, ll. 
94-6.  All Ælfric quotations come from Clemoes and Malcolm Godden, Ælfric’s Catholic Homilies: Introduction, 
Commentary, and Glossary, Early English Text Society n.s. 18 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); crossed þ 
will be silently expanded and puncti elevati replaced with colons. 
2
 Translations are mine unless otherwise noted. 
3
 Bitt corresponds to petite in Luke 11:9.  Biddan + ben thus renders petare pretty accurately. 
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England.  Anglo-Saxon England also proves comparatively rich in early prayer books,4 and these 
manuscripts and the prayers they (and others) contain also illuminate an understanding of the 
sources, practice, and orientation of Anglo-Saxon prayer.  A further complication of studying 
Anglo-Saxon prayer is that its concerns overlap many different fields of study: the liturgy; 
devotional practice (monastic, lay); spirituality (whatever exactly that is); magic; penance (both 
as a penitential act, and as it gets caught up in commuted penances and substitution atonement);5 
gender and selfhood; monastic endowments; theology; historical traditions of prayer; and, in the 
context of teaching on prayer, sermon studies.  These are all vast fields of scholarly endeavor, 
and so, of course, I have had to set some limits. 
First of all, I am limiting my study of Anglo-Saxon prayer to the sermons of Bede and 
Ælfric.  Even though Bede and Ælfric presented themselves for this study by virtue of the fact 
that they were the only Anglo-Saxon authors who address prayer directly and extensively,6 they 
neatly complement each other.  Both are among the most prolific and influential of Anglo-Saxon 
authors.  Bede writes early in the Anglo-Saxon period, in Latin, and for monks, while Ælfric 
writes late, in Old English, for a mixed audience.  Additionally, while studies of the spirituality 
of Bede are becoming more common (although not so common that each new one can forego a 
lament for the lack of such studies), no one, to my knowledge, has systematically addressed the 
                                                 
4
 The four main prayer anthologies are Royal Library Prayer Book (London, BL Royal 2 A.xx), the Book of 
Nunnaminster (London, BL Harley 2965), the Harley Prayer Book (London, BL Harley 7653), and the Book of 
Cerne (Cambridge, University Library L1.1.10).  For a brief description of these and other prayer collections, see 
Thomas H. Bestul, “Liturgy,” in Sources of Anglo-Saxon Literary Culture: A Trial Version, ed. Frederick M. Biggs, 
Thomas D. Hill, and Paul E. Szarmach (Binghamton, NY: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 
1990), 135-144. 
5
 Cyrille Vogel’s term, in Arnold Angenendt, “Donationes pro anima: Gift and Countergift in the Early Medieval 
Liturgy,” in The Long Morning of Medieval Europe: New Directions in Early Medieval Studies, ed. Jennifer R. 
Davis and Michael McCormick (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 136. 
6
 Alcuin is the other major Anglo-Saxon author who has left a record of prayer; however, in his case it is in the form 
of prayerbooks such as the Libelli Precum.  Benedicta Ward, High King of Heaven: Aspects of Early English 
Spirituality, Cistercian Studies Series 181 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1999), briefly discusses De 
Psalmorum usu liber as Alcuin’s (found in Patrologia Latina 101, cols. 465-508).  However, according to Palémon 
Glorieux, this attribution to Alcuin is incorrect (Bullough, referenced below, does not list this work in his index of 
Alcuin’s writings, whether attested, doubtful, or pseudo).  Glorieux, Pour revaloriser Migne: Tables rectificatives 
(Lille: Facultés catholiques, 1952), 54. Ward also walks through an “Anglo-Saxon” explication of the Lord’s Prayer 
arrived at by blending together explications by Bede and Alcuin taken from various parts of their works (without 
documenting her sources fully) with an interest to showing their “interior understanding of the Lord’s Prayer” (84).  
For further information on Alcuin’s place in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of prayer, see Donald Bullough, Alcuin: 
Achievement and Reputation (Leiden: Brill, 2004); and Radu Constantinescu, “Alcuin et les ‘Libelli Precum’ de 
l’époque carolingienne,’ Revue d’histoire de la spiritualité 50 (1974): 17-56. 
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topic of prayer in the works of Ælfric.  What I am specifically interested in for each author is 
how he theorizes prayer: how does it form or enact a relationship between the precator7 and God 
and within the Christian community, and how is it efficacious (whether subjectively or 
objectively)? 
When one reads through the sermon collections of both Bede and Ælfric, one is 
immediately struck by the way each author takes care to establish at the beginning of his series a 
clear picture of the relationship between humans and God.  Bede’s Advent homilies present the 
figure of Mary as exemplary for all Christians in the way she bears Christ in her body and brings 
him forth into the world, but what Bede especially emphasizes is the way that Mary’s 
relationship with God is predicated on the exchange of gifts: God’s many gifts to Mary, and 
Mary’s counter-gifts to God.  Ælfric’s first collection of homilies begins with a sort of prologue-
homily disconnected from the liturgical year, Catholic Homily I.1, De initio creaturae, which 
recounts the creation of the world and the fall of angels and man.  This homily, too, takes care to 
show that humans have all they have by virtue of God’s gracious gift and that they owe 
obedience to him in return.  Thus, in different ways, both Bede and Ælfric open up their 
homiletic series by emphasizing that humans are (or should be) in a relationship with God 
characterized by reciprocal gift-giving. 
My own starting place will likewise be to frame Anglo-Saxon prayer in the context of 
petitionary practices and expectations.  To many, petition may seem a limited view of prayer, 
which is commonly and more expansively defined as “talking with God.”8  But what is the 
                                                 
7
 The relative poverty of modern English words for prayer can lead to confusion and awkward circumlocutions.  I 
am adopting Hugh A.G. Houghton’s use of “precator” (borrowed in turn from ante-classical Latin) to designate the 
one praying.  See “The Discourse of Prayer in the Major Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles,” Apocrypha 15 (2004), 
172, n. 2. 
8
 Variants of this definition are found from Clement of Alexandria: Prayer is “converse with God” (Stromateis vii.7, 
qtd. in Eric Jay, Origen’s Treatise on Prayer (London: S.P.C.K, 1954), 27); to John Chrysostom (Homily 30.5, in 
Homilies on Genesis 18-45, trans. Robert C. Hill, Fathers of the Catholic Church 82 (Catholic University of America 
Press, 1990)); to Augustine (5th century): “Oratio tua locutio est ad Deum” (Your prayer is speech to God).  
Enarratio 1.7, l. 50 on Ps. lxxxv.5, CCSL 39 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1956).  Augustine, of course, has a famous 
example of prayer as a conversation with God in his Confessions.  More recent examples include Father van Acken, 
prayer is “cultivating personal communion with God” (qtd. in Mary Elizabeth Mason, Active and Contemplative 
Life: A Study of the Concepts from Plato to the Present (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), 3); Josef 
Jungmann: “Likely enough we can regard this daily programme of conversing with God as the core and kernel of 
Christian prayer” (Christian Prayer through the Centuries, 2nd ed., trans. John Coyne (London: Paulist Press, 2007).   
Orig. publ. Christliches Beten (Munich: Verlag Ars Sacra Joseph Mueller, 1969), 13); Marcel Mauss: “Prayer is 
speech” (On Prayer, trans. Susan Leslie (New York: Durkheim Press/Berghahn Books, 2003).  Orig. publ. La 
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content and form of this speech?  What effect is it supposed to have?  What type of being is God 
pictured to be, and what kinds of attributes is he imagined to have?  How does he respond to or 
interact with humans?  How do humans get God to respond to or interact with them?  The 
answers to these questions vary according to time and place, and this variation can reveal cultural 
expectations for communication between human and divine, the way that this relationship is 
imagined to reflect or resist human cultural paradigms, and the way it reveals and forms 
particular cultural understandings of what we might call human psychology.  For Anglo-Saxons, 
I will argue, the content and form of this “talking” is petition, and within this petition, God is 
imagined variously as a father, a king, and a lord, all relationships framed within the receiving 
and giving of gifts. 
 Once prayer is situated within the context of petition, it becomes obvious that key 
elements of successful petitions are the gifts the petitioners bring to encourage a hearing and a 
response, the gifts they receive, and the return-gifts they gratefully give – the reciprocal nature of 
the gift-giving relationship within which prayer exists.  Thus, modern gift-theory proves a 
valuable frame on which to view forms of subjectivity, hierarchical power relations, and 
economic structures that are somewhat alien to our modern, individualistic ways of thinking.  
But contextualizing prayer within gift-giving does not, unfortunately, cause a clear pattern of the 
workings of prayer to emerge within the Anglo-Saxon social context.  Rather, it brings out 
complications and tensions within understandings of prayer, praxis, and theology that we can see 
threading throughout the discourse even if they rarely resolve into a dominant pattern.   
While prayer as petition in some ways reflects human/human models of petitioning, in 
which gifts can operate to create freedom as well as obligation, spaces of independence as well 
as dependence, in other ways it resists those models.  Things that are acceptable within a 
human/human relationship are not necessarily acceptable within a human/divine relationship, 
and the lines between human and divine can be drawn differently in different situations and 
times.9  These varying petitionary models present four overlapping complications within a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Prière: Les Origines (France: privately printed, 1909), 22).  Ann and Barry Ulanov: “Prayer above all else is 
conversation with God” (“Prayer and Personality: Prayer as Primary Speech,” in The Study of Spirituality, ed. 
Cheslyn Jones, Geoffrey Wainwright, and Edward Yarnold (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 24). 
9
 For instance, Roman and (less philosophically influenced) Greek prayer did conceptualize the relationship between 
humans and the gods in much the same way hierarchical human relationships were considered.  See Simon Pulleyn, 
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discourse of prayer informed by gift-theory that I will briefly state here and then revisit in more 
detail below.  First, one of the major distinctive aspects about prayer as petition is that this prayer 
can function both as the petition itself, and also as a gift or sacrifice.10  This is because prayer 
can either be thought of as simple communication (words corresponding to thoughts), or it can be 
reified into a symbolic object that can then function as an element of exchange just as does any 
other good work. 
 The second complication gift-theory presents for the study of prayer is that prayer can be 
concerned predominantly either with purity, in which case the relationship with God is 
conceptualized more abstractly and gift-giving plays a lesser part, or with reward and merit,11 in 
which case God is more fully personified and reciprocity attains greater importance.  What 
exactly “purity” means is its own question.  In the structure set forth in Levitical law, according 
to Mary Douglas, impurity is a violation of order.12  Within the eastern tradition represented by 
such early authors as Evagrius, Origen, and Cassian, ideas of purity are related to the Greek 
concept of apatheia (detachment), which is reached as material desires and distractions are 
stripped away.  As Chapter 3 will show in more detail, Augustine’s commentary on the Lord’s 
Prayer reflects this eastern idea of purity, an idea we might conceptualize as sanctity, with its 
connotations of removal from the world, its desires and pollutions.  Thus, for Augustine, 
almsgiving functions within the more abstract system of purification-as-detachment.  In contrast, 
Ælfric’s teaching on prayer has little to say about purity;13 rather, his focus is more on communal 
                                                                                                                                                             
Prayer in Greek Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); and John Scheid, “Sacrifices for Gods and Ancestors,” 
in A Companion to Roman Religion, ed. Jörg Rüpke (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 263-71.   
10
 Patristic writers such as Tertullian state explicitly that prayer replaces the sacrifices offered in earlier religious 
systems: “Haec est enim hostia spiritalis, quae pristina sacrificia deleuit. … Nos sumus ueri adoratores et ueri 
sacerdotes, qui spiritu orantes spiritu sacrificamus orationem hostiam Dei” (De Oratione XXVIII, 1 and 3, ll. 1-3 
and 8-10, CCSL 1)  [For this is the spiritual oblation which has wiped out the ancient sacrifices. … We are the true 
worshippers and the true priests, who, praying in the Spirit, in the Spirit offer a sacrifice of prayer as an oblation] 
(De Oratione Liber.  Tertullian’s Tract on the Prayer, ed. and trans. Ernest Evans [London: S.P.C.K, 1953], ch. 28).  
This idea is not unique to Tertullian.  Ælfric also says: “Ure gastlican lac sint ure gebedu. 7 lofsang. 7 huselhalgung 
7 gehwilce oðre lac þe we gode offriað” (CHI.3, ll. 164-5) [Our spiritual offerings are our prayers and hymns and 
husel-hallowings and all other offerings that we offer to God].  In this passage he is apparently remembering 
Augustine.  See Godden, Ælfric’s Catholic Homilies, 27. 
11
 “Merit” presents further complications, since this term is used within the penitential system, which operates 
according to a judicial model, yet one that also uses the language of purity, as will be seen below. 
12
 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, Publishers, 1966). 
13
 As an interesting aside: a DOE Corpus search turns up only a handful of hits in Ælfric where either ben or gebed 
are in proximity to clæne/clænysse.  Most of them are in female saints’ lives. 
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wholeness represented in the way he re-casts the relationship between prayer and almsgiving.14  
On the other hand, Bede manages to meld elements of both traditions.  As we will see, he 
strongly contextualizes prayer within a reciprocal gift-giving relationship while at the same time 
showing concern for a sort of transformational efficacy in prayer that could be termed purity. 
 The final complications are doctrinal.  The third lies within soteriological doctrine, which 
influences the way the relationship with God is imagined, and, insofar as prayer is an expression 
of that relationship, it informs the way prayer is understood as well.  Fourth is the doctrine of 
grace, which as formulated by Augustine strongly resists being assimilated into human gift-
giving structures of obligation while, because of the language in which the discourse is couched 
(especially in Old English, in which gifu means both “gift” and “grace”) it simultaneously 
invokes them.    
 In spite of these complications, I argue that prayer needs to be understood not merely 
within the more usual context of contemplation, rumination, and meditation, but within the 
context of gift-exchange, sacrifice, and offering.  If one situates Anglo-Saxon prayer only within 
the first context it becomes impossible to understand the more symbolic uses of Anglo-Saxon 
prayer (which, as far as we can tell, were much more common in practice) as anything more than 
superstition.  Furthermore, the first context necessarily privileges the individual, private, interior, 
and (at least assumed) spontaneous and unique experience of prayer over the communal, ritual, 
active, and symbolic.  This reproduces modern preferences and fixations regarding human 
psychology, sincerity, and autonomy within the early medieval world, obscuring the way that 
prayer can enact a different model of the psyche, one that privileges symbol, action, gesture, and 
community. 
 
SCHOLARSHIP ON PRAYER 
 From the perspective of most medievalists who study spirituality or devotion, Anglo-
Saxon prayer falls at a particularly unfortunate moment in the practice of Christian prayer.  First 
of all, it has more in common with the “practical” Latin orientation of prayer than with the 
                                                 
14
 Douglas mentions the semantic differences in varying words pertaining to purity/holiness/sanctity.  Both Latin 
sacer (like sanctity) and Hebrew k-d-sh have to do with separation, set-apartness, things removed from the common, 
profane, mundane (Purity and Danger, 8).  “Holy,” however, comes from a nexus of OE words having to do with 
wholeness, healing, salvation (hælu, hælig, etc.). 
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“mystical” eastern tradition (to which, indeed, the Anglo-Saxons would have had limited access).  
Additionally, according to many scholarly paradigms, Anglo-Saxon England exists before the 
“invention” of the individual,15 and the individual’s invention of interestingly personal, emotive, 
and even mystical prayer that emphasizes personal experience and the individual’s sense of 
personal connection with God.16  If we imagine these two types of orientation on an XY axis (X: 
pre-12th century/post-12th century; Y: Eastern prayer at the top, of course/Latin prayer) it 
becomes apparent that Anglo-Saxon prayer falls in the dark lower-left corner of religious 
experience, a corner traditionally ceded to the mustier disciplines of philology17 and liturgical 
study.  As can be seen, there is a strongly judgmental strain in prayer studies.   
The early 20th century saw the publication of two foundational books on the study and 
psychology of prayer.  The first was by the psychologist William James on the nature of 
religious experience.  In it, he defines prayer as “no vain exercise of words, no mere repetition of 
certain sacred formulae, but the very movement itself of the soul, putting itself in a personal 
relation of contact with the mysterious power of which it feels the presence.”18  The second was 
by Friedrich Heiler on the history and psychology of prayer; he defines “genuine prayer” as “the 
free, spontaneous expression of one’s own experience, or at least the fruit of what one has 
                                                 
15
 See n. 33 below. 
16
 Which means a generally wider variety of experience, including gendered experience, the subject of much 
scholarly interest.  For an example of a confluence of just these concerns, see John C. Hirsch, The Boundaries of 
Faith: The Development and Transmission of Medieval Spirituality (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 7. 
17
 Philological studies of prayer have, of course, added much of value to our knowledge of the origins and influences 
of prayers in Anglo-Saxon England.  Phillip Pulsiano’s chapter, “Prayers, Glosses and Glossaries,” in A Companion 
to Anglo-Saxon Literature, ed. Phillip Pulsiano and Elaine Treharne (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 209-30, provides a 
very basic, thorough introduction to prayer texts, including an appendix of vernacular prayers and a bibliography of 
scholarship.  Thomas H. Bestul gives a very brief introduction to the subject in “Liturgy”; many of his other works 
are in this vein, notably “Continental Sources of Anglo-Saxon Devotional Writing,” in Sources of Anglo-Saxon 
Culture, ed. Paul E. Szarmach (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1986), 103-26.  Like Bestul, others 
have traced the various paths prayers and prayer-formulae took to arrive in Anglo-Saxon England: Latin, 
Carolingian, Iberian, and Irish.  Henry Mayr-Harting, The Coming of Christianity to Anglo-Saxon England, 3rd ed. 
(London: Batsford, 1991) discusses the liturgy the Romans brought to England and the practice of private prayer in 
the context of the extant prayerbooks.  Further examples discussing the sources of Anglo-Saxon prayer can be found 
Patrick Sims-Williams, “Thought, Word, and Deed: An Irish Triad,” Eriu 29 (1978): 78-111; Religion and 
Literature in Western England: 600-800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).  Thomas D. Hill, 
“Invocation of the Trinity and the Tradition of the Lorica in Old English,” Speculum 56 (1981): 259-67.  Kathleen 
Hughes, “Some Aspects of Irish Influence on Early English Private Prayer,” Studia Celtica 5 (1970): 48-61.  Donald 
Byzdl, “The Sources of Ælfric’s Prayers in Cambridge University Library MS. Gg.3.28,” Notes and Queries n.s. 24 
(1977): 98-102. 
18
 James, Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York: Modern Library, 1902; New 
York: Mentor, 1958), 352.  Citations refer to the Mentor edition. 
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experienced and gained in struggle.”19  Both definitions privilege spontaneity (or at least resist 
the formulaic) in prayer, emphasize the individual and personal, and, in the case of James, 
assume a sort of direct although “mysterious” experience of the divine frequently attached to 
mystical experience. 
Both of these men’s definitions of prayer (and their projects as a whole) implicitly resist a 
modernist materialist mindset that was dismissive of the spiritual world and spiritual experience.  
As a tool of their resistance, they followed in the prayer tradition coming out of the Reformation, 
which tended toward suspicion of set prayer, preferring individual, spontaneous prayer as “true” 
prayer, and conceptualizing prayer as something a person does within himself, as an interior 
activity or discipline.20  Feeding into this discourse of spirituality was the type of selfhood 
preferred from the Romantic period on, rooted in interiority, individualism, genuine emotional 
experience, and spontaneity-marked sincerity.   
Additionally, both James and Heiler subscribe to an evolutionary development of prayer, 
which starts with more “primitive” ritualistic prayer and progresses through time to the more 
valued spontaneous prayer.  Marcel Mauss, in his study on prayer, nicely sums up this 
progression (although he does not explicitly value one type of prayer over another): “At first 
completely mechanical and effective only through the production of certain sounds, prayer 
finished by being completely mental and interior.”21  In subsequent studies of prayer this 
evolutionary teleology feeds into the Protestant ideal of spontaneity in prayer, devaluing the 
ritual form seen as “primitive,” and privileging an individually creative mental and interior 
prayer as more developed and more complex – a better, truer kind of prayer because it is a better 
and truer expression of the self in prayer. 
That this unexamined preference for modern ideals in prayer is distorting the scholarship 
on medieval prayer is beginning to be recognized.  For instance, a recent anthology, A History of 
Prayer (2008) begins to try to address the “Simply Complicated Scholarly Problem” that prayer 
presents (as the introduction states it).  In that introduction, Roy Hammerling points out:  
                                                 
19
 Heiler, Prayer: A Study in the History and Psychology of Religion, trans. Samuel McComb (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1958), xxiii. Orig. publ. Das Gebet: eine religionsgeschichtliche und religionspsychologische 
Untersuchung (Munich: E. Reinhardt, 1923). 
20
 See Lori Branch, “The Rejection of Liturgy, the Rise of Free Prayer, and Modern Religious Subjectivity,” 
Restoration 29.1 (2005): 1-28. 
21
 Mauss, On Prayer, 24.   
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[A] definition or even a broad consensus concerning the nature of prayer has been 
difficult to come by in part because many scholars assume a definition of prayer without 
attempting to define it.  Likewise, many have tended to pursue the study of spirituality by 
looking at a variety of valuable primary sources without attempting to look closely at 
prayer itself.22 
Because of this lack of careful consideration, implicitly or explicitly, most studies of prayer 
theory tend to focus on the interior, individual, and contemplative practice of prayer marked as 
“sincere” by spontaneity or individual creativity in prayer-forms.  This focus presents a distorted 
picture of prayer.  So, for instance, liturgical scholar Josef Jungmann states: “… the most 
authentic prayer takes place outside all forms, in the secret encounter between God and man and 
woman.”23  More profusely, Ann and Barry Ulanov claim: 
Prayer above all else is conversation with God.  It is the primary speech of the true self to 
the true God.  It reaches far below words into the affects and images and instincts living 
in us unconsciously – into what depth psychologists call primary-process thinking.  
Prayer makes use of all we know verbally and emotionally – our conscious secondary-
process thinking – forming words and wishes sent in urgent pleas or in quiet meditations 
to our Lord.  We speak in prayer from our most hidden heart to the hiddenness of God, in 
whose astonishing image we were fashioned and find our true faces.24 
This passage in particular reads like it comes from a devotional text; however, the volume it 
comes from, The Study of Spirituality, and its companion-volume, The Study of Liturgy, both aim 
to lay out the central issues to scholarly study of these topics.  In both these cases it is fairly 
obvious that the authors speak in their own voices (rather than reflecting historical perspectives), 
privileging in their study the type of prayer they themselves value. 
It is striking, then, that when one turns to studies of Christian late-antique and early 
medieval prayer (and Jungmann’s book quoted above is on early Christian prayer) we see much 
                                                 
22
 Roy Hammerling, “Introduction: Prayer – A Simply Complicated Scholarly Problem,” in A History of Prayer: 
The First to the Fifteenth Century, ed. Roy Hammerling (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 2. 
23
 Jungmann, Christian Prayer through the Centuries, xiii.   
24
 Ulanov and Ulanov, “Prayer and Personality,” 24.  
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the same preoccupations with individuality, interiority, and formlessness in prayer.25  Thus, 
Columba Stewart defines prayer for John Cassian as follows: 
For [Cassian], as for many monastic writers, “prayer” (oratio) was both a generic and a 
particular term.  It was used inclusively for all forms of human communication with God 
… .  In the monastic milieu, “prayer” also had a more specific meaning.  Cassian follows 
earlier monastic tradition by locating oratio particularly in the reflective pause following 
each psalm of the canonical office.  … oratio in this narrower sense happened when the 
flow of recited or sung text paused and the heart spoke from its own appropriation of the 
texts.  Offered by each monk in silence and then communally in a prayer by the leader, 
such prayer arises from, and responds to, the biblical words that have been vocalized.26 
Stewart emphasizes the interior, individual, silent nature of prayer in its more specific meaning, 
even though this type of prayer was rare in Cassian’s work and even rarer outside of it.27    
Scholarly work on early medieval prayer in England also reproduces the focus on this 
kind of prayer, turning to contemplative practices, often those of Cassian, to do it.  Cassian 
uniquely provides the most detailed account of the interior discipline of praying of any early 
author, making it tempting to apply Cassianic teaching on prayer to more laconic later 
                                                 
25
 Behind some of the emphasis individual spirituality is a sort of defensiveness on the part of Catholic scholars, 
who are keen to show that medieval spirituality is just as sincere and genuine as modern.  A strikingly exaggerated 
example of this is Benedicta Ward, High King of Heaven, which emphasizes again and again the genuinely spiritual 
nature of Anglo-Saxon Christianity.  Examples of this are the way she generalizes from a quotation from Bede to all 
Anglo-Saxons: “Such an approach [to the eucharist] shows that the celebration of the eucharist for the Anglo-Saxons 
was by no means a clerical formality” (41), and her emphasis on the “interior” nature of Anglo-Saxon teaching on 
prayer mentioned in n. 6 above. 
26
 Columba Stewart. Cassian the Monk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 100 (emphasis added) . 
27
 Cassian’s Conference 10 gives instruction in the discipline of prayer necessary to arrive at the point where one can 
appropriate biblical text as one’s own (as Stewart puts it).  It is notable that this is considered a very high level of 
spiritual advancement directed toward hermits rather than something any praying Christian (or even any praying 
monk) could attain (see Boniface Ramsey’s introduction to his translation in John Cassian: The Conferences, 
Ancient Christian Writers no. 57 [New York: Paulist Press, 1997], 27).  Additionally, the words the monks speak in 
prayer are from the Psalms rather than either their own words or their own catena-like meditational embroidery of 
the Psalms.  See below under “Early Christian Praxis and Teaching on Prayer” for my reading of Cassian.  Other 
than Cassian, the early Christian works on prayer do not typically present the discipline of prayer as leading to this 
end.  As Scott DeGregorio shows, even when Bede adopts Cassian’s language of “purity” he means something 
different by it: “… pure prayer in Cassian’s sense is akin to contemplation, indeed indistinguishable from it.  Yet 
these are not the associations carried by Bede’s use of the phrase orationis puritas in his homily.  Bede is 
undoubtedly referring to vocal prayer here, as such phrases as ore precamur and clamor labiorum … indicate.  By 
the phrase “pure prayer,” Bede thus appears to have had something quite different in mind from Cassian”  (“The 
Venerable Bede on Prayer and Contemplation,” Traditio 54 [1999]: 1-39, 24). 
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accounts.28  Benedicta Ward’s account of Bede’s use of the Psalter does exactly this, invoking 
Cassian’s much fuller account of prayer to explain Bede’s practice.29  Rachel Fulton follows this 
trajectory to muster a formidable argument against the limited understanding of people such as 
James and Heiler, in favor of understanding text-based prayer as “real” prayer (i.e., individually 
oriented, sincere prayer).30  In her argument she applies Cassian’s conception of prayer to 
Anselm’s prayers, arriving at a place in which prayer is a strikingly individual, creative, mental 
act performed by an imagined nun praying alone from a group of Anselmian prayers.31  I am not 
arguing that Fulton is essentially wrong in her basic argument.  Medieval spirituality obviously 
had a place for contemplation.  Rather, my point is that when scholars turn to study early 
medieval prayer they tend to reproduce the modern preference for prayer as an interior, mental, 
individual exercise by choosing to study a contemplative, monastic prayer that very few 
medieval people would have had access to, and by presenting Cassian’s ideal of prayer as more 
individually creative than it is.  
But Anglo-Saxon spirituality is largely left out “of the grand narratives of devotion and 
mysticism in the Middle Ages,” as Allen Frantzen points out.32  Partly this is because the type of 
prayer that has proven of interest to modern scholars is difficult to find in Anglo-Saxon England.  
Additionally, studies of early prayer (or more specifically, devotion) also explicitly or implicitly 
speak to the debates about the “invention” of the individual, which is usually located after the 
Anglo-Saxon era.33  Thus, some scholarship on Anglo-Saxon prayer implicitly or explicitly 
                                                 
28
 Cassian was, of course, influential in the establishment of monasticism, although it seems unlikely his works were 
very influential in England.  See Stephen Lake, “Knowledge of the Writings of John Cassian in Early Anglo-Saxon 
England,” Anglo-Saxon England 32 (2003): 27-42. 
29
 Ward, Bede and the Psalter, Jarrow Lecture, 1991, 6-9. 
30
 “There was no question of prayer being ‘free’ or ‘spontaneous,’ which was not to say, as I have already noted, that 
it should lack sincerity.”  Fulton, “Praying with Anselm at Admont,” Speculum 81 (2006): 700-33, 708. 
31
 For her imagined scenario, see Fulton, “Praying with Anselm,” 724. 
32
 Frantzen, “Spirituality and Devotion in the Anglo-Saxon Penitentials,” Essays in Medieval Studies 22 (2005): 
117-128, 117. 
33
 Conventionally, the Italians discovered the individual in the 15th-century.  Naturally, as with so many other 15th-
century discoveries, scholars have rushed in to point out that others were there before.  Influential in this project is 
Colin Morris, The Discovery of the Individual: 1050-1200 (London, 1972; Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of 
America, 1987), the most prominent articulator of a 12th-century discovery of the individual.  For two concise 
summaries of the state of the question see Aaron Gurevich, The Origins of European Individualism, trans. Katharine 
Judelson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), chapter 1; and Andrew Cowell, The Medieval Warrior Aristocracy: Gifts, 
Violence, Performance, and the Sacred (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2007), “Introduction.”  Gurevich focuses on the 
development of the individual in medieval scholarship.  Cowell situates his account within anthropological and gift-
giving theories of the individual.  Cowell summarizes: “the recent trend has been to focus more on the social limits 
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resists this categorization, attempting to make space in prayer for a private, individual interiority 
that is often claimed to be the development of later eras.  This is Frantzen’s explicit project.  He 
lauds the work of scholars like Thomas Bestul on early medieval devotion34 and Scott 
DeGregorio on various aspects of Anglo-Saxon spirituality,35 both of whom seek to situate the 
Anglo-Saxon spiritual tradition at the early edge of affective piety and a devotion oriented 
around individual experience.36  Frantzen focuses on forms of spirituality that are oriented 
toward individual, interior experience.  Since Frantzen’s goal is to make room for Anglo-Saxon 
England at the early edge of affective individuality, he of course reproduces this kind of 
individual within Anglo-Saxon piety.   
 Conversely, scholars who do study ritualized prayer37 often focus on prayer’s relationship 
to power.  The literature on charms and magic has historically focused on prayer as a means for 
the church to control access to God.38  Earlier scholars assumed that the “syncretism” evidenced 
by the charms’ mixture of supposedly pagan and Christian elements was evidence of the 
church’s desire to control all means of access to the divine, such as, for example, healing.39  Such 
studies are often skeptical of organized religion and power hierarchies in a way that is perhaps 
                                                                                                                                                             
and constraints on individualism in the Middle Ages – especially the period prior to 1200 – while at the same time 
recognizing the existence of forms of individual autonomy which were expressed in culturally specific ways which 
may not match – and even less lead to – classic modern forms of the autonomous individual” (1). 
34
 Bestul, “St. Anselm and the Continuity of Anglo-Saxon Devotional Traditions,” Annuale Mediaevale 18 (1977): 
20-41.  “The Book of Cerne and the English Devotional Tradition,” Manuscripta 23 (1979): 3-4.  “St Anselm, the 
Monastic Community at Canterbury, and Devotional Writing in Late Anglo-Saxon England,” Anselm Studies 1 
(1983): 185-98. 
35
 DeGregorio, “The Venerable Bede on Prayer and Contemplation”; “Affective Spirituality: Theory and Practice in 
Bede and Alfred the Great,” Essays in Medieval Studies 22 (2005): 129-39; “Texts, Topoi and the Self: A Reading 
of Alfredian Spirituality,” EME 13 (2005): 79-96. 
36
 I am not convinced this is quite what DeGregorio does.  His article on Alfred, “Texts, Topoi, and the Self,” 
focuses on a textually mediated self constructed through reading: “spiritual selfhood for Alfred was evidently in part 
a process of reading and internalizing texts” (84). 
37
 Obviously, I am not talking about liturgical scholarship here, which tends to focus on praxis, or philological works 
like those cited above, n. 17, that trace the pedigree of various written prayers.  Neither of these types of scholarship 
really interacts with the theoretical question of what prayer is. 
38
 The central book to this project is Valerie Flint, The Rise of Magic in Early Medieval Europe (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1991).  Her approach influences two quasi-scholarly books: Bill Griffiths, Aspects of 
Anglo-Saxon Magic (Norfolk: Anglo-Saxon Books, 2003) and Stephen Pollington, Leechcraft: Early English 
Charms, Plantlore, and Healing (Norfolk: Anglo-Saxon Books, 2008).  These are two of the most recent 
editions/translations of Anglo-Saxon charms. 
39
 J.H.G. Gratton and Charles Singer, Anglo-Saxon Magic and Medicine.  Publications of the Wellcome Historical 
Medical Museum (London: Oxford University Press, 1952); Godfrid Storms, ed. and trans., Anglo-Saxon Magic 
(Halle: Nijhoff, 1948); Felix Grendon, ed. and trans., “The Anglo-Saxon Charms,” The Journal of American 
Folklore 22 (1909): 105-237. 
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more appropriate to modern than medieval subjectivities.  They posit individuals who might be 
impatient with the limitations imposed by church power, or, conversely, who might be trying in 
every way possible to consolidate personal power by means of the church.  More recent 
scholarship on charms, notably work by Karen Louise Jolly,40 has challenged this easy binary 
between pagan and Christian, not by considering what prayer is or the way it functioned in 
Anglo-Saxon England, but by pointing out that Anglo-Saxons did not have the same 
understanding of the relationship between the natural and spiritual world that we do,41 and by 
noting that many “superstitions” taken as evidence of lingering Germanic paganism were beliefs 
shared with the Christian Mediterranean world.42 
I run through the issues embedded in the scholarship of prayer at this length because 
these unexamined assumptions imported into the study of prayer point toward the need to begin 
with Anglo-Saxon evidence in attempting to reconstruct Anglo-Saxon theories of prayer, rather 
than assuming a theory of prayer that may be anachronistic.  I also wish to highlight what is at 
stake in labeling Anglo-Saxon prayer as essentially petition: according to modern 
preconceptions, reducing prayer to petition debases it, stripping it of what is most personal and 
genuine, of what is least self-interested and most pure, leaving nothing but self-interest as prayer 
becomes a site for the struggle over various forms of power that then tend to get reduced to the 
economic.  Prayer-as-petition also explains why theoretical aspects of Anglo-Saxon prayer have 
been largely ignored (except insofar as the influences of Cassian can be traced): both because 
prayer-as-petition does not fit modern ideas of the individual expression of a unique self, and 
because, if one is looking for highly developed contemplative prayer, the literature of Anglo-
Saxon England is not a very rewarding place to look.  But situating prayer in the context of 
petition and the cultural practices petition invokes actually allows us, without positing a 
potentially anachronistic notion of individuality, to see how the reciprocal relationships involved 
in petition make room for a highly personal relationship between God and petitioner within 
                                                 
40
 Jolly, Popular Religion in Late Saxon England: Elf Charms in Context (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1996). 
41
 See M.L. Cameron’s work, but especially Anglo-Saxon Medicine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993). 
42
 For instance, a belief in spirits, and a shared sense of the way the spiritual and material worlds were interlinked.  
See Jolly, Popular Religion, 2. 
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ritualized, communal prayer.  That is, we need to consider what petition meant for the Anglo-
Saxons, and how these ideas work out in the Anglo-Saxon discourse of prayer.   
 
THE VOCABULARY OF PRAYER 
That modern studies of prayer largely dismiss its petitionary aspect (and what this might 
mean for the way the relationship with God is imagined and the way personhood is constructed) 
is rather odd insofar as the vocabulary of prayer is largely petitionary.  The broad ModE 
understanding of prayer as “talking with God” does not work within the Old English vocabulary 
for prayer.  But ModE “pray” (from Latin precari via Old French) means at heart petition, as the 
OED entry shows.43  Every definition for “pray, verb” refers to petition, although all definitions 
except the archaic are in a religious context or become generalized from the religious meaning.  
Strangely, the OED overlooks the way that the word is commonly used in devotional, hence 
scholarly literature.  One example of the limitation of the OED entry is that the Creed – which 
makes no petitions – is in common modern usage called a prayer.44  In scholarly usage, then, 
prayer can refer to petition or it can refer to a devotional prayer aligned with contemplation, as 
the kind of prayer Stewart defines in Cassian’s work (quoted above); however, the roots of 
prayer are in petition. 
In Latin the vocabulary for prayer is much more narrowly related to petition.  The most 
common words (out of a rather large vocabulary) are oro, rogo, precor, obsecro, supplico, and 
deprecor.  All of these represent various shades of petitioning.  Oro is in some ways the most 
interesting, in that its semantic range includes both religious petition and legal/political 
arguments.45  What it emphasizes is the formal, public nature of the speech.  Thus oratio, the 
noun, has a more general meaning before ecclesiastical Latin picks it up as the common word for 
                                                 
43
 "pray, v.," OED Online, November 2010, Oxford University Press, 
http://www.oed.com.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/view/Entry/149429?rskey=3GTRnZ&result=3&isAdvanced=false. 
44
 The Creed is not called a prayer in Anglo-Saxon texts.  Ælfric makes a clear distinction between them in CHI.20, 
ll. 1-3: “Ælc christen man sceal æfter rihte cunnan ægþer ge his pater noster ge his credan; Mid þam pater nostre he 
sceal hine gebiddan. mid þam credan he sceal his geleafan getrymman.” [Every Christian person should rightly 
know both his Pater Noster and his Creed.  With the Pater Noster he should pray; with the Creed he should confirm 
his faith]. 
45
 Q.v. Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1879), oro, sense 
II.A: “to argue, to treat, to plead.”  A. Walde and J.B. Hofmann in Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch 
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1982) give the earliest written use of oro in the Duodecim Tabulae. 
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prayer: speech, language, utterance,46 and from there to “formal language, artificial discourse, set 
speech.”47  The emphasis here is on the formality of the language and the speaking situation. 
The most common OE verb for prayer is biddan, a word used in both secular and 
religious contexts, the basic meaning of which (in either case) is petition.  That is, the semantic 
field of biddan is not the same as ModE “prayer,” being both narrower in that it means petition 
alone (rather than catching any wider idea of discourse with God), and broader in that it covers 
both secular and religious petitions.  Biddan also picks up an interesting ambiguity, partly 
because some of its forms are indistinguishable from beodan (to command), so that biddan 
sometimes means “command,” and it can call on sometimes subtle contextual cues to clarify 
which sense is meant.48  For the purposes of this study, it is enough to note that Ælfric 
consistently uses biddan to mean petition, and hatan for commands.  Furthermore, halsian, 
which is sometimes used for prayer (in collocation with biddan), is never used by Ælfric for 
speech directed toward God.  Halsian has a stronger binding force (e.g., “Ic halsige ðe þurh ðone 
lifiendan God” [I adjure you through the living God] 49), associated with exorcism and 
conjuration.  OE has further verbs used for address to God; clipian (to cry out) is the most 
common of these, but since people cry out to God for help or for favor, it still operates within the 
petitionary context. 
The most common nouns for prayer are gebed and ben (also both defined as “prayer” in 
the Dictionary of Old English50).  While the two words are broadly interchangeable and often 
used in collocation, within Ælfric’s corpus they have subtly different semantic ranges.  The 
central meaning of both is “request, petition,” but gebed (which is far more common) is almost 
always used when the rhetorical form of prayer is meant (thus a church is a gebedhus, the place 
where regular prayers are offered, never benhus), and ben51 usually means more specifically the 
content of a petition, used when someone is making a particular request, whether to God or men.  
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 Lewis and Short, sense I. 
47
 As opposed to sermo, which is ordinary speech.  See sense II. 
48
 Q.v. DOE biddan, sense 5. 
49
 An example BT gives of the way it is used in conjuring/exorcism situations (trans. of Mt. 26.63).  That is, halsian 
appeals to some power outside of the speaker for its binding force. 
50
 Dictionary of Old English: A to G online, ed. Angus Cameron, Ashley Crandell Amos, Antonette diPaolo 
Healey, et al. (Toronto: Dictionary of Old English Project 2007). 
51
 Ben corresponds to ON bón, not Latin ben- (as in benedictus), according to the OED. 
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A very clear example of this differentiation is found in CHI.25, on the nativity of John the 
Baptist: 
Hit gelamp æt sumum sæle þæt zacharias eode into godes temple: þa mid þam ðe he on 
his gebedum stod him æteowde godes heahengel gabrihel. 7 him to cwæð; Ne beo þu 
afyrht zacharia: se ælmihtiga wealdend þe hæt cyþan þæt he gehyrde þine bene. 7 þin wif 
sceal acennan sunu.52 
[It befell at a particular time that Zacharias went into God’s temple.  Then when he stood 
in his prayers God’s archangel Gabriel appeared to him and said to him: “Do not be 
afraid, Zacharias: the Almighty Ruler commanded that it be made known to you that he 
has heard your request, and your wife will bring forth a son.”] 
Zacharias stands in the temple praying gebed.  This is not his own, particular request (which is 
about to be heard), but rather the formal prayers appropriate to the particular season.  Gabriel 
reveals to him, however, that God has heard his particular request, his ben, for a son.  The way 
the content of this request is specified makes this a very clear example; gebed is almost never 
used when a specific request is given.  An apparent exception to this is in CHI.19, where the 
various petitions of the prayer are referred to as gebed;53 however, in this case gebed refers to the 
set petitions of a formal prayer rather than specific petitions a person might ask and in this way 
comes closest to Latin oratio in that it encompasses the formal elements of prayer, its set form.54  
Likewise, ben sometimes refers to petitions that do not have specific content but do have a 
specific effect.  For instance, in CHI.24, in a catalogue of various Christian manifestations of 
virtue, Ælfric says: “Sind eac sume gecorene menn þe afligað þa awyriedan gastas fram ofsettum 
mannum þurh mihta heora bena.”55 (There are also certain of the elect who put to flight accursed 
spirits from afflicted people through the power of their prayers.)  Here, bena does not refer to 
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 CHI.25, ll. 8-12. 
53
 “Seofon gebedu sind on þam pater nostre. on þam twam formum wordum ne sind nane gebedu. ac sind herunga 
þæt is ure fæder þe eart on heofonum. þæt forme gebed is sanctificetur nomen tuum” (CHI.19, ll. 71-3) [There are 
seven petitions in the Paternoster.  No petitions are in the first two phrases but praises, that is, ‘our Father who art in 
heaven.’  The first petition is ‘sanctificetur nomen tuum’]. 
54
 As when, for instance, Stephen asks for Saul’s salvation: “Stephanus soðlice gebigedum cneowum drihten bæd. 
þæt he Saulum alysde; Wearð þa stephanes ben fram gode gehyred: 7 saulus wearð alysed” (CHI.3, ll. 109-111) 
[Stephen truly prayed the Lord with bended knees that he might redeem Saul.  Stephen’s request was heard by God 
and Saul became redeemed]. 
55
 CHI.24, 117-19. 
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specific requests; rather, the emphasis is on the power of the people praying (and so, presumably, 
the power of their language).  While this seems to shade very close to the rhetorical meaning of 
gebed, apart from specifying a particular request, Ælfric uses ben in this sort of situation only 
when the efficacy of powerful prayers is being emphasized. 
 There are, of course, many ambiguous examples of usage of the two words.  The 
following two make an interesting comparison because of the similarity of the ideas.  In CHI.10, 
concerning the blind man on the road to Jerusalem, Ælfric says: “Gif we þonne þurhwuniað on 
urum gebedum. þonne mage we gedon mid urum hreame þæt se hælend stent. se ðe ær eode 7 
wyle gehyran ure clypunge 7 ure heortan onlihtan. mid godum 7 mid clænum geþohtum.”56 (If 
we then persevere in our prayers then can we bring about with our cry that the Savior stands, he 
who previously went by, and will hear our crying and enlighten our hearts with good and pure 
thoughts.)  There seems to be no essential difference between gebed and ben here; ben would 
even seem to follow the semantic range I have just mapped out a little better, since the cries of 
the one praying cause Jesus to stop – a specific petition.  However, in the larger context of the 
homily, which will be examined in more detail in Chapter 3, Ælfric is apparently concerned with 
the reiterated discipline of prayer and its subjectively efficacious power – that is, with gebed, 
rather than specific requests.57  In CHI.18, which began this introduction and is also discussed 
further in Chapter 3, Ælfric makes a similar statement: “Ælc þæra þe geornlice bitt. 7 þære bene 
ne geswicð. þam getiðað god þæs ecan lifes.”58  (To everyone who diligently prays, and does not 
cease from prayer, to them God will grant everlasting life.)  Unlike CHI.10, in this case the 
content of the request is emphasized, not just in the eternal life that God will grant in response to 
zealous prayer, but in the “three loaves” of faith, hope, and charity that the petitioner requests in 
the contextualizing passage.  Keeping the distinction between ben and gebed in mind helps 
explain how petition – prayer – could be conceptualized as a gift, insofar as it is a formal speech-
act designed to praise or express dependence on God.  And, in fact, we find that gebed is the 
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 CHI.10, ll. 80-3. 
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 Although, as will be seen in Chapter 3, the idea of subjective efficacy in this homily is not quite as straightforward 
as I have worded it here. 
58
 CHI.18, ll. 94-6. 
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word preferred when Ælfric refers to prayer as lac, or as something offered.59  There are also 
many OE words for praise (aræran, arwurþian, began [a word with a much broader range of 
meanings], bletsian, and blissian, to list some of the most common), although, as subsequent 
chapters will make clear, this concept is subsumed into the petitioning relationship as a response 
to God’s gifts, a return gift. 
The OE vocabulary for prayer places it squarely within practices and expectations of 
petition, and, as both Bede and Ælfric’s work shows, the prayer-relationship between humans 
and God is within a discourse and practice of reciprocal gift-giving.  For Bede, the relationship 
with God is couched in terms of God’s gifts, which humans use and thereby return in humility.  
For Ælfric, obedience to God is a key concept, but he most emphasizes God’s protection of those 
who pray to him.  For Bede, this gift-giving relationship is transformative and is almost 
subjectively efficacious,60 as the discipline of prayer remakes the one praying and causes Christ 
to intervene in the lives of those prayed for.  For Ælfric, prayer is situated much more within the 
cosmic battle between God and the devil and serves as a marker of whose side the petitioner 
aligns himself with.  The practices of prayer serve to shape a community and as an expression of 
allegiance to the one to whom a person prays.  For Ælfric, prayer is therefore more objective: 
God responds to it with direct intervention in the world. 
Beyond gifts, the discourse of early Christian prayer is often conceptually connected to 
sacrifice, almsgiving, and more general good works, all of which are related through and 
illuminated by theories of gift-giving.  It is therefore helpful to consider ways that modern gift-
theory can contribute to an understanding of Anglo-Saxon practice while at the same time 
reflecting on its limitations.  Modern gift-theory (and some of the challenges it presents) helps to 
rethink presentist assumptions about selfhood and economic structures that influence the way we 
conceptualize prayer.  It also helps to set a useful frame through which to consider Anglo-Saxon 
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 For instance, “Mid store bið geswutelod halig gebed. be þam sang se sealmscop: drihten sy min gebed asend swa 
swa byrnende stor on þinre gesihðe” (CHI.7, l. 230-1) [With frankincense holy prayer is revealed, concerning which 
sang the Psalmist: “Lord, may my prayer ascend as burning frankincense in your sight”]. 
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 Because it matters whom the Christian prays to, true Christian prayer can never be fully subjectively efficacious  – 
that is, working to change a person through the mere discipline of praying, regardless of God’s power or help.  
Subjective efficacy is a modern idea akin to meditational practices.  However, if we think about prayer on a 
spectrum from subjectively to objectively efficacious, the type of prayer Bede presents effects changes upon the one 
praying through the discipline of prayer (Cassian is the most extreme early example of subjective efficacy), while 
objectively efficacious prayer brings changes in the world through the direct intervention of God. 
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theories of prayer, insofar as it emphasizes the basic structure of the gift-giving relationship 
within societies where gift-giving was much more of a “total system” – that is, a practice 
drawing together economy, religion, and morality to produce a cohesive society.61 
 
PRAYER AND GIFT-THEORY 
Modern gift-theory essentially begins with Marcel Mauss’s 1924 essay, The Gift.62  
Mauss’s work focuses on agonistic giving between human beings in “archaic” societies.  
Mauss’s fundamental insight was that all gifts, while seemingly “free,” are actually both 
“interested” and “constrained.”63  Gifts create obligation on the part of the recipient both to 
receive gifts and to reciprocate.  Often, gifts create obligation on the part of the giver as well 
(although this idea is not fully developed in Mauss64).  They create obligations – and this is often 
missed when people focus on the economic function of gift-exchange – not through the 
mechanism of a mean accountant’s heart, self-interestedly keeping careful calculations of debits 
and credits,65 but through creating personal ties of gratitude, recognition, and mutual loyalty.  
The basic question Mauss sought to answer was what was it about these sorts of gifts that 
obligated a return-gift.66  To answer this question, he posited a “total system” in which the 
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 Mauss most explicitly describes a total system at the end of The Gift, 78-9.  For a concise explanation of “total 
system,” see Mary Douglas, “Foreward: No Free Gifts,” in Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in 
Archaic Societies, trans. W.D. Halls (London: Routledge, 1990), viii-ix.  Orig. publ. Essai sur le don, forme 
archaïque de l’échange, (France: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950). 
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 Mauss, The Gift.  This was not the very first modern study in gift-giving (Bronisław Malinowski, Argonauts of the 
Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea 
[London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922]; and Vilhelm Grønbech, The Culture of the Teutons, 3 vols., trans. W. 
Worster [London: Oxford University Press, 1932] were earlier), but it is the most formative within the field. 
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 “[W]e seek here to study only one characteristic [of gift exchange] … the so to speak voluntary character of these 
total services, apparently free and disinterested but nevertheless constrained and self-interested.”  Mauss, The Gift, 
3. 
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 The idea is not developed, but it is implied in his account of the potlatch, since what the tribal leaders are 
competing for is the rulership of the community.  As its leaders, they have some obligation toward the people 
involved.  See further n. 110.  
65
  This perspective reduces gift-exchange to a kind of commodity exchange (a point sometimes missed in the 
literature on gift-giving).  To the extent it is present in a gift-giving system it reveals a failure to meet the ideals of 
gift-giving and a breakdown of social relations. 
66
 “What rule of legality and self-interest, in societies of a backward or archaic type, compels the gift that has been 
received to be obligatorily reciprocated?  What power resides in the object given that causes its recipient to pay it 
back?  This is the problem on which we shall fasten more particularly.”  Mauss, The Gift, 3. 
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obligation to give, to receive, and to reciprocate was supported by moral duties, religious 
practice,67 and economic structures. 
 The scope and reception of Mauss’s essay are slightly complicated by the fact that part of 
his interest was in the way gift-giving was a means of exchange in pre-market economies and an 
early form of contract.68  This interest introduces a teleology to gift-giving in which it is always 
already defined by and against the later development of the market economy and especially 
market capitalism.  As a result, his argument is left open to certain sorts of misunderstandings, 
namely, that the logic of the gift-economy mirrors the logic of a market economy in certain basic 
ways: that individuals act fundamentally in their own interests in gift-giving just as in a market-
economy,69 and that accumulation of things and getting a fair economic exchange is a major 
focus of the gift-giving.  Mauss’s desire to find a different economic model also limits the types 
of gift-giving he focuses on; notably, he focuses on agonistic gift-giving, even though, as 
Maurice Godelier points out, non-agonistic gift-giving is really more common.70  Thus, although 
                                                 
67
 Some scholars, such as Lévi-Strauss, have faulted Mauss for allowing the “mystical” notion of the hau (the 
“spirit” or mana of a gift obliging its circulation) explanatory power, correcting him by secularizing his explanation.  
But it is, in fact, a Western imposition to refuse religious explanations in a society that has them.  Jos Bazelmans, 
among others, notes that this focus on the merely human overlooks a key element of the construction of personhood 
and the motivation of the exchange cycle in gift economies: “In most societies it is not only relationships between 
humans that are relevant but also those between these persons and other supernatural entities.  The person takes 
shape in this culture-specific totality of relationships.  … [T]hese constituents … in the end do not have  social but a 
supernatural origin.” “Beyond Power.  Ceremonial Exchanges in Beowulf,” in Rituals of Power: From Late 
Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, ed. Frans Theuws and Janet L. Nelson (Leiden: Brill, 2000): 311-375, 319. 
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devoid of economic markets …. In these societies we shall see the market as it existed before the institution of 
traders ….  We shall see how it functioned … before the discovered of forms of contract and sale.”  Mauss, The Gift, 
4. 
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 Jonathan Parry corrects the common misperception that Mauss’s essay has much to say about individual behavior: 
“It is not individuals but groups or moral persons who carry on exchanges.  The individuals of modern society are 
endowed with interests as against the world.  The persons who enter into exchanges which centrally concern Mauss 
do so as incumbents of status positions and do not act on their own behalf.”  “The Gift, the Indian Gift, and the 
‘Indian Gift,’” Man n.s. 21.3 (1986): 453-73, 456 (ital. orig.). 
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 Godelier points out that Mauss uses “non-agonistic gift-giving as the starting point for understanding” forms of 
agonistic gift-giving.  One of the key markers of non-agonistic gift-giving is, according to Godelier, “The giving of 
gifts and counter-gifts creates a state of mutual indebtedness and dependence which presents advantages for all 
parties.”  The Enigma of the Gift (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 48.  Orig. publ. L’Énigme du don 
(Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1996).  One example he gives of this type of exchange is of women as wives.  As 
Godelier explains elsewhere, these types of gift-exchanges never create balance in which the debt between the two 
parties is cancelled.  Rather, “They create new debts that counterbalance the earlier ones.  According to this logic, 
the gifts constantly feed obligations.”  “Some Things You Give, Some Things You Sell, but Some Things You Must 
Keep for Yourselves: What Mauss Did Not Say about Sacred Objects,” in The Enigma of Gift and Sacrifice, ed. 
Edith Wyschogrod, Jean-Joseph Goux, and Eric Boynton (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 26). 
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Mauss’s central interest is gift-giving between humans, when he briefly discusses gifts to the 
gods (which he calls sacrifice), he considers them a type of contract or exchange between 
humans and gods referred to as do ut des (“I give so that you might give”), not really different in 
kind from exchanges between humans.71  In fact, in some ways, these exchanges are the original 
of exchanges between humans: humans give to the gods so that the gods might, in return, give to 
humans, who replicate this pattern among themselves. 
 The way Mauss makes gift and sacrifice into similar economic transactions 
oversimplifies the theoretical problem the two concepts represent insofar as it focuses only on 
the contract aspect of sacrifice without considering further expiatory, purificatory, and atoning 
functions of sacrifice.  While Mauss’s treatment of sacrifice is necessarily brief in The Gift, his 
earlier essay on sacrifice accounts for the purificatory nature of sacrifice by subsuming the idea 
of purity into the essentially exchange nature of sacrifice; the rituals surrounding sacrifice create 
a sacred space free of defilement in which to ask for divine favor.72  Most gift theorists follow 
more or less in Mauss’s footsteps.  Like Hubert and Mauss, Aafke E. Komter points to the 
destruction of the sacrifice as the main difference between sacrifice and gift; its destruction 
transfers the sacrifice to the divine realm, making it accessible to the gods and activating its 
potential for mediation between humans and gods.73  Dennis King Keenan attempts to capture the 
paradoxical nature of sacrifice, in that sacrifice is at once economic – “sacrifice pays.  One gets a 
return on one’s investment” – while at the same time “sacrifice must necessarily be a sacrifice 
for nothing, a sacrifice for no reason, no goal.  It must necessarily be a nonsensical aneconomical 
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 Mauss, The Gift, 16. 
72
 The person or group of people on whose behalf the sacrifice is being offered up, as distinguished from the 
sacrificer, the priest whose job is to do the actual killing (Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, Sacrifice: Its Nature and 
Function, trans. W.D. Halls [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964], 10, 22.  Orig. publ. as Essai sur la 
Nature et la Fonction du Sacrifice, in L’Année sociologique, 1898). 
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  Hubert and Mauss: “[T]he thing consecrated serves as an intermediary between the sacrifier, or the object which 
is to receive the practical benefits of the sacrifice, and the divinity to whom the sacrifice is usually addressed.” 
Sacrifice, 11.  Komter: “In anthropological theories gift and sacrifice are conceived as two manifestations of one 
underlying dimension.  In the first case what is given is kept intact; in the second it is “sacrificed” (destroyed, 
burned, slaughtered, killed, and the like).  In the theoretical model that is presented, the gift manifestation of the 
supposed solidarity dimension relies on mutual recognition, dependency, and reciprocity, whereas the sacrifice 
manifestation more often involves denial of personal autonomy and ‘otherness.’”  Social Solidarity and the Gift 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 11.  In a way, what he is doing is assigning characteristics of the 
“free” gift to sacrifice, preserving reciprocal gifts from being implicated in the loss of autonomy that many find such 
a problematic aspect of the gift.  This issue is picked up in the discussion of the free gift below. 
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sacrifice. … The sacrifice must be performed without calculation.”74  But, for Keenan, the 
aneconomic nature of the sacrifice is what allows it to become “sublated by a transcendent 
economy” in which sacrifice is rewarded.75  Others, such as Maurice Godelier, argue that in a 
gift-system, the first gift (life and sustenance) comes from the gods; hence human/human gift-
giving is a re-enactment of that first gift, while sacrifice recognizes human dependence on the 
gods for continued divine gifts.76  Thus, all of these variations on a theme of sacrifice still place 
sacrifice within what we might call a gratia economy: in which grace (gratia) is received with 
gratitude (gratia), which then brings further favor (gratia).  Sacrifice and gift operate according 
to much the same logic; no clear distinction need be made between gifts and sacrifices made in 
the divine realm. 
 The complex relationship between gift and sacrifice, then, is not so much within gift-
theory but rather at the nexus of sacrifice and ritual purity.  The more serious challenge to a 
cohesively economic idea of sacrifice comes from work on Levitical law, such as that of Mary 
Douglas, who explores the way that sacrifice is situated within “rituals of purity and impurity 
[that] create unity in experience.”77  Within this context, sacrifice is a way of dealing with 
disruption, defilement, sin, guilt – things that affect the human realm and the (divine-mandated) 
human order.78  That is, for Douglas, Levitical law and ritual is a way of ordering the world 
intended to draw sharp distinctions between kinds: human/divine, human/animal, male/female, 
etc.  In this case, sacrifice, in some sense, mends violations of this order and analogically 
constructs “a pattern of the cosmos under cover of God’s protection.”79 
The potential distinctions between gift and sacrifice are a thorny conceptual problem 
within the scholarly literature.  In a project like this, it is important to be aware of a potentially 
different logic behind sacrifice (petitionary prayer-as-sacrifice) than gift (petitionary prayer-as-
gift) since both terms are used to refer to prayer.  It does potentially matter on some level 
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 Keenan, “The Sacrifice of Sacrifice: Waiting without Hope,” in The Question of Sacrifice (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2005), 1. 
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 Keenan, “Sacrifice of Sacrifice,” 2. 
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 Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift. 
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 Douglas, Purity and Danger, 2. 
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 Purity and Danger focuses more on ritual order and ideas of purity than on sacrifice.  In Leviticus as Literature 
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whether prayer is conceptualized as gift or economic sacrifice, or whether it is conceptualized as 
the type of sacrifice embedded in an ordering sort of purity system.  The works of both Bede and 
Ælfric raise this problem in places where prayer and sacrifice seem to be conflated.  For Bede, 
this happens in a complicated exegetical moment when the spices the women bear to Jesus’ tomb 
become prayer-as-incense (a reference to Revelation 8:4, which refers back to the Old Testament 
altar of incense burning before the Holy of Holies in the Tabernacle).  This will be examined in 
more detail in Chapter 2.  For Ælfric prayer and sacrifice are treated as much the same thing in 
CHI.31, the passio of St. Bartholomew, when the pagan Indians offer lac (most safely translated 
as “offering”) to idols as part of (and indistinguishable from) a process of petition.  But, as we 
will see in more detail in the coming chapters, neither Bede nor Ælfric seems to draw a sharp 
distinction between gift or sacrifice, treating these offerings as gifts (i.e., relational) rather than 
as a means of purification through restoring ritual systems of order.80  
 Mauss’s gift-theory has further complications as it is developed by subsequent theorists.  
Mauss’s focus on the necessary reciprocity in agonistic gift-giving has caused scholars who work 
on reciprocal gift-giving to notice the way that all gifts, agonistic or not, even the most 
ostensibly “free” are, in fact, interested and constrained.81  In fact, the discourse of gift-giving, 
which uses the language of generosity and the expectation of no return, cuts against the practice 
of gift-giving, in which gifts actually create obligation and indebtedness.82  What this means is 
that gifts are symbolic (of relationships, of feelings, of desired relationships).  Put positively, 
then, reciprocal gift-giving creates social bonds of allegiance and commonality.83  Negatively, 
gifts threaten autonomy.  Furthermore, like all symbols, gifts can be manipulated, all the more 
seeming-sinisterly so because of the way that the discourse is at odds with practice in even the 
friendliest gift-exchange: ostensibly friendly, gifts can mask a manipulative, coercive, or hostile 
edge, and (because of this potential) gifts can be unwelcome, even while they are presented as 
                                                 
80
 In a sense offerings to God do restore order, but only insofar as people pray to the right power, the true creator 
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 See Godelier in n. 70, above, for positive ways this can be construed. 
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 That is, the Maussian gift violates modern notions of sincerity. 
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 “A gift that does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction.”  Douglas, “Foreward,” in The Gift, vii. 
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generously given.  This fact forms a strong thread of interest within scholarship on gift-giving 
that focuses on the relationship between gift-giving and struggles for power and autonomy.84 
 For people whose ideal is the modern, Western independent individual, the idea that gifts 
create obligations – create debts, as the terminology usually is – is profoundly challenging to 
ideals of personal autonomy.  Thus, another path gift-theory has taken is to point out that the 
Maussian gift is set in implicit opposition to the “free” or “pure” gift – the gift without strings, 
disinterested, unconstraining85 – which is often implicitly preferred.  This scholarship also 
questions whether the “free” gift can actually exist at all, and, if so, under what sorts of 
conditions it can exist, and what sorts of functions it might serve.86  A most idiosyncratic (and 
influential) example of this is Jacques Derrida’s meditation on the gift, in which he concludes 
that the gift (by which he means the free gift) is impossible (is the impossible87), that its 
existence is negated in the very language used to describe it, because, most essentially, a true gift 
must be outside cycles of reciprocity and exchange: 
For there to be gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, countergift, or debt.  If 
the other gives me back or owes me or has to give me back what I give him or her, there 
will not have been a gift, whether this restitution is immediate or whether it is 
programmed by a complex calculation of a long-term deferral or differance.88 
For Derrida, even the recognition of a gift, with the possible satisfaction it brings the donor in 
giving, and the possible feelings of gratitude it inspires in the recipient, creates a circle, binding 
donor to recipient and reducing the gift to calculation and economic interest.  Derrida’s interest 
in the gift is fairly obviously not in actual gift-giving practice, but rather in the way the 
discordance between the “gift and economy” open up a “gap between, on the one hand, thought, 
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language, and desire, and, on the other hand, knowledge, philosophy, science, and the order of 
presence.”89  But in its substructure, Derrida’s argument manifests a profound discomfort with 
the bond and obligation that the gift places upon people.90  Alain Caillé points out the limitations 
of this discomfort: Derrida’s argument, he says, 
fails because it does not take into consideration the idea that the gift must be constituted 
by something – that it cannot simply be an auto-referential affirmation of the self – so 
that the question whether it comes from interest, pleasure, or spontaneity is not at all 
indifferent to it, but, on the contrary, co-substantial.  But it also fails for another subtler 
and stronger reason.  In the end, is it so certain that those who receive must be profoundly 
humiliated by accepting the gift, and are indebted to the point of being incapable of 
enjoying the gift, unless they do not perceive it as such?  Similarly, is it so certain that 
those who give, ought, for the sake of symmetry, to feel guilty until the end of time for 
having committed the aberration of allowing themselves a moment of human, all too 
human, generosity?  In the final analysis, I am tempted to say, it behoves [sic] the donors 
and the recipients to resolve their problems with gratitude.91 
Caillé’s criticism points out the extent to which the “self” (and a modern, individualistic self, at 
that) is at the center of Derrida’s argument, but also the extent to which Derrida overlooks or 
devalues the actual details of gift-giving as it occurs within real relationships, the very facets of 
gratitude and generosity that give gift-exchange its power to bind people together. 
Lurking behind Caillé’s question about whether it is “so certain that those who receive 
must be profoundly humiliated by accepting the gift” is the fact that almost all instances of “free” 
gifts within the scholarship on gift-giving are charity and almsgiving, in which the inequality of 
the donor and recipient is, in fact, a given: the donor gives because the recipient needs; the 
recipient cannot repay the donor, nor is he expected to.92  Furthermore, these types of free gifts 
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are almost always conceptualized as between strangers, and are not necessarily expected to 
create a social bond between the two parties.93  To the extent a “free” gift is possible between 
relatives or perhaps good friends, it is insulting because it insists on treating family like 
strangers.  Rather, a gift given in response to need (say, clothes and furniture given when a 
family member’s house burns down) is almost always understood within the context of that 
relationship, as an expression of the relationship (“families look out for each other”; “blood is 
thicker than water”), with the implied acknowledgement that the one receiving the gift would do 
the same for the giver had the situation been reversed (and might do so in the future).  That is, it 
is seen as an obligation attendant on that kind of relationship.  But, a gift in response to need 
presented as truly free (that is, charity) between friends or family is, in fact, insulting insofar as it 
implies the recipient has and will have nothing to offer himself, and as it represents a refusal on 
the part of the donor to acknowledge that the recipient in fact has some claim on her attentions 
and to her goods by virtue of the prior relationship.  Charity reduces family or friends to 
strangers, just as loans between family members reduce the relationship to a business transaction, 
highly fraught because of the tensions between performing under the constraints of family (in 
which generosity is presumed) and performing under the constraints of contract (where the giver 
expects her money to be returned).94  Caillé’s non-humiliating gifts, then, are presumably not 
charity, even as Derrida seeks to imagine a gift that is as much like charity as possible but 
without the implied hierarchy or pre-existing relationship that makes charity potentially 
offensive.  Derrida’s gift is an inhuman gift, in the end, one that denies human connection in the 
name of freedom, that pries open the circularity of gift exchange but leaves nothing but the 
emptiness of the atomized individual behind it.   
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 And yet, is this inhuman gift inhuman because it is actually divine?  Within early 
Christian discourse, it is the act of charity that comes closest to representing the gifts God gives 
humans, since God’s gifts are given within an absolute hierarchy to those who can never hope to 
repay him.  Does Derrida’s argument point toward a radical difference between human/human 
interactions and human/divine interactions (a difference that goes against much of the 
anthropological work on the subject)?  Unlike the limited nature of human charity, the 
overwhelmingly fundamental nature of God’s gifts then creates a relationship in which humans 
are utterly and inescapably dependent upon him, God’s beggars (þearfan in Ælfric).95  At the 
same time, God’s fundamental gifts are given to all indiscriminately, regardless of whether they 
ask for or acknowledge the source of these gifts.  It is those who do not recognize their 
dependence on God who come closest to the Derridean ideal.96  Those who recognize their 
dependence on God beg for God’s favor out of the depths of their need, recognizing that God 
gives without being in any way constrained to give, not because he must give, but simply out of 
his gratia.  But in this case, far from the Derridean gift, God’s gratia may be unconstrained, but 
those who accept it realize that God’s gifts constrain a response in which humans owe God 
everything.  Stated this way, gratia emphasizes human constraint and obligation.  Humans are 
enmeshed in a relationship predicated upon gifts they did not ask for (such as life), constrained 
within unending debt to a being who, in the end, because humans have nothing they can give, 
owes them nothing and can cut them loose without warning.  As we will see, this is essentially 
how Lucifer conceptualizes his relationship with God in Ælfric’s CHI.1.   
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But this discourse, with its cold, distant God scattering rain on just and unjust alike, and 
its abjectly dependent humans, is not the discourse used, for the most part, in Bede or Ælfric.  
The distance implied in the relationship between almsgiver and beggar is rejected for a closer 
model of reciprocity.  That is, while the almsgiving model most closely fits the nature of God’s 
gift to humans, in fact, as we will see, this model is one that Anglo-Saxon teaching 
acknowledges but resists at almost every turn in favor of the mutual model of reciprocal gift-
giving in which Christians have a closer relationship to God than those who merely receive his 
charity.  As Caillé recommends, Bede and Ælfric’s solution to God’s astounding generosity is 
gratitude and joy resulting from the gift unlooked-for and unearned, and God’s response to that 
gratitude is a self-constraining promise of future gifts. 
The attitude toward power and constraint inherent in the gift is another way that modern 
gift-theory tends to diverge from the model found within the Anglo-Saxon discourse on prayer.  
Within a gift economy the power and constraint in gift-giving are inextricably linked with 
generosity, gratitude, and joy.  That is, gratitude and joy are seen to be the appropriate responses 
to gifts, which are experienced as unconstrained and unconstraining, even though, in practice, 
gifts place a person in a position of having to return the gift, and thus in a position of dependence 
and debt.  Ever sensitive to power relationships, modern sociological theory has called attention 
to these entwined discourses of power and gratitude, tending to see the free and unconstrained 
nature of the gift relationship as a disguise for the “true” nature of gifts: interest and constraint.  
That is, the discourse of the gift (free, unconstraining) and the praxis of the gift (interested, 
constraining) cannot, it seems, both be true.   
Rather than leaving this perceived knot hopelessly snarled, the modern theoretical gaze 
teases the two strands apart.  The difference between the subjective and objective natures of the 
gift (what I have been calling discourse and praxis, respectively) is the problem Pierre Bourdieu 
addresses by positing “individual and collective misrecognition of the social rules that govern the 
act of reciprocation.”97  That is, in the end, the subjective experience of the gift is a 
“misrecognition” of the objective way that the gift works to weave webs of power relations and 
cement hierarchy.  While Bourdieu himself seems to have felt that this solution gives equal 
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weight to the subjective experience and the objective view, or at least leaves room for the 
subjective,98 the language in which he states his argument consistently gives primacy to the 
objective experience as the true one.  The subjective view “misrecognizes” the “truth of the 
objective ‘mechanism’ of the exchange.”99  This misrecognition is a “collectively maintained and 
approved self-deception.”100  That is, clear-eyed, undeceived recognition of the truth of exchange 
mechanisms lies with the objective perspective because that is the one that reveals the way that 
power works.  Power is truth, truth power.  Or rather, truth is power misrecognized as a gift that 
obligates hapless recipients to respond in gratitude to what, in fact, enslaves them. 
 In some respects, there is no arguing with this model from within its own structures.  
Mark Osteen makes the same observation regarding market rhetoric: “‘market rhetoric’ renders 
invisible anything outside of the market.”101  In the same way, a focus on power, like a focus on 
economy, reduces everything to its own terms.  While, for Bourdieu, the space between 
subjective experience and objective observation is productive, in the end, however much he 
might try to imagine a sociological theory that salvages both subjective experience and objective 
observation, he is caught up both in “market rhetoric”102 and in a focus on power that subtly 
privileges the ideal of the autonomous individual through its emphasis on and then suspicion of 
all power hierarchies, however capitally disguised they might be.  Thus, Bourdieu’s 
“misrecognition” of the gift has a curious blindness of its own.   
 To escape this blindness, we might take gratitude on its own terms.  Caillé posits 
gratitude as the solution to the “debt” of the gift, appealing to the common sense of experience – 
we are, in the normal course of things, often grateful for gifts, and we experience the obligation 
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to reciprocate the gift as a delight rather than a burden.  The problem is, in emphasizing the 
burden of reciprocity rather than the joy, theorists place an implicitly higher value on the 
autonomy that the “bond and bind” of the gift threatens.  But one person’s autonomy is another 
person’s alienation.  Who, after all, is more free than the Wanderer?  Yet the Wanderer 
experiences his wide freedom in the world as loneliness: that he 
sohte sele dreorig    sinces bryttan, 
hwær ic feor oþþe neah    findan meahte 
þone þe in meoduhealle    min mine wisse, 
oþþe mec freondleasne    frefran wolde, 
weman mid wynnum.103 
[sadly sought a hall of a giver of treasures, 
where, far or near, I might find 
one who would in the mead-hall acknowledge my affection, 
or comfort me in my friendless condition, 
persuade me with joys.] 
What the Wanderer values in the gift is exactly the social bonds it creates, a space where he is 
welcomed and loved, where he has particular rights within a particular group of people. 
Gifts create bonds between people and a space of belonging.  Because gift-bonds are a 
matter of social cohesion, gratitude is not merely an issue of politeness, of manners, but is a 
moral obligation.  As Georg Simmel put it, “Gratitude … is the moral memory of mankind”;104 it 
reminds people of their obligations to each other.  Because of the discomfort with the debt of 
gifts and the discrepancy between discourse and praxis in gift-giving,105 this moral element is too 
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commonly overlooked or dismissed as misrecognized power.  As Mauss saw, the moral element 
of gift-giving seeks to construct a society whose obligations to each other are based, not on 
utility or naked power, but on generosity, gratitude, reciprocity, and the joy of the gift.106  That 
gifts can be unwelcome insofar as bonds between people are unwelcome, is, of course, the flip 
side of this sort of system.  In response to this emphasis on power, I do not want to posit a 
romanticized early medieval past where everyone knew his place and was happy for whatever 
was given him within it.  Medieval people were as adept at recognizing the potential trap of the 
gift as anyone else might be.107  Furthermore, work like Bourdieu’s (and Mauss’s) ably counters 
more naïve views of the gift as always free, as essentially benignant.  But if one mistrusts the 
way gifts create bonds between people or cement a hierarchy, this has much to do with what one 
thinks of being bonded to others (and which others) or being cemented in hierarchy (and which 
hierarchy).  We might posit a world in which some people are happy to receive gifts from a lord 
they admire and are proud to serve him in return, and who, when they are wrenched out of this 
relationship, mourn its loss like we would mourn the loss of family.  Within the context of 
reciprocal gift exchange and the moral system it creates, it is not the reciprocal gift that threatens 
social order, it is the “free” gift, if any, in fact, exists; the gift that creates nor seeks to create 
bonds between people.  
But more essentially, we need to recognize, as Osteen, Caillé, and Komter urge us to, that 
the logic of the gift brings with it its own system of reciprocal morality, one in which gratitude is 
a moral virtue, and failures of gratitude (and the concomitant failure of return-gifts or service) 
are seen as moral failures that threaten to unravel the fabric of society.  As is so amply shown in 
the literature on early Germanic gift-giving,108 a society that organizes its relationships according 
to gifts is trying to reproduce the same bonds of familial affection and obligation, within the 
wider society.109  In this case, gifts are inescapably “about” power, but they are also inescapably 
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“about” affection.  To give power’s threat to autonomy primacy within this discourse is to 
reproduce our own anxieties within the early Middle Ages instead of listening to theirs. 
In addition, it is easy to overlook the fact that, in a gift-giving hierarchy, superiors have 
obligations to their inferiors as well as the other way around,110 and that, if a superior should fail 
to fulfill his obligations this threatens his position and loosens his inferiors’ obligations to him.  
Within Anglo-Saxon teaching, the idea that God could (or would) fail to fulfill his obligations is 
never entertained;111 the reciprocal relationship between God and humans is a fully functioning, 
idealized model of human reciprocity insofar as God is the perfect lord.  But Anglo-Saxon 
teaching presents a paradox: humans cannot initially constrain God to give them anything, yet 
they can oblige him to reward their good works; God has obligations, too.  It is these reciprocal 
obligations that move the relationship between God and humans beyond the abject distance 
implied in charity and enable humans to have a close relationship with God.  Thus within this 
gift-giving system both Bede and Ælfric repeatedly emphasize exactly what you would expect 
them to: that God’s gifts are great, and that he is a good lord, obliged to reward those who obey 
him. 
 
 
 
                                                 
110
 A fact Mauss’s system accommodates: “The obligation to give is no less important [than the obligation to 
receive]; … .  To refuse to give, to fail to invite, just as to refuse to accept, is tantamount to declaring war; it is to 
reject the bond of alliance and commonality.  Also, one gives because one is compelled to do so, because the 
recipient possesses some kind of right of property over anything that belongs to the donor.”  Mauss, The Gift, 13.  
This point has been easily overlooked because Mauss spends less time on the obligation to give.  His sense of the 
circularity of the gift-cycle that people are always already part of by virtue of being born de-emphasizes this point 
yet further, in spite of the fact that for gifts to be able to forge new ties with new communities, there must be a first 
gift, given before the web of reciprocity constrains every subsequent gift.  Theorists after Mauss muse on the 
superiority of the first gift as the best, most valuable gift, impossible to fully reciprocate because it is unconstrained, 
most fully given gratis (Simmel, “Faithfulness and Gratitude,” in The Gift, ed. Komter, 47), while others, following 
Godelier, point out that the only first gift is the hypothesized gift of the gods, and thus, they are the only ones truly 
outside of the gift-cycle (Enigma of the Gift, 30).  At the same time, typical exchange theories of sacrifice do not 
agree with this, since the gods are involved in reciprocal relationships with humans through sacrifice.  In contrast to 
Mauss, Bourdieu’s ideas of the gift show how complex the issue can be within particular cultural expressions.  In 
Bourdieu’s case, his observations on the gift are focused through the lens of personal honor because of the particular 
society he is studying, the Kabyle of North Africa.  Because of this, Bourdieu’s study does not address the 
obligations of superiors to inferiors. 
111
 It is, in some ways, carefully not entertained, as at the end of CHI.31 where Ælfric explains why God does not 
necessarily answer prayers for healing. 
  
33 
GIFT-GIVING IN ANGLO-SAXON STUDIES 
Scholars since Mauss have found gift-giving a fruitful field of inquiry because of the way 
it “can be located at the center of current discussions of deconstruction, gender, ethics, 
philosophy, anthropology, and economics.”112  Within Anglo-Saxon studies, gift-theory is most 
heavily represented in the scholarship on Beowulf.113  Much of this scholarship reflects the 
preoccupation with reconstructing a secular Germanic Anglo-Saxon culture that occupied a great 
deal of scholarly attention from the 19th-century on.114  Thus, the focus of gift-exchange within 
Anglo-Saxon studies tends to be on heroic literature and the kind of social performance usually 
limited to aristocratic men.115  A few studies bring gift-exchange into the religious context, but 
they also focus on the insight that Old English poetry often presents God along the model of the 
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Anglo-Saxon lord,116 and that this involves exchange of gifts and services.117  Both gift-theory 
and Anglo-Saxon literature have more to offer than this.  Anglo-Saxon teaching on prayer is 
aimed at a more “normal” (i.e., less heroic) cross-section of society which would include all 
levels of wealth and power, varying statuses of religious and lay, and both men and women.  It 
thus presents ways beyond the heroic in which the gift-giving relationship performed in prayer 
constructs community between humans and God and among humans. 
 
DOCTRINAL COMPLICATIONS 
Gift-theory developed in the field of anthropology, so it is not surprising that its primary 
focus is on human relationships rather than human/divine relationships, which it tends to 
conceptualize as mirroring human relationships.118  We have already run across some of the 
ways that this assumed parallel necessarily raises complications when one applies gift-theory to 
the imagined relationship between humans and God (or the gods) as a negotiated relationship, in 
which human and divine differ in rank rather than essentially in kind.  Since the Christian God is 
usually imagined as differing in kind (theologically speaking, his ineffability, omniscience, etc. 
are often emphasized, thus the necessity for Christ to take on flesh, to operate as a mediator 
between two very different kinds of beings), it seems obvious that the normal rules regarding 
reciprocal gift-giving would be heavily modified or suspended, but, as the discussion of 
almsgiving has shown, this is not necessarily the case.  In fact, in early Christianity, strains of 
Christianity most influenced by Neo-Platonism or Gnosticism tend to imagine God more 
abstractly, less humanly, and in these cases the exchange element of the relationship is indeed 
muted (the focus tends to be on purity instead).  At the same time, outside of the rarified circles 
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of high theology, God is more usually imagined as a person, as some sort of super-human at the 
very top of a hierarchy.  This conceptualization does tend to picture humans and God as locked 
in a reciprocal relationship.  But there are some theological complications to this. 
 There are, first of all, two differing soteriological models used to explain exactly how 
Christ’s sacrifice worked to save mankind.  The first, the ransom theory of salvation, pictures 
God and Satan as rival lords and thus fits very neatly into Anglo-Saxon cultural models of gift-
giving within a lordship relationship.119  This will be revisited in further detail in Chapter 3, 
where I show how Ælfric’s soteriology influences the way he conceptualizes prayer as a means 
of stating allegiance to one lord or the other.  While ransom theory fits almost seamlessly into 
gift-giving paradigms, both penance and the Eucharist add disruptive complications insofar as 
the Eucharistic sacrifice is imagined both as a gift from God to humans and from humans to God, 
and insofar as penance introduces legal theories of atonement and purity to an already existing 
vocabulary of atonement and purity within Judaism, and the further ideas of purity in Neo-
platonic philosophy that privilege the spiritual realm.  In either case, the vocabulary of penance, 
especially insofar as purity is concerned, overlaps with Neo-platonic vocabulary of purity.  
Because Neo-platonic-influenced Christian thought conceptualizes God more abstractly – we 
will see this most strongly in Augustine – gift-giving does not have much place within a 
discourse of purity.120  But purity can also be effected by prayer as a gift for God, and purity is 
also a goal of penance.  The main difference is that the penitential system does not conceptualize 
good works as a gift given by humans in gratitude for God’s gifts, but as a debt owed on account 
of sin.  Confusingly, this also is often called impurity and is also talked about in terms of healing.  
These issues are too complex to deal with in the abstract; I bring them up here because we will 
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be continually seeing the way that these different theoretical strands twine themselves through 
the discourse of gift-giving that surrounds prayer.  As Bede and Ælfric’s CHI.29 both make 
clear, although in different ways, prayer is seen as a total system, central to salvation, sine qua 
non, involving the individual’s gift (or giving up) of himself to God.  In Ælfric’s life of 
Laurence, this gift explicitly parallels Christ’s Eucharistic gift conceptualized as a gift from men 
to God, while Bede’s theories of prayer interact more with modified Neo-platonic ideas of purity.   
 To summarize: as subsequent chapters will show, prayer is petition and operates within a 
reciprocal system.  But prayer also catches up these other theological issues (and other exchange 
models).  The purity resulting from prayer and its associated good works can be thought of as a 
gift to God, or as the payment of a debt, or more abstractly, outside of the gift-system altogether.  
The Neo-platonist theologians recognize more openly that God is beyond human concretizations, 
that we can only speak of him in metaphor and symbol, and that these human symbols are 
inherently unstable when applied to the divine.   
 Finally, the last doctrinal complication is the doctrine of grace.  Augustine strove 
mightily to wrench the Latin gratia away from any sort of system in which God might have a 
reason to show favor on humans or in which God might be subsequently obliged to continue in 
gift-giving (that is, he continues in gift-giving out of the bounty of his nature rather than 
obligation).  Augustine argued for a system in which all gratia (“free” gift – although not fully 
free, since it obligates a response) was on God’s part, and all obligation on humans.  But for 
most early medieval Christians, Augustine’s formulation of gratia simply did not take.  As 
Aaron Kleist shows, while the medieval church thought of itself as Augustinian, in practice it 
made much more room for human cooperation with grace.121  Aside from the doctrinal struggle, 
room for human volition was reinforced by practices such as penance.  For instance, Tertullian, 
the earliest articulator of penitential doctrine, said that penance “Bonum factum deum habet 
debitorem” (A good deed has God as its debtor).122   And it was also reinforced by the cultural 
baggage of exchange terms such as the Greek charis, gratia, and gifu carried with them.  These 
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issues will become crucial to understanding Bede’s articulation of the gift-giving relationship 
between God and humans in Chapter 2. 
 
EARLY CHRISTIAN PRAXIS AND TEACHING ON PRAYER 
Early Christian praxis and teaching on prayer helps to contextualize the Anglo-Saxon 
teachings on prayer that adopt and adapt this same tradition.  However, these earlier works often 
assume a different praxis of prayer than that of Bede and Ælfric, and reflect, therefore, 
potentially different theories of prayer.  Thus, it is necessary to briefly situate the early Christian 
tradition of teaching within its social and institutional context; teaching on prayer differs 
according to whether private, communal, monastic, or whole-church prayer is assumed.  This 
inescapably brushes up against studies of the early liturgy, which was multi-faceted, complex, 
and poorly documented,123 as well as studies of “spirituality” more generally.  Since this project 
is not intended as a liturgical study, what follows is a necessarily brief summary, focusing only 
on those considerations that bear immediately on this study. 
The general trend through the late antique and early medieval period was that prayer at 
set hours became increasingly professionalized.  In the early church all Christians were expected 
to pray the Lord’s Prayer (LP) three to seven times a day (depending on time and place).124  
Tertullian, the earliest Latin writer on prayer, indicates all Christians were expected to pray six 
times daily.  By private prayer is meant prayer within the home, whether with the whole 
household or individually.125  This private prayer was apparently based fundamentally on the LP 
with potential room for additional personal intercessions.126  With the growth of cathedral and 
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monastic prayer in the 4th century, it becomes increasingly difficult to see what practice of prayer 
lay Christians were expected to keep, since the written record focuses more on clerical and 
monastic than lay prayer.  Thus, there are three basic contexts for the practice of prayer to be 
considered: private prayer in the home; monastic prayer sourced especially in the practice of the 
Egyptian ascetics, and later based on the Benedictine and other rules; and cathedral prayer 
performed by priests (at which lay people might be present).  As Bradshaw points out, “The 
differences between the [cathedral or monastic] types of worship, however, relate not merely to 
the people who participated in them but to their external forms and ultimately to their spirit and 
purpose.”127  These different contexts and expectations are reflected in the early teachings on 
prayer.  As Bradshaw puts it, the fundamentally different conceptions of the nature of prayer in 
both contexts are as follows: 
The cathedral office had a strong ecclesial dimension: here was the Church gathered for 
prayer, exercising its royal priesthood by offering a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving 
on behalf of all creation and interceding for the salvation of the world.  The monastic 
office, on the other hand, was centred around silent meditation on the word of God and 
supplication for spiritual growth and personal salvation.  Its ultimate aim was spiritual 
formation.128 
In the main, it is the cathedral type of prayer, oriented eventually around the Eucharist and its 
model of reciprocal gift-giving between humans and God,129 that is especially infused with the 
structure of gift-giving, whereas monastic prayer, reflecting a more abstract conception of God, 
emphasized knowledge, an idea of purity related to the Greek concept of apatheia, and 
contemplative practice.   But just as it becomes increasingly difficult to say much about lay 
private prayer, the cathedral and monastic offices begin to influence each other as monks begin 
to be ordained and become involved in administering the cathedral sacraments, especially the 
                                                                                                                                                             
is right to build upon it outside petitions, yet with mindfulness of the precepts, lest we be far from the ears of God as 
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mass.130  As a result, the two orientations of gift-giving and purity begin to influence each other.  
In addition, the development of penitential practices (and the complicated way that they become 
increasingly bound within a human/human discourse of gift-giving with the practice of 
commutation of penance) adds another way of thinking about and enacting the individual’s 
relationship with God and the spiritual community.  We will see some ways that Bede weaves 
together these two discourses of prayer, especially in Homily 1.22. 
Within the Western tradition, explicit teaching on prayer is rather limited.131  While 
prayers, exhortations to pray, and (especially) exhortations to pray within a penitential context 
are common and everywhere present, there are just four general patristic treatments of prayer: 
Tertullian’s tract on the Lord’s Prayer, at c. 200 the earliest Christian work on prayer, addressed 
to lay people and perhaps catechumens; Cyprian’s slightly later work on the same subject (c. 
250);132  Cassian’s Conlationes 9 and 10, addressed to monks and reflecting Egyptian practice 
(early 5th century);133 and Augustine’s Letter CXXX to questions asked by the laywoman Proba 
(5th century).134  At the center of all of these works is line-by-line explication of the LP.135  
Augustine, naturally, had much more to say about prayer than he said in this one letter, but it is 
scattered throughout his voluminous corpus.136  However, some of his most direct teaching is in 
the form of four catechetical sermons on the LP, plus his commentary on the LP (and the 
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surrounding passage) in his Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount.  Additional commentary 
on the LP is found in the works of Jerome137 and Bede;138 in sermons, usually, like Augustine’s, 
addressed to catechumens by Caesarius of Arles and Rabanus Maurus;139 and in a commentary 
on the sacraments by Ambrose.  In addition, one can find (usually brief) comments on key New 
Testament passages on prayer in commentaries or sermons.140  The biblical passages lead to 
certain theoretical issues regarding prayer that many of the early teachers comment on at one 
point or another.  These are: 
1.  What are Christians to pray for?  While all teaching on prayer prefers asking for 
spiritual above material benefits, they differ in the relative asceticism of their answer.  Cassian, 
for instance, never once considers that the 4th petition in the LP (for daily bread) could refer to 
literal bread,141 while Tertullian allows people to add on their own specific, additional requests at 
the end of the LP.142 
2.  When Jesus said, “Si quid petieritis me in nomine meo hoc faciam”143 (If you ask 
anything in my name I will do it), what are the practical limits on this?  The many, many 
promises in the NT of God’s generous response to prayer seem to open up the dangerously naïve 
possibility that prayer might work like a magic genie, an idea that would not be born out in real-
life experience and thus could both lead to presumption and damage faith.  Gregory sets the 
standard response: “Sed quia nomen Filii Iesus est, Iesus autem Saluator uel etiam salutaris 
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dicitur, ille ergo in nomine Saluatoris petit, qui illud petit quod ad ueram salutem pertinet”144 
(But because the name of the Son is Jesus, and Jesus means savior or saving, he asks in the name 
of the Savior who asks for that which pertains to salvation).145  Both Bede and Ælfric have 
passages following Gregory’s teaching.146 
3.  How does one pray without ceasing (I Thess. 5:17)?  This question inspires the 
greatest diversity in answers.  For instance, among the Egyptian ascetics Cassian studied, the 
command was understood to mean pray continuously, and the expectation was that the ascetics 
were literally praying, usually by reciting the psalms, every waking moment, while reducing the 
hours of sleep to the bare minimum.147  Another response was to understand it as praying 
continually; the development of the Divine Office responded to this understanding, as did the 
earlier lay practice of praying the LP at set times during the day.  Augustine’s solution was that 
ceaseless desire for the heavenly kingdom constituted ceaseless prayer.148  But he also gestures 
in the direction that Bede takes: “Et cuius lingua durat meditari tota die laudem Dei? … 
Quidquid egeris, bene age, et laudasti Deum” (But whose tongue could bear to intend to praise 
God all day long? … Whatever you do, do it well and you have praised God.)149  Bede’s solution 
is that all the actions of a just man constitute ceaseless prayer.150  As we will see in the next 
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chapter as we consider this aspect of Bede’s teaching, the various answers given can reflect 
different ideas of what prayer is and how prayer works. 
5.  Why does God command people to persevere in prayer?151  A related question: if God 
knows what we need before we ask it and is well-disposed toward us, why pray?  The latter 
question tends to come up within the works of more philosophically oriented teachers.  Thus, 
Origen first addresses the question as a response to the more esoteric philosophical Greek ideas 
concerning prayer.  Augustine also addresses the question both in his sermon lxxx.2152 and in his 
commentary on the Sermon on the Mount; in the commentary, the reason given is that “ipsa 
orationis intentio cor nostrum serenat et purgat capaciusque efficit ad excipienda diuina munera 
… .  Fit ergo in oratione conuersio cordis ad eum.”153 (the very effort involved in prayer calms 
and purifies our heart, and makes it more capacious for receiving the divine gifts … .  Hence 
there is brought about in prayer a turning of the heart to Him.)154   
As we will see in Bede and Ælfric’s teaching, the answers given to these questions 
present a system of prayer oriented toward salvation and eternal rather than material concerns 
that have implications for the way prayer works as a total system, encompassing thoughts, 
words, and deeds, and having the power to transform the one praying. 
But what is often just as striking as the teaching on prayer is the absence of teaching on 
prayer.  For instance, while the Regula S. Benedicti establishes the hours of prayer, and which 
psalms, prayers, and scripture readings should fill those hours, it pays only minimal attention to 
the theoretical issues of prayer – what prayer was supposed to accomplish or how it was 
supposed to accomplish it.155  In Gregory’s series of forty sermons not one is either wholly or 
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largely on prayer; the only teaching on prayer is a short passage on praying in Jesus’ name, cited 
above.  In Augustine’s hundreds of sermons, only four primarily address prayer;156 all of these 
are on the LP, and all of these focus on a line-by-line explication of the literal meaning rather 
than presenting a fuller theology of prayer.  One of his very favorite Bible verses to weave into 
sermons is the 5th petition of the LP (forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors), but his 
point is invariably to preach against revenge rather than about prayer.157  Like Gregory, most of 
his sermons do not address questions of prayer at all, except in passing.  Often, it is difficult or 
even impossible to tell whether the teachers assume private prayer on the part of their 
congregations or communal prayer, or whether there is any expectation of unstructured or 
spontaneous prayer either in the communal liturgy,158 or in private devotion.  But the tendency in 
modern scholarship on prayer is to assume a central place both for private piety and for 
individual spontaneous159 prayer, locating “true” prayer in the silences between the canonical 
hours or within the liturgical service rather than in the actual set prayers themselves. 
An example of the orientation toward individual spontaneous prayer is the way scholars 
discuss Cassian’s presentation of prayer in Conferences 9 and 10.  Bradshaw states the common 
position succinctly: “It should be noted that the psalms here [recited alternating with silent 
prayer] were not understood as being prayer themselves – the sources often speak of prayer and 
psalmody – but as readings, as the fount of inspiration for the fount of prayer which followed 
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each psalm.”160  But the issue is more complicated than Bradshaw makes it seem.  For Cassian, 
the apex of prayer was what he called “preces ignates” (fiery prayers), prayer “quae ore 
hominum nec conprehendi nec exprimi potest” (which can be neither seized nor expressed by the 
mouth of man)161 and which comes when a mind rooted in a  
uerum puritatis proficit adfectum … ad deum preces purissimi uigoris effundere, quas 
ipse spiritus interpellans gemitibus inenarrabilibus ignorantibus nobis emittit ad deum, 
tanta scilicet in illius horae momento concopiens et ineffabiliter in supplicatione 
profundens, quanta non dicam ore percurrere, sed ne ipsa quidem mente ualeat alio 
tempore recordari.162 
[true disposition of purity … pours out to God wordless prayers of the purest vigor.  
These the Spirit itself makes to God as it intervenes with unutterable groans, 
unbeknownst to us, conceiving at that moment and pouring forth in wordless prayer such 
great things that they not only – I would say – cannot pass through the mouth but are 
unable even to be remembered by the mind later on.]163 
As has been mentioned, this type of prayer fits with reassuring neatness into modern ideals of 
formless prayer, leaving room for individual creativity and expression, or at least a personal sort 
of individual experience of God.  Yet this is not the only kind of prayer for Cassian; rather, it is a 
rare and occasional164 result of the discipline of prayer, which comes after step-by-step 
advancement in the different kinds of prayer: supplication, prayer, intercession, and 
thanksgiving.165   
 In some ways Rachel Fulton’s study of Anselm’s prayers illustrates Bradshaw’s claim; 
for her as well “real” prayer is to be found beyond written prayers, which serve as tools to teach 
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the craft of praying.166  She considers the question of how repetition of set prayers can be 
“considered ‘real prayer,’ when it would seem at least by some modern definitions rather closer 
to a political or social performance.”167  She musters Cassian’s description of the use of texts 
within a mental discipline of prayer leading to formless prayer in her defense of Anselm’s 
prayers as tools toward “real prayer.”  Anselm, like Cassian, was concerned with the experience 
of God,168 and he used the same text-based techniques to get there.  Or what she takes to be these 
same techniques.  The prayer Fulton describes uses written prayers as a starting point for catena-
like meditational practices.169  She describes a reconstructed pattern: 
from text (Anselm’s second prayer) to commentary (Honorius’ Sigillum) to liturgical 
chant (Song of Songs 3.6) to image (Admont MS 18, fol. 163r) to psalm (Psalm 109) to 
text (Anselm’s third prayer) to image (Admont MS 289, fol. 21v) to liturgical chant (the 
hymn and other neumed texts of the banderoles) and back … .  There is a restlessness to 
the experience … .170 
This meditation is supposed to result, eventually, in “real” prayer: “here, at last, … our nun … 
will find herself in the presence of the Lady for whose attention she has longed and so will be 
able to turn to her and her Son,”171 thus arriving at a sense of the presence of and communion 
with the divine.172  As Fulton shows, these meditational practices leave ample room for 
individual creativity in the practice of, or surrounding, prayer.  And while I am willing to be 
convinced by her reading of Anselm, this type of catena-like prayer is actually not what Cassian 
teaches.  Although he also finds creativity in the process he describes,173 it is not of making 
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something unique and original, but rather of conforming oneself to and internalizing an outside 
standard. 
In Conference 9 Cassian and his travel companion and fellow-monk, Germanus, learn 
about prayer from Abba Isaac, an Egyptian monk: he discusses types of prayer, explicates the 
Lord’s Prayer, and describes fiery prayer.  Later, they return to Isaac, and Germanus confesses 
that the previous teachings were too advanced for him.  He has no idea how to pray like Isaac 
taught.  Furthermore, his problem is just exactly a catena-like wandering of the mind, 
restlessness of experience, as the mind flits from passage to passage instead of staying rooted in 
the text being prayed at the present moment:174  
Cum enim capitulum cuiuslibet psalmi mens nostra conceperit, insensibiliter eo subtracto 
ad alterius scripturae textum nesciens stupensque deuoluitur.  Cumque illud in semet ipsa 
coeperit uolutare, necdum illo ad integrum uentilatio oborta alterius testimonii memoria 
meditationem materiae prioris excludit.  De hac quoque ad alteram subintrante alia 
meditatione transfertur, et ita animus semper de psalmo rotatus ad psalmum, de euangelii 
textu ad apostoli transiliens lectionem, de hac quoque ad prophetica deuolutus eloquia et 
exinde ad quasdam spiritales delatus historias per omne scripturarum corpus instabilis 
uagusque iactatur.175 
[For when our mind has understood a passage from any psalm, imperceptibly it slips 
away, and thoughtlessly and stupidly it wanders off to another text of Scripture.  And 
when it has begun to reflect on this passage within itself, the recollection of another text 
shuts out reflection on the previous material, although it had not yet been completely 
aired.  From here, with the introduction of another reflection, it moves elsewhere, and 
thus the mind is constantly whirling from psalm to psalm, leaping from a gospel text to a 
reading from the Apostle, wandering from this to the prophesies and thence being carried 
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away to certain spiritual histories, tossed about fickle and aimless through the whole body 
of Scripture.]176 
In response to this issue Isaac takes them back to the rudimentary beginnings of the discipline of 
prayer.  He instructs that the novice should choose a short phrase from the Psalms as a 
“formula,” something like Ps. 69:2: “Deus ut liberes me Domine ut auxilieris mihi festina” (O 
God, come to my assistance; O Lord, make haste to help me),177 which he says he recommends 
because it is appropriate for all situations (to prove this he gives an exhaustive list of situations.  
Sure enough …).  The novice is then to pray this phrase without ceasing, that is, as the Egyptians 
understood it, continuously, in and around the daily regimen of private and communal prayers 
largely derived from the Psalms: “hunc in opera quolibet seu ministerio uel itinere constitutus 
decantare non desinas”178 (“You should not stop repeating it when you are doing any kind of 
work or performing some service or are on a journey”)179  until “incessabili eius exercitatione 
formatus etiam per soporem eum decantare consuescas”180 (“you are formed by having used it 
ceaselessly and are in the habit of repeating it even while asleep”).181  Isaac continues: 
Istam, istam mens indesinenter formulam teneat, donec usu eius incessabili et iugi 
meditatione firmata cunctarum cogitationum diuitias amplasque substantias abiciat ac 
refutet, atque ita uersiculi huius paupertate constricta ad illam euangelicam beatitudinem, 
quae inter ceteras beatitudines primatum tenet [“beati pauperes spiritu”].182 
[Let the mind hold ceaselessly to this formula above all until it has been strengthened by 
constantly using and continually meditating upon it, and until it renounces and rejects the 
whole wealth and abundance of thoughts.  Thus straightened by the poverty of this verse, 
it will very easily attain to that gospel beatitude which holds the first place among the 
other beatitudes (“blessed are the poor in spirit”).]183   
                                                 
176
 Ramsey, Conf. X.xiii.1. 
177
 The Latin is from the Vulgate; the translation is Douay-Rheims. 
178
 Conl. X.x.xiv, ll. 7-8. 
179
 Conf. 10.10.14. 
180
 Conl. X.x.xv, ll. 15-7. 
181
 Conf. 10.10.15. 
182
 Conl. X.xi.1, ll. 1-6. 
183
 Conf. 10.11.1. 
  
48 
The end result of this discipline is that the one praying would begin to experience the words of 
the Psalms as his own words and to adopt the Psalms as his own: 
ita incipiet decantare, ut eos non tamquam a propheta conpositos, sed uelut a se editos 
quasi orationem propriam profunda cordis conpunctione depromat uel certe ad suam 
personam aestimet eos fuisse directos, eorumque sententias non tunc tantummodo per 
prophetam aut in propheta fuisse conpletas, sed in se cotidie geri inplerique cognoscat.  
Tunc enim scripturae diuinae nobis clarius perpatescunt et quodammodo earum uenae 
medullaeque panduntur, quando experientia nostra earum non tantum percipit, sed etiam 
praeuenit notionem, sensusque uerborum non per expositionem nobis, sed per documenta 
reserantur.  Eundem namque recipientes cordis affectum, quo quisque decantatus uel 
conscriptus est psalmus, uelut auctores euis facti praecedemus magis intellectum ipsius 
quam sequemur.184 
[he will begin to repeat them and to treat them in his profound compunction of heart not 
as if they were composed by the prophet but as if they were his own utterances and his 
own prayer.  Certainly he will consider that they are directed to his own person, and he 
will recognize that their words were not only achieved by and in the prophet in times past 
but that they are daily borne out and fulfilled in him.  For divine Scripture is clearer and 
its inmost organs, so to speak, are revealed to us when our experience not only perceives 
but even anticipates its thought, and the meanings of the words are disclosed to us not by 
exegesis but by proof.  When we have the same disposition in our heart with which each 
psalm was sung or written down, then we shall become like its authors, grasping its 
significance beforehand rather than afterward.]185 
This is not quite the exact opposite of what Fulton describes, but it is very different.  The main 
difference here is that there is, in fact, no personal creativity (in the sense of creating prayers) at 
work, and that the individual praying never prays his own words – nor is that ever presented as 
desirable.  The continued repetition of the prayer formula would blot out “the rich and full 
resources of all thoughts,” erase that distracting interior monologue, lead to a radical unmaking 
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of the psyche, and remold it according to the form of the Psalms.186  In fact, if the novice were to 
pray his own words, or even his own personal Psalm mash-up, that would destroy the very thing 
this discipline of prayer is reaching for: the loss of self and individual experience, subsumed 
beneath the experience of the Psalmist, and, hence, a very personal (but not individual, and not 
creative as we tend to think of it) identification with Christ.187  And this idea is, in fact, the exact 
opposite of the modern ideals of genuineness and sincerity in prayer put forward by James and 
Heiler.  Ideally, the Egyptian ascetic does not pray from his own experience, and does not pray 
his own words, but begins to adopt the words and experience of someone else, the Psalmist.188  
Spontaneous prayer, in its endless iteration and re-representation of the self to the self (or, if you 
will, the self to God) would be powerless to effect the kind of transformation the ascetics were 
seeking.     
 Hence, the emphasis we find in authors like Stewart and Bradshaw189 on the silences 
between the Psalms as being the location of “real” prayer is not something Cassian exactly 
supports.  Yes, the goal of the discipline of prayer is a type of formless, fiery experience of the 
presence of God, but this (as he says repeatedly) is a rare experience.  That fiery prayer is prayer 
does not make not-prayer the word-dependent discipline that leads up to the personal 
appropriation of the Psalms.  Otherwise, how would people be able to pray without ceasing? 
But in the context of Western prayer, Cassian is strange.  His ideas of prayer, and 
sometimes his phrasing, bear the unmistakable stamp of Eastern practice and patterns of thought 
that never really caught on in the Latin church in the period under consideration, even though 
                                                 
186
 As Isaac says, the monk should be formed by using his prayer formula ceaselessly (“donec incessabili eius 
exercitatione formatus” (Conl. CSEL 13, X.X.15, ll. 15-6) [until [he is] formed by having used it ceaselessly] (Conf. 
X.X.15). 
187
 See Bradshaw p. 174, n. 15 on the Christological interpretation of the Psalter, “apparently derived by the desert 
tradition from the exegetical method adopted by Origen from classical literature.”  He cites Marie-Josèphe Rondeau, 
Les Commentaires patristiques du Psautier (IIIe-Ve siècles) II (OCA 220, 1985), pp. 39ff; Paul F. Bradshaw, “From 
Word to Action: The Changing Role of Psalmody in Early Christianity,” in Martin Dudley, ed., Like a Two-Edged 
Sword: The Word of God in Liturgy and History (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 1995), pp. 21-37; Graham W. 
Woolfenden, “The Use of the Psalter by Early Monastic Communities,” SP 26 (1993), pp. 88-94. 
188
 Fulton, in considering prayers as tools, says, “we must first trust both their makers (typically other human beings, 
but also, if we are the makers, ourselves) …” (“Praying with Anselm,” 731).  But, for Cassian, what can be trusted 
more than the words of inspired Scripture? 
189
 Bradshaw says: “It should be noted that the psalms here [recited alternating with silent prayer] were not 
understood as being prayer themselves – the sources often speak of prayer and psalmody – but as readings, as the 
fount of inspiration for the fount of prayer which followed each psalm” (Search for the Origins of Christian 
Worship, 174). 
  
50 
Cassian’s work was known and, in many ways, influential.190  Even so, Cassian’s example – the 
most complete presentation of the interior practice of the discipline of prayer we have – should 
give scholars pause when they come to silent points in the liturgy or in private prayer.  We 
should not rush to fill these in with spontaneous prayer or even catena-like meditation. 
Obviously, the type of prayer Cassian presents is something that would only be possible 
within a highly committed, disciplined, eremitic structure.  It would even be difficult to carry out 
in a post-Benedict monastic community, and would have been totally out of reach of lay people 
or clerics.  Expectations and the experience of prayer were quite different for lay vs. religious.  
Naturally, it is much easier to reconstruct monastic prayer and devotion than that of lay people.  
As far as our authors go, Bede does not overtly address lay people in his sermons, which thus 
reflect a more monastic piety.191  Ælfric’s sermons, even though they are intended for a mixed 
audience, including lay people, do not give much indication as to expectations for private prayer 
beyond the statement that “Ælc cristen man sceal æfter rihte cunnan ægþer ge his pater noster ge 
his credan”192 (Every Christian should correctly know both his Paternoster and his creed).   
Whether every Christian is expected to pray the LP at set times daily is obscure.  In fact, it is also 
difficult to say whether he expected lay people to pray the LP in Latin or OE.  Ælfric translates 
the LP at the beginning of his sermon on the subject (CHI.19) and in the process of explicating it, 
and he also gives a stand-alone translation of both the LP and the Creed.193  However, there does 
not seem to be a standard OE translation of the LP, which would presumably be needed for 
group recitation.194  Neither Ælfric’s sermon version nor the stand-alone quite match up.   
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Additionally, the other sermon translation we have, by Wulfstan, is a looser, heavily alliterative 
translation in no way like Ælfric’s,195 but preceded by the words, “geleorniað hit on Englisc þus 
…”
196
 (“learn it in English thus”).   It is hard to imagine that he really meant for his congregation 
to pray the form of the prayer he then recites.  Without any particular evidence of a standard 
translation, it is also hard to imagine that lay people would have joined in the LP during the mass 
in OE, or even that there would be a switch from the Latin of the rest of the mass to OE just for 
that prayer.  Also, the evidence of the charms points in the direction that the Latin version of the 
prayer was more standard for recitative efficacy than any OE versions. 
 
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
This project examines the way prayer was taught in the Anglo-Saxon homilies 
 of Bede and Ælfric, and this introduction attempts to give some context to the study.  Chapter 2 
focuses on Bede’s 50-homily series covering the liturgical year.  What is most interesting about 
Bede’s teaching on prayer is the way he focuses on a relationship with God oriented around gift-
giving, and melds this discourse with the more abstract idea of prayer’s subjective efficacy.  I 
examine the way the opening Advent homilies establish an ideal relationship between the 
Christian and God through the figure of Mary, and argue that this relationship is oriented towards 
the giving and return of gifts that includes Bede’s subtle rewriting of Augustine’s idea of gratia.  
With this frame in place, I consider the passages and homilies where Bede teaches most 
explicitly on prayer: I.22, II.10, II.12, II.14.  In spite of the fact that Bede shares language in 
common with Cassian and Augustine, Bede’s idea of prayer is much more actively oriented.  He 
defines prayer as “omnia quae iustus secundum Deum gerit et dicit”197 (everything that the just 
man does and says according to the will of God).  Although this phrase was used in early Eastern 
teaching on prayer, by this they meant an idea of apatheia, whereas Bede’s emphasis is on 
action.  For Bede, prayer is a “total” request, governing every aspect of the precator’s life 
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through the way that it requires the alignment of thought, word, and deed.  Prayer is thus a kind 
of action (the petition and the gift) enmeshed in a discourse of gift-giving oriented around the 
sole and most important petition a person can make: the request for salvation.  In prayer, Bede’s 
concern in the alignment of thought, word, and deed does not reflect a concern for sincerity on 
the part of the precator, but rather with something we might call purity; through this, he draws 
together both the discourse of gift-giving and the subjective efficacy of prayer. 
 Chapter 3 begins by looking at the way that Ælfric establishes the relationship between 
God, man, and the devil in Catholic Homily I.1, De initio creaturae.  While Ælfric downplays 
the language of lordship used to describe Lucifer’s rebellion as found in poetic works such as 
Genesis A and B and Christ and Satan, he grapples with some of the key concepts within a gift-
giving relationship brought up by implications of an Augustinian idea of grace and free will.  
Lucifer is able to find a position for his rebellion by claiming as his own attributes that are really 
God’s gift to him.  Lucifer’s flaw is a failure of gratitude, which is really a failure of love.  He 
reduces God’s gifts to a power play instead of understanding them through personal affection.  
The relationship between God and humans is not quite parallel to the relationship between God 
and Lucifer.  The expectation of obedience is made much clearer through the command not to eat 
of the forbidden tree; this simple act of obedience, and the way it represents Adam and Eve’s 
own choice (agen cyre) to obey God, gives them a possibility of returning God’s gifts through 
freely chosen service, hence compelling God to the obligations of reciprocity.  When they fail in 
this, God is no longer obliged to protect them from their new lord, the devil, and yet God 
graciously meditates mercy. 
 The relationship that CHI.1 sets up becomes important for both Chapter 3, which 
examines Ælfric’s explicit teachings on prayer in Catholic Homilies I.10, I.18, and I.19, and 
Chapter 4, which looks at the three of Ælfric’s narratives in which prayer is most central.  
Ælfric’s explicit teachings on prayer adapt sermons by Augustine and Gregory, consistently 
downplaying the more abstract orientation toward purity found in their teaching, while 
introducing (or emphasizing) the figure of the devil as a counter-lord to God, a structure he takes 
from the ransom theory of atonement.  For Ælfric, the act of praying itself, almost secondary to 
the content, becomes a statement of allegiance to God and thus a claim to his protection. 
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 The homilies considered in Chapter 4 all adapt radically different base-texts: an 
apocryphal life of Bartholomew (written in the Carolingian era but pretending to be older), the 
Latin passion of Laurence from Rome, and an abridgement of a Latin translation of the Greek 
Life of St. Basil.  Each of these narratives gives prayer a slightly different perspective and 
context.  In Bartholomew the Fall of humankind is re-enacted through the pagan Indians’ prayers 
to their idols which entrap their souls through a diabolical exchange.  In Laurence, the 
connection between human self-sacrifice in martyrdom and the Eucharistic offering is explicitly 
invoked; additionally, Laurence’s life gives a narrative context for six “actual” prayers.  Finally, 
while exchange is a central issue in several key episodes of Basil’s life, the concerns manifest in 
St. Basil’s life show a sophisticated, philosophically influenced anxiety surrounding issues of 
orthodoxy and belief that the prayer of Basil mediates as the figure of the saint becomes a 
guarantor of the true faith.  Because Basil is a very different figure for Ælfric than for the Eastern 
church, and because Greek philosophy did not apparently present issues of pressing intellectual 
importance to Ælfric, this narrative largely explores a slightly different concern.  Ælfric subtly 
moves the discourse away from the Greek philosophical concerns of belief, toward an idea of 
belief as allegiance, thus situating it within the allegiance and gift-giving paradigm.  
Furthermore, because, for Ælfric, prayer is objectively efficacious, and tends toward becoming a 
reified symbol of the precator’s allegiance, this opens up room for anxiety of potential distance 
between the symbol (prayer) and the thing symbolized (belief) that Ælfric’s life of Basil still 
explores.  Thus, though each of these narratives presents a different angle on prayer and gift-
giving, each tends to present a coherent theory of prayer as a statement of allegiance, objectively 
efficacious in securing God’s protection, and placing the precator within a relationship in which 
God owes future rewards for present gifts. 
Prayer was one of the central facts of medieval life.  This study of how Bede and Ælfric 
theorized prayer contributes to an understanding of Anglo-Saxon literary culture and to the 
scholarship on devotion more broadly in several ways.  First, in its focus on sermons addressed 
to monks and to lay people, it allows us to place gift-exchange in a non-heroic context, revealing 
an idealization of lordship accessible to people beyond the aristocracy.  Second, it complements 
and corrects current studies of devotion and spirituality by providing a way to conceptualize 
prayer that is personal and intimate without reproducing the modern individual.  Third, it shows 
  
54 
important ways that Anglo-Saxons adapted Latin Christian doctrine and practice to their own 
cultural structures.  Fourth, this study demonstrates how central prayer is to an understanding of 
Anglo-Saxon society and its members because of the way prayer mediates between interior and 
exterior, thought and action, the individual and the community.  The iterative nature of prayer 
reflects, reinforces, and reforms social structures, cultural assumptions, and ideals, as well as the 
people who pray. 
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CHAPTER 2 
GRATIAM PRO GRATIA: BEDE ON PRAYER 
 
Teque deprecor, bone Iesu, ut cui propitius donasti uerba tuae scientiae dulciter haurire,  
dones etiam benignus aliquando ad te fontem omnis sapientiae peruenire, et parere 
semper ante faciem tuam.1 
[And I beg you, good Jesus, that, as you favorably gave him sweetly to drink the words of 
your wisdom, you would also kindly grant hereafter to arrive at you, the fount of all 
wisdom, and to appear ever before your face.] 
 
With this prayer Bede ends his most famous work, the Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis 
Anglorum.  The prayer functions as a sort of colophon to the work,2 and it also nicely 
exemplifies the reciprocal and intimate way Bede views prayer.  Bede’s main request is an 
eternal one – for salvation, essentially – that Jesus might give him “parere semper ante faciem 
tuam.”  He bases this request on the fact of previous favors given (“cui propitius donasti uerba 
tuae scientiae dulciter haurire”).  The favor he asks is, not that he might see Jesus’ face (a 
contemplative ideal), but that Jesus might see him.  Bede’s humility is such he does not use the 
personal pronoun in most of the prayer, but he asks to appear before Jesus in a relationship 
defined by favors already received.  Modestly elided is the fact that the favor Bede has received 
is the book just finished, the Historia, a major undertaking situating the English people in their 
place within the community of God’s own people.  It is on this basis, of a gift received and used 
in the service of God, that Bede asks to be allowed into Jesus’ presence in eternity.  And it is also 
notable that Bede addresses Jesus intimately by his personal name rather than as Dominus.  With 
bold humility Bede asks to be considered an intimate of Jesus. 
 While the Venerable Bede (c. 673-735) is still most famously known for his Historia, the 
central task of his life was biblical commentary and creating the educational tools necessary for 
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understanding Christian doctrine and practice.3  Recent scholarship has addressed itself to 
rectifying the neglect of Bede’s exegetical works, and to reassessing Bede’s authority and 
innovation as a Christian Latin writer in the process.4  The essays in the collection Innovation 
and Tradition in the Writings of the Venerable Bede argue against the older view of Bede as a 
derivative compiler and for a much more central and active role of Bede as “a creator of 
Christian Latin culture,”5 an auctor,6 and a “patristic figure.”7  As Joyce Hill shows, the 
influence of Bede’s exegesis down through the Carolingian era and beyond was immense.8  
Bede’s corpus is, as one might expect, filled with prayer, prayers, and people praying.  Tackling 
the subject of prayer in the full corpus would be a daunting task.  This study will therefore focus 
on the explicit teachings on prayer in Bede’s homilies.   . 
 Alongside renewed study of Bede’s exegesis, there has been a one-man renaissance of 
interest in what might be called Bede’s “spirituality” in the work of Scott DeGregorio.9  Within 
his important essay on prayer and contemplation in Bede’s work, he argues that Bede’s teaching 
on prayer reflects the least contemplative of the Latin writers, Gregory, and that even with 
Gregory’s work Bede largely ignored the “subtle interior dynamics of the spiritual life” that 
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interested Gregory,10 showing “little interest in exploring the interior workings and slippery 
paradoxes of the spiritual life that so captured Gregory.”11  DeGregorio explains the active 
orientation of Bede’s prayer through the pastoral concerns manifested in Bede’s work, especially 
his desire to see reform in the Anglo-Saxon church, and through the active role monks had in 
providing pastoral care to lay people in his day.12  DeGregorio’s essay, however, is set against an 
assumed background of contemplative prayer, and he at times seems to consider the active type 
of prayer he argues Bede presents as being for a less sophisticated audience:  
sources had to be selected, adapted, digested, and reworked in order to make them 
accessible to his newly Christianized Anglo-Saxon audience.  Such an audience, Bede 
may well have thought, would benefit less from thinking of unceasing prayer in terms of 
desire than in terms of the performance of just deeds.13   
Perhaps.  But DeGregorio at this moment overlooks the similarity that Bede’s definition of 
prayer had with that of Origen, who writes fully within the eastern, “mystical” tradition, and 
whose account of prayer no one would accuse of being unsophisticated.14  While Bede’s teaching 
on prayer is not heavily indebted to Origen, it, in fact, presents a consistent “psychology” of the 
self and of the way that prayer forms and reforms both individual and community. 
 As this chapter will argue, a central reason for the active nature of Bede’s conception of 
prayer is his understanding of the doctrine of grace within a relationship between God and 
humans formed by the exchange of gifts.  As DeGregorio points out, Bede defined prayer 
broadly, saying, “Certe omnia quae iustus secundum Deum gerit et dicit ad orationem esse 
reputanda”15  (certainly, everything that the just man does and says according to the will of God 
ought to be counted as prayer.)  Within the total relationship of gratia within which people 
petition God, the works of a just man are significant both as counter-gifts returned to God 
accompanying the petition for salvation, and also an enactment of the gratia for which one prays.  
While the gratia-relationship is conceptualized as individual and personal, the emphasis is on the 
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ceasing’ as being possible, if we can say that the whole life of the saint is one mighty integrated prayer,” 12.2. 
15
 In Lucam 5 (CCSL 120, p. 322, ll. 1056-8). 
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individual situated within the community.  Communal, ritual, and set prayers rather than 
spontaneous (or contemplative), individual prayer primarily mediate the relationship with God.  
This way of imagining the relationship between God and humanity is very far indeed from the 
later medieval religious experience often expressed by borrowing the language and affect of 
sexual ecstasy.  It is a formal and often prescribed ideal of appropriate behavior, approaching 
God as lord rather than as lover. 
It is important to clarify what we can know about the practice of prayer that Bede might 
have in mind when he teaches about prayer.  Bede’s formative training would have been within a 
monastic rule, whether Benedictine, or, more likely, mixed.16  First of all, he rarely specifies 
whether he is talking about formal, communal prayer or individual, private prayer, and he never 
specifies whether people are praying set prayers or praying spontaneously.17  As was discussed in 
Chapter 1, for most theorists of prayer the two types of prayer express two different types of 
piety, two different ways of understanding the self, and two different stages of religious 
development.  But for Bede, both kinds of prayers perform essentially the same function:18 they 
confess sin, present petitions to God, express gratitude for gifts received, and are oriented toward 
salvation.   
By its nature the written record privileges formal, set prayers above the spontaneous 
outpourings of the soul.  There is much about prayer that we just cannot know because we no 
longer have the oral context in which it was taught and practiced.  One could presume that 
Bede’s original audience knew the type of prayer he was talking about in specific instances 
because they knew the appropriate behavior for the situation.  However, in the teaching and 
discourse surrounding prayer, there is no emphasis on spontaneous prayer; it seems to have had 
little inherent value.  It seems that Bede usually assumes the prayers his audience are praying are 
formal, set prayers, whether communally in the liturgy or else alone in response to a particular 
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 See Henry Mayr-Harting, “The Venerable Bede, the Rule of St. Benedict, and Social Class,” Jarrow Lecture, 
1976.  He argues for the centrality of the Regula Benedicti, but not its exclusive use (8). 
17
 For one good example, see Homily I.18 on the Feast of the Purification and Bede’s explication of the pigeon and 
dove offered in sacrifice where he does mention both private and public prayers, but sees no difference between 
them in form or even function. 
18
 See Homily I.4 on the Magnificat for an example.  The public recitation of the Magnificat at vespers prepares one 
for private prayer.  Prayer performs an entirely different function in Bede’s account of the death of John the 
Evangelist in Homily I.9 where prayers are merely a marker of a holy life and well-ordered death. 
  
59 
situation.  There are several reasons for this.  Bede’s audience was monastic19 so they would 
have been praying the hours daily.  That is, their overwhelming and formational experience with 
prayer would have been the set prayers chanted communally at the hours.  In addition, from what 
we know about personal piety of the era, most injunctions to pray concern praying the Pater 
Noster and the psalms.20  Bede himself, according to Benedicta Ward,21 developed the breviate 
psalter in order to facilitate private prayers.  For Bede, the breviate psalter served as a tool for 
meditation and also as words for private prayer.22  Bede also repeatedly emphasizes the necessity 
of congruence between thoughts and words in a way that implies those praying are praying 
words familiar from long habit, words that they could easily say without attention.  There might 
be a tendency to think that as long as one’s body is in a particular place, and as long as one is 
saying the right words, one is praying.  Bede takes care to emphasize this is not so.  Finally, the 
context in which Bede talks of prayer often implies set prayers.  This will be seen in the 
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 Alan Thacker, “Monks, Preaching and Pastoral Care,” argues that, while Bede’s direct audience was largely 
monastic, there is some evidence that several times a year his sermons were directed toward an “augmented” 
audience (Holy Saturday, for instance, pp. 140-1), and that Bede’s sermons would have served for monks to adapt 
for their own preaching.  To this is must be added that most instances of address in Bede’s homilies do presume a 
monastic audience (see Lawrence T. Martin’s “Introduction,” in Bede the Venerable: Homilies on the Gospels, 2 
vols., trans. Lawrence T. Martin and David Hurst [Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1991], bk. I, xi).  
Furthermore, since the homilies are in Latin, it would be difficult for most lay people hearing them to understand 
them if they were read in Latin. 
20
 And, in fact, explications of the Pater Noster emphasize that it completely covers all a person would need to pray 
for.  For lay people most encouragements to pray concern praying the Pater Noster.  For monks, it is the Pater 
Noster, the psalms, and other biblical prayers. 
21
 Ward, Bede and the Psalter, Jarrow Lecture, 1991.  In the way that she sees it, these psalms are used more as 
hooks for personal meditation and prayer than as prayer itself, but she invokes Cassian at this point in a questionable 
way, as my introduction makes clear. 
22
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, the scholarly tendency is to fill in the silences around the Psalms with personal 
(spontaneous?) prayer.  Since our authors are generally silent about what goes in the silence, it is significant that 
what few mentions there are do not fully support this.  Cassian has been dealt with in Chapter 1.  When Tertullian 
grants that additional petitions may be tacked on to the end of the Pater Noster, he still speaks in terms of formal 
prayers added: “et sunt quae petantur pro circumstantia cuiusque, praemissa legitima et ordinaria oratione quasi 
fundamento accedentium desideriorum, ius est superstruendi extrinsecus petitiones, cum memoria tamen 
praeceptorum, ne quam a praeceptis, tantum ab auribus Dei longe simus” (De oratione X, ll. 3-8, CCSL 1) [and as 
there are things to be asked for according to the circumstances of each, having advanced the prescribed and regular 
prayers as a foundation for the desires of those who draw near, it is right to build upon it outside petitions, yet with 
mindfulness of the precepts, lest we be far from the ears of God as we are from the precepts].  Finally, Augustine 
does speak of something like formless prayer in his Epistola CXXX ad Probam when he addresses the question of 
why people need to pray to an omniscient God at all: “Nam plerumque hoc negotium plus gemitibus quam 
sermonibus agitur, plus fletu quam affatu” (CCSL 31b, 20.371-3) [[I]n most cases prayer consists more in groaning 
than in speaking, in tears rather than in words] (trans. from NPNF, vol. 1), although this precedes his explication of 
the LP, before which he says, “Nobis … uerba necessaria sunt” (21.376) [To us … words are necessary] (trans. 
NPNF, vol. 1).  
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discussion of Homily II.10, where Bede uses the episode of the women bringing spices to Jesus’ 
tomb to talk about prayer.  My point, however, is not that people never prayed spontaneously or 
composed their own prayers (this chapter begins with a composed prayer by Bede23), but rather 
that what is called “free” prayer was not particularly valued as an end in itself,24 nor could prayer 
function in the way Bede imagines in his homilies on prayer if it were spontaneous. 
For Bede prayer operates within gift-paradigms in three ways.  First, access to God in 
prayer is a gift from God; people use this access to request further favor from God.  Bede’s 
prayer at the end of the Historia clearly models this petitionary conception: on the basis of past 
favors from God, gratefully received by Bede, he request future favors.  The same scheme is 
modeled in the way Bede uses the concept of twofold grace found in Homily I.2, explored in 
more detail below.  Second, the prayers people bring with them into God’s presence function as 
gifts, so prayer works as both petition and as the gift accompanying the petition.  The petition 
offered is the request for salvation; the desire expressed in this prayer is offered to and accepted 
as a gift by God.  We will see the somewhat complicated way this operates in Homily II.10.  
Third, the discipline of prayer is also a gift from God.  Through using this gift, people internalize 
the prayer in thought and externalize it in deeds, so that prayer is in some sense subjectively 
efficacious; it transforms the one praying.  It is important to recognize that what people are 
praying for in all these cases is salvation (or, in Homily I.2, the gratia of salvation).  When the 
words correspond to their thoughts and deeds, people enact their request.  But, as I will show in 
the discussion of grace in Homilies I.2-4, Bede also thinks of these good deeds as a counter-gift 
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 Narrative reports saints praying “spontaneously” as well.  Hugh A.G. Houghton, “The Discourse of Prayer,” 
argues that narrative accounts of prayer in the Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles reflect the features of “the 
improvised liturgical prayers of the early Church” (175).  As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the tendency over time was 
for prayer to become more set and less spontaneous.  Donald Byzdl, “Prayer in Old English Narratives,” examines 
the formulaic ways narrative prayers reflect the structure of private prayers found in prayerbooks and considers how 
narrative prayers contribute to the construction of distinct saintly characters rather than as particular examples of 
“spontaneous” prayer, which practice (as opposed to the attitudes, and maybe even the prayers themselves) hearers 
might be expected to adopt.  This topic will be further explored in Chapter 4. 
24
 “Free” prayer is spontaneous, verbal prayer.  Within the Eastern tradition, some sort of formless, wordless ecstatic 
prayer was held to be an ideal.  This is Cassian’s “fiery prayer,” which he presents as a rare state in Conl. IX; this 
type of prayer also appears in other teachings of the Desert Fathers (for an example see Ward, Bede and the Psalter, 
7).  Within the Eastern tradition, ecstatic prayer is reached through the discipline of set prayers.  Within the early 
Western tradition, Augustine’s statements about prayer as groaning (above, n. 22) and desire as prayer (below, n. 
155) are as close as one gets to formless prayer.  But this formless prayer is also wordless.  So, while ecstasy is 
highly valued by some (usually Eastern) authors, and while Augustine presents an emotion-laden type of prayer, 
there is no particular value for spontaneous prayer either as a normal way of praying or as a way to reach ecstasis.   
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to God; people ask for gratia and receive good deeds.  The performance of these good deeds is a 
gift gratefully returned to God, which God then rewards with gratia (eternal salvation).  In some 
ways, it is tempting to think of this congruence between word, thought, and deed as “sincerity,” 
but modern sincerity is understood as an accurate enactment of the inner self coming from within 
the individual;25 this is not the model Bede presents.  For Bede, the words are primary26 and are 
both internalized and externalized through prayer.  Bede’s integrated prayer does not speak to 
concerns of sincerity, but of purity and wholeness: both of the individual and of the individual 
within the praying community.  Through this conception of purity, Bede blends a discourse of 
gift-giving (with its more concrete conceptualization of God) with ideas of purity found in the 
more abstract Neo-platonic-influenced work of authors like Cassian and Augustine.  We will see 
how this works at the discussion of Homily I.22 at the end of the chapter. 
 The scope of Bede’s homiletic cycle is most closely akin to Gregory’s cycle of forty 
gospel homilies,27 and Lawrence T. Martin argues that Bede’s homilies were designed to 
supplement Gregory’s collection.28  Both cycles use pericopes from the Neapolitan liturgy,29 but 
there is only one overlapping pericope between them, on Easter, for which Bede could have seen 
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 As Adam B. Seligman puts it, sincerity emphasizes intention, “something within the social actor or actors” (4).   
“Rather than becoming what we do in action through ritual, we do according to what we have become through self-
examination.  This form of thought emphasizes tropes of ‘authenticity’” (Adam B. Seligman et al.  Ritual and Its 
Consequences: An Essay on the Limits of Sincerity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
26
 This is congruent with much patristic teaching on prayer (see the discussion of Cassian in Chapter 1), but it is also 
similar to the project DeGregorio describes in “Texts, Topoi, and the Self” (79-96), of king “Alfred’s spirituality as 
a functional process of living texts, or of ‘textualizing’ the self (79), although the process DeGregorio describes 
seems closer to ruminatio, while the process of praying is repetition. 
27
 Gregory’s homilies were probably split into two books.  The second begins with Christ’s resurrection.  The first is 
randomly ordered in the PL.  Although none of the extant manuscript copies has homilies 1-20 in a stable order, 
Hurst, in his translation, rearranges them in accordance with the liturgical year, beginning just before Advent with 
the feast day of St. Felicity (November 23).  Even if this was not the order in which they were written, it is the order 
in which they would be preached. 
28
 Martin, “Introduction,” in Homilies on the Gospels, bk. 1, xvi.  Aaron Kleist delivers the important warning that 
Bede’s homiletic collection is not quite as coherent as the neat 50-homily CCSL edition by Hurst and Martin and 
Hurst’s two-volume translation make it look.  See Kleist, Striving with Grace, 59-60, for an outline of the problems, 
and the table detangling the various editions (and authorship questions) on 249-66.  The chief issue is not the 
homilies that Hurst includes (all of which are thought to be genuine, although he divides up the homilies differently 
than the PL does), but the homilies printed by Migne as uncertain.  According to Kleist many of these are actually 
Bedan.  As is the case with Gregory’s homilies, a congregation hearing Bede’s homilies read would have heard them 
in the order of the liturgical year, starting at Advent.  However, many of Bede’s homilies became most widely 
circulated in the collection of Paul the Deacon where they would have been mixed in with others’ homilies rather 
than read as a set. 
29
 David Hurst, ed.  Bedae Venerabilis opera III: Opera homiletica.  CCSL 122 (Turnhout:Brepols, 1955), vii-xxii. 
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the need to amplify Gregory’s rather short sermon.30  Because of the relationship between the 
two cycles, it is possible to view the development of Bede’s ideas in relationship to those of 
Gregory.  Gregory approaches Advent, for example, through a different set of pericopes that 
focus on the figure of John the Baptist as exemplary in humility.31  Gregory’s focus is to prepare 
the hearts of his hearers for Christ to come into them as he came into the world at Christmas.  
John functions as a forerunner of this double advent; as John prepared the way for the coming of 
Christ, with an emphasis on good works, preaching the gospel, and repentance of sins, so too 
does he become both a preacher whose words Gregory’s own audience must hear32 and a model 
to emulate in his humility and as a forerunner and preacher of Christ.33  Insofar as Gregory 
conceives of either of these comings in the context of exchange, he imagines a sort of violent 
“seizing” of the kingdom through contrition.  Although “[v]ult a nobis omnipotens Deus talem 
uiolentiam perpeti,”34  (Almighty God desires to suffer this kind of violence from us),35 Gregory 
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 Martin, trans., Bede the Venerable: Homilies on the Gospels, book 1 (Kalamazoo, 1991),  xvi. 
31
 The order that Gregory’s homilies are supposed to go in is a vexing question.  As David Hurst points out, the PL 
prints the first twenty in random order (Gregory the Great: Forty Gospel Homilies [Kalamazoo: Cistercian 
Publications, 1990], 3).  Hurst’s translation prints them in the likely order they were preached.  CCSL 141 follows 
the order given in the PL, but devotes a section of the introduction to detangling the proposed dates for which the 
sermons were written, pp. lvix-lxx).  Because of this, I will refer to the homilies by the numbers given in the 
translation with the pericopes, cross-referenced to the numbers in the CCSL with the rubrications given in the PL. 
32
 In Homily 6 (Homily XX CCSL 141, p. 153-69.  Rubricated Sabbato Quatuor temporum ante Natalem Christi, on 
Lk. 3.1-11, on John’s preaching in the wilderness) Gregory puts his hearers in the same position as John’s hearers: 
“Sed quia iam peccauimus, quia usu malae consuetudinis inuoluti sumus, dicat quid nobis faciendum sit, ut fugere a 
uentura ira ualeamus” (p. 159, 8.144-6) [But since we have sinned, since we have become accustomed to an evil 
way of life, let John tell us what we must do to escape the wrath to come] (Hurst, 40).  John’s sermon ends  
with exhortations to righteous living that Gregory applies to his audience as well. 
33
 Gregory uses John’s example to describe a humility which his hearers can emulate in Homily 4 (Homily VII, 
CCSL p. 45-52.  Rubricated Dominica quarta in Adventu Domini, on Jn. 1.19-27): “Restat ergo ut in omne quod scit 
sese mens deprimat, ne quod uirtus scientiae congregat, uentus elationis tollat. Cum bona, fratres, agitis, semper ad 
memoriam male acta reuocate” (p. 51, 4.131-4) [It remains, then, that the mind should abase itself in regard to 
everything it knows, lest the wind of exaltation blow away what the virtue of knowledge is vigorously gathering in.  
When you do something good, my friends, always call to mind the evils you have done] (Hurst, 25).  And he 
concludes: “In cunctis ergo quae agitis, fratres mei, radicem boni operis humilitatem tenete, nec quibus iam 
superiores, sed quibus adhuc inferiores estis aspicite” (p. 52, 4.164-6) [My friends, in everything you do hold on to 
humility as the root of good works.  Do not look at the things which make you better now, but at those which make 
you still bad] (Hurst, 27).  Homily 5 (Homily VI, CCSL 141, pp. 38-44.  Rubricated Dominica tertia Adventus 
Domini) continues using John as an example.  Gregory’s application is that all Christians should be messengers of 
God, able to give counsel and encourage others (pp. 42-3; Hurst, 32), and avoid idle talk (p. 44; Hurst, 33).   
“ut in quantum uires suppetunt, si annuntiare eum non negligitis, uocari ab eo angeli cum Joanne ualeatis” (p. 44, 
6.152-3) [Then as far as your strength allows it, if you do not neglect to make him known, you may be worthy to 
have him call you an angel along with John] (Hurst, 33). 
34
 Homily XX, CCSL 141, p. 169, 15.383-4. 
35
 Hurst, Homily 6, 48. 
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focuses firmly on stressing his audience’s need to repent36 and human agency and responsibility 
within repentance,37 rather than building a picture of a particular kind of relationship between 
God and humanity.  Bede’s concerns are filtered through a different sensibility: Bede emphasizes 
the relationship between humans and God as expressed through the gift of Advent.  
Like Gregory, Bede’s purpose is also to prepare his hearers for the personal advent of 
Christ analogous to the first Advent.  But in contrast to Gregory, Bede’s Advent homilies have 
an unusual emphasis on gift exchange.  In Bede’s sermons, the first four homilies develop 
Advent themes;38 through focusing on John the Baptist but more especially on Mary, they 
establish a relationship with God defined by his munificence and the proper human response to 
his gifts.  The Advent homilies create a story-line that Bede’s hearers can re-create in their own 
lives as they also meditate on the significance of God’s gift of his Son to and in them.  The 
pericopes Bede uses make both John the Baptist39 and Mary central characters.  Bede uses John 
                                                 
36
 For instance, he ends Homily 3 (Homily I, CCSL 141, pp. 5-11.  Rubricated Dominica secunda Adventus Domini, 
on Lk. 21.25-33) on the signs of Christ’s second coming with a call to repentance in light of the second coming: 
“Illum ergo diem, fratres carissimi, tota intentione cogitate, uitam corrigite, mores mutate, mala tentantia resistendo 
uincite, perpetrata autem fletibus punite.  Aduentum namque aeterni iudicis tanto securiores quandoque uidebitis, 
quanto nunc districtionem illius timendo praeuenitis” (p. 11, 6.151-5) [Give hard thought to that day, dearly 
beloved; amend your lives, change your habits, resist and overcome your evil temptations, requite your evil deeds by 
your tears.  The more you now anticipate his severity by fear, the more securely will you behold the coming of your 
eternal Judge] (Hurst, 20). 
37
 Again, Homily 6 (Homily XX, CCSL 141) portrays repentance as an active seizing of the kingdom of heaven: 
“Recogitemus ergo, fratres carissimi, mala quae fecimus et nosmetipsos assiduis lamentis atteramus. Hereditatem 
iustorum, quam non tenuimus per uitam, rapiamus per paenitentiam. Vult a nobis omnipotens Deus talem uiolentiam 
perpeti. Nam regnum caelorum rapi uult nostris fletibus, quod nostris meritis non debetur” (p. 169, 15.381-6) 
[Dearly beloved, let us think over the evils we have committed; let us give ourselves to continual sorrow.  Let us 
seize by our repentance the inheritance of the righteous which we have not kept by our way of life.  Almighty God 
desires to suffer this kind of violence from us.  He desires us to seize by our tears the kingdom of heaven which is 
not owed us on our merits] (Hurst, 48).  Humanity’s greater responsibility in salvation is consistent with Gregory’s 
position on the doctrine of grace, according to Kleist: “Prevenient grace does not make humans irresistibly choose 
good, Gregory suggests, but enables them either to cooperate with or reject God” (Striving with Grace, 43). 
38
 Although none of the extant MS collections preserve Bede’s homilies in any particular order, Hurst arranges them 
according to the Neopolitan pericopes (vii).  The numbering followed in this chapter is Hurst’s (Migne uses a 
different order.  The two numbering systems are helpfully collated by Kleist, Striving with Grace, Appendix II, 249-
66. While Bede might not have begun his series with Advent, they would have been used in the order of the 
liturgical year, making the development of the themes outlined above loosely cohere.  
39
 Bede’s first Advent homily (Mark 1:4-8, on the baptism John gave) begins with the figure of John the Baptist, the 
precursor to Christ’s coming.  He begins by focusing on John’s baptism as an anticipation of the baptism Christ 
brings, as the necessary confession and correction of sins that could then be fulfilled in Christ’s baptism of 
forgiveness.  It is then Christ’s baptism that gives “dationem carismatum spiritus” (CCSL 122, p. 6, l. 160) [the 
charismatic gifts of the Spirit] (Martin, 7).  Bede moves on from there to a typological explication of the figure of 
John in which John becomes an exemplary saint by separating himself from the allurements of the world.  He thus 
designates the lives of the saints, who “tota semper intentione animi praesentis saeculi desideria spernunt” (CCSL 
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to emphasize baptism, the first act that brings a person from death to life, introducing him to 
God’s family.  Yet he focuses more on Mary, presenting her as a loyal servant, receiving God’s 
gift of his Son in her own body, and then giving thanks for the great gift she has been given.  In 
her obedience, she serves as a model for Christians, who must also receive Christ within 
themselves, and in whom Christ must grow to fullness in order to come forth into the world.  
Like Mary, Christians should show grateful awareness for this greatest of gifts which they have 
received.  As they do this, their humility and gratitude move them into an intimate and dependent 
relationship with God.  Bede builds this theme through the first four homilies. 
While Bede explicates a two-fold scheme of grace in Homily I.2, which he then 
illustrates through Mary, many of Bede’s homilies show a pattern of gift-giving in which various 
gifts are associated with various members of the Godhead: the foundational gifts come from 
God’s creative act,40 Christ’s incarnation and sacrifice bring further gifts, and he also gives the 
“charismatic” gifts through the Holy Spirit;41 and the final gifts are associated with God the 
Father, and are the eternal rewards given in the heavenly kingdom.  Continual gift-giving, with 
its attendant concepts of grace and humility, establishes a relationship between humans and God 
that is continually invoked in the subsequent homilies.  Bede’s first homily on prayer, I.22, falls 
in Lent, a typical time in any sermon series for teachings on prayer in its collocation with fasting, 
almsgiving, and vigils.  As he approaches Easter, the theme of Christ’s sacrifice begins to 
dominate over gift-giving.  After Easter, in short order, are three more homilies on prayer, II.10, 
12, and 14.  As the liturgical year moves toward Pentecost, Bede begins to ruminate on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
122, p. 2, ll. 40-1) [always reject the desires of the present world with the whole intention of their minds] (Martin, 
2).  Bede begins laying the foundation for his understanding of humility, which he comes back to in Homily I.4.  He 
says here that what the elect have that others do not is a heightened sense of their sins: “[Q]uia minus perfectos se 
esse deprehendunt sordes suae fragilitatis undis paenitentiae diluunt” (CCSL 122, p. 3, ll. 87-8) [because they 
apprehend themselves to be less perfect, they wash away the stains of their weakness with the waves of repentance] 
(Martin, 4).  Bede ends the sermon with an exhortation to prepare for the celebration of Christ’s nativity by 
examining consciences, wiping away negligences, and acquiring virtues (CCSL 122, p. 6, ll. 177-9; Martin, 7-8).  So 
far, this is much like Gregory. (This is not surprising.  Bede borrows slightly from Gregory’s homilies at this point, 
and, like Gregory, he is discussing John the Baptist.)  Bede begins to develop his own context for understanding the 
relationship between God and man in his next homily on grace. 
40
 [D]e plenitudine conditoris nostri … omnes quicquid boni habemus accepimus” (CCSL 122, p. 8, l52-3) [all of us 
have received whatever good we have from the fullness of our Maker] (Martin, 11). 
41
 For example, “Baptizat quippe spiritu sancto qui munere spiritus sancti peccata dimittit et accepta remissione 
peccatorum etiam spiritus eiusdem gratiam tribuit” (CCSL 122, p. 6, ll. 157-60) [He indeed baptized with the Holy 
Spirit who pardoned sins by the favor of the Holy Spirit; and when they had received forgiveness of sins he also 
bestow the grace of the same Spirit] (Martin, 7). 
  
65 
meaning and effect of the second gift, that of the Holy Spirit.  The Holy Spirit enables Christians 
to perform good works, and there are several sermons on apostles that exemplify this theme; this 
naturally leads Bede back to considering gift-giving as he emphasizes that everything Christians 
have, including their good works, are gifts from God which must be used appropriately.  The 
cycle concludes with two homilies outside of the liturgical calendar on the dedications of a 
church.  In these homilies, Bede considers the heavenly and eternal congregation that the earthly 
church pictures, which ties back to gift-giving: a place in the eternal kingdom is the final gift that 
humans receive for using the gifts they have been given on earth. 
 
HOMILY I.2: GRACE, THE GIFT-GIVING RELATIONSHIP IN ABSTRACT 
 Bede’s second homily is a tour-de-force case-study of what shifting an exchange-
paradigm can do.  Because the doctrinal definition of grace, “God’s unmerited love and favor” 
which “transforms the human will so that it is capable of doing good,”42 emphasizes its one-way 
nature (from God to humans) and dominates a modern understanding of gratia, and because 
debates about gratia situate it within the theological context of human nature, free will, and 
predestination,43 it is worth resituating gratia within the field of petition and giving, to consider 
the ways it could still carry some of the more concrete semantic charge of reciprocity and 
obligation.   
 Insofar as Bede follows Augustine, he has to resist the normal, reciprocal function of the 
gift,44 just as Augustine did when adapting the social term gratia to suit his own doctrinal ends.  
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 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, a History of the Development of Doctrine, vol. 1.  The Emergence of 
the Catholic Tradition (100-600) (Chicago, 1971), 294.  
43
 See Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, vol. 1.,  278-331 and vol. 3, The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300) 
(Chicago, 1978), 80-95 for a summary of the debate.  Whether one can choose to do such good as would obligate 
God to show his favor is of course at the heart of the discussion, but this tends to be overshadowed by debates of 
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That is, socially speaking, gratia is not a free gift (unconstrained and unconstraining) because it 
creates a relationship.  Rather, gratia carries with it the value of the first gift, which is more 
valuable than any subsequent gifts because it is unconstrained.45  It is a gift experienced as being 
outside the limits of anything the recipient might have deserved or expected.  In this way, it 
affirms hierarchy, since the one giving gratia will always come out ahead in the tally of gifts (if 
one were to tally them – a practice at odds with the discourse of gratia).  Ostensibly, no return is 
expected to such a gift – except gratitude (gratia).46  Gratitude is not merely something felt but 
shown through praise, service, objects given in return.  The goal of this return-gratia is not to 
discharge the debt incurred by the first gift (which would sever the relationship) but to 
acknowledge and continue it in gratitude, because the dependent, so long as he is dependent, is 
grateful, has an expectation of further gratia on the basis of an already-established relationship. 
On the surface, Bede’s homily is a hard-hitting, Augustinian explication of grace in 
which Bede disrupts an exchange paradigm by emphasizing repeatedly that humans do not in any 
way earn God’s grace; all that they receive is gratis.47  But there are two key differences.  First, 
Augustine positions grace in opposition to a purchase/wage economy, which Bede does not do.  
Second, what Bede actually does is to subsume Augustinian grace into a reciprocal gift-paradigm 
in which humans play a more active role than in the gratia relationship Augustine lays out in his 
explication of the same passage.48  At the heart of the matter is John 1:16 (from the pericope): “et 
de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus gratiam pro gratia.”49  (And of his fulness we all have 
received grace for grace.)50  The verse presents a translation problem: is “gratiam pro gratia” to 
be understood as excess (“grace upon grace”) or as exchange (“grace in exchange for grace”)?  
The Greek clarifies the superlative nature of God’s grace (charin anti charitos, “grace upon 
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grace”), but the Latin (like the English) hovers ambiguously between the meanings of excess or 
exchange:  Is this grace in exchange for grace?  Grace in proportion to grace?  Grace by virtue of 
grace?  And whose gratia are we talking about when the word can mean either favor or 
gratitude? 51  The version of the verse Bede uses is as quoted above.  In Augustine’s explication 
of the passage, however, he makes a point of using a version that matches the Vulgate in order to 
argue for a reading that prefers the excess of grace: 
Et de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus.  Quid accepistis?  Et gratiam pro gratia.  
Sic enim habent uerba euangelica, collata cum exemplaribus graecis. Non ait: Et de 
plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus, gratiam pro gratia; sed sic ait: Et de plenitudine 
eius nos omnes accepimus, et gratiam pro gratia, id est, accepimus: ut nescio quid nos 
uoluerit intellegere de plenitudine eius accepisse, et insuper gratiam pro gratia. 
Accepimus enim de plenitudine eius, primo gratiam; et rursum accepimus gratiam, 
gratiam pro gratia.52 
[“And of His fullness have all we received.” What have you received? “And grace for 
grace.” For so run the words of the Gospel, as we find by a comparison of the Greek 
copies. He does not say, And of His fullness have all we received grace for grace; but 
thus He says: “And of His fullness have all we received, and grace for grace—that is, 
have we received; so that He would wish us to understand that we have received from His 
fullness something unexpressed, and something besides, grace for grace.]53 
The et allows Augustine to emphasize the superlative, inexpressible nature of God’s grace 
toward abject humanity and expressly to negate a conception of God’s favor being earned by 
anything humans can do. 
Initially, Bede’s focus seems, like Augustine’s, to be on the excessiveness of God’s 
grace; he celebrates the superlative nature of God’s gifts by momentarily breaking out of an 
economy of exchange entirely to one where all God does is give and all humans do is receive: 
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“omnes quicquid boni habemus accepimus curandum summopere,”54 (all of us have received 
whatever good we have from the fullness of our maker)55 he says.  “[I]llius auxilio debemus 
semper inniti qui ait: Quia sine me nihil potestis facere.”56  ([W]e ought always to rely for 
support on the help of the one who says, “For without me you can do nothing.”)57  As part of this 
project, he borrows from Augustine’s explication of the passage.  Bede says: “nos gratiam 
accepisse testatur [euangelista] unam uidelicet in praesenti alteram in futuro; in praesenti quidem 
fidem quae per dilectionem operatur in futuro autem uitam aeternam.”58  ((The evangelist) is 
testifying that we have received a twofold grace, namely one grace in the present and another for 
the future – in the present, faith which works through love, and for the future, life eternal.) 59  
Elided in this focus on the plenitude of what God gives is the counter-gift.  It seems humans are 
given “good works” and then eventually given eternal life as two separate, not-necessarily-
related bestowals.  What is ignored at this moment (although only for the moment) is that the 
good works God gives are actually carried out by humans.  The first gratia and the second 
gratia are not unconnected.  Through this momentary elision, Bede apparently resists the 
possibility of exchange within gratiam pro gratia to focus on the one-sided nature of God’s gifts.  
That is, Bede seems to follow an Augustinian doctrine of grace. 
 Let us examine more closely how Augustine frames his concept of grace in his 
explication of John 1:16.  In arguing for grace, the primary paradigm Augustine argues against is 
characterized by purchasing or wage-earning.  His intent is to correct the error of thinking that 
humans in any way deserve or can buy God’s favor with good works, and he emphasizes this 
repeatedly: “gratia tibi data est, non merces reddita. … Non enim praecendentibus meritis emisti 
quod accepisti.”60  (grace is given to you, not recompense repaid. …  Indeed, you did not by 
previous merits purchase that which you received.)  He hammers on this point: “Quid est gratis 
data?  Donata, non reddita.  Si debebatur, merces reddita est,  non gratia donata.”61  (What is 
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grace?  That which is freely given.  What is freely given?  Given, not paid.  If it was owed, 
recompense was repaid, not grace given.) Augustine’s teaching on grace attempts to disrupt a 
commodity mentality through which humans “buy” or earn grace through merit.62  To do this he 
emphasizes the completeness of human helplessness, and the gratuity of God’s gratia: “Non se 
quisque compalpet, redeat in conscientiam suam … inueniet non se dignum fuisse nisi supplicio.  
Si ergo supplicio dignus fuisti, et uenit ille qui non peccata puniret, sed peccata donaret; gratia 
tibi data est, non merces reddita.”63  (Let not each one flatter himself, but let him return into his 
own conscience … he will find that he was not worthy of anything save punishment. If, then, you 
were worthy of punishment, and He came not to punish sins, but to forgive sins, grace was given 
to you, and not reward rendered.)64  Within a purchase economy, humans have nothing that they 
can offer to “buy” God’s grace; their abjection is so complete they deserve nothing but 
punishment from him. 
 In contrast to salvation-as-commodity, Augustine outlines an economy of grace that 
looks, initially, cyclical: 
[C]ogita quid per legem tibi imminere debebat, et quid per gratiam consecutus sis. 
Consecutus autem istam gratiam fidei, eris iustus ex fide.  Iustus enim ex fide uiuit; et 
promereberis Deum uiuendo ex fide: cum promerueris Deum uiuendo ex fide, accipies 
praemium immortalitatem, et uitam aeternam. Et illa gratia est.65 
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[(C)onsider what did by right hang over you by the law, and what you have obtained by 
grace. But having obtained that grace of faith, you shall be just by faith (for the just lives 
by faith); and you shall obtain favor of God by living by faith. And having obtained favor 
from God by living by faith, you shall receive immortality as a reward, and life eternal. 
And that is grace.]66 
Augustine asserts a cycle of grace: the gratia of faith given, which the recipient lives by, thereby 
obtaining God’s favor, and finally obtaining immortality as a further favor.  The “cycle” of 
gratia, for Augustine, fundamentally negates two different exchange paradigms that both assert 
the independence67 of the participants in the exchange: buying goods and paying wages.68  At the 
same time, he frees humans from the position of merely being God’s wage-slaves; a gratia 
relationship is closer, more privileged, than being either a customer or a hired hand.   
But Augustine’s emphasis on the one-sided nature of the human/divine relationship has 
the effect of making humans passive recipients of gratia who have no real role of their own in 
maintaining or continuing the relationship between themselves and God.69  Because all favor 
comes from God – gratia is superlative, not reciprocal – God does not have any particular 
obligation toward his dependents even after the first gift is given.  The result of this is that in 
some sense all God’s gifts are always first gifts: given freely, without obligation to those who 
never have any claim on him or any reason to expect further gifts from him.  As such, they have 
the advantage of the surprise and joy that goes with a gift unlooked-for.  However, this is 
tremendously disruptive for a relationship oriented around a gift-exchange paradigm.  Therefore, 
it is instructive that what Augustine contrasts with gratia is not reciprocal gift-giving but 
purchase: neither model Augustine presents, commodity or gratia, creates mutual bonds.  This is 
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so even when Augustine briefly imagines a reciprocal model for salvation: he momentarily 
concedes that, because of God’s grace (gratiam pro gratia), one could think about the eternal 
rewards he gives (the second gratia) as a type of payment in exchange for faith (the first gratia): 
“Si enim fides gratia est, et uita aeterna quasi merces est fidei, uidetur quidem Deus uitam 
aeternam tamquam debitam reddere.”70  (If indeed faith is grace, then life eternal is like the 
payment for faith: it seems indeed as if God gives eternal life as though repaying a debt.)  As an 
example of this, he cites St. Paul, who desires his reward, a “crown of righteousness,” as though 
it were a debt due him.71  But Augustine quickly clarifies: “[I]pse dedit fidem primo … .  Quod 
ergo praemium immortalitatis postea tribuit, dona sua coronat, non merita tua.”72  (It was God 
who first gave faith … .  Therefore, in afterwards paying the rewards of immortality, he crowns 
his own gifts, not your merits.)  Augustine uses the metaphor of commodity exchange to imagine 
the transactions of grace, faith, and eternal reward.  Saints “purchase” an eternal payment from 
God through the coinage of faith, although this is a coin God gratuitously gave them in the first 
place.  Both of these models posit independence.  The “free” gift (which is not fully free for 
Augustine in that God is free, but not humans73) and a purchase resist the creation of 
relationships by means of the exchange.74  Against a model that allows humans independence, he 
asserts a model that preserves God’s independence.  While using the language of gift-exchange, 
Augustine resists actual reciprocity. 
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Bede, on the other hand, does not turn to commodity exchange for his analogies.  He 
creates a sense of the superlative nature of grace while situating grace within an exchange 
paradigm of the gift.  Before he gets to the matter of gratiam pro gratia, Bede emphasizes that 
humans have no good of their own “quia ergo de plenitudine conditoris nostri non quidam sed 
omnes quicquid boni habemus accepimus.”75  (because not only some of us, but all of us have 
received whatever good we have from the fullness of our Maker.)76  In the immediate context, 
the “good” Bede refers to is that good given through the fullness of Christ, manifest to all 
“saints”77 through the gifts of the Spirit – utterances of wisdom and knowledge, faith, healings, 
miracles, prophecy, and so forth.  But in pointing out that “all of us” receive whatever good we 
have from our Maker, Bede expands the reference of the “good” as these more spectacular 
spiritual gifts to embrace all the good qualities that come from being made in a particular way.  
All people have received good from God.  The fact of this indebtedness entails obligation upon 
the recipient: “ne si ingrates largitori remanserit, perdat bonum quod accepit.”78 ([b]y remaining 
ungrateful toward his benefactor, he may lose the good which he has received.)79  By refusing to 
enter fully into the relationship of gratia by not recognizing the obligation which God’s gifts 
place upon a person, by refusing to give gratia in response to gratia, the recipient will lose that 
which he was given in the first place and risks bringing the relationship to an end.  As mentioned 
previously, this gratitude is not merely a feeling of gratitude, but gratitude enacted through the 
continued use of God’s gifts.  For Bede, gratitude for God’s grace incurs in humans an obligation 
but also a desire to use the gifts given them or else lose them.  Bede quotes the words of Paul to 
affirm gratitude enacted, “Et gratia eius … in me uacua non fuit, sed plus illis omnibus 
laboraui.”80  (His grace has not been fruitless in me, but I have labored more than any of them.)81  
Humans do not receive God’s favor toward them in exchange for serving him but they owe God 
gratitude because of his grace. 
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In Augustine’s discussion, faith is the first “grace” of God given to humans.  He defines 
faith passively, as something done to the sinner: “Hanc ergo accepit gratiam primam peccator, ut 
eius peccata dimitterentur.”82  (This first grace therefore the sinner receives, that his sins should 
have been forgiven.)83  A little later he asks a question Bede picks up: “Quid est ergo: gratiam 
pro gratia?  Fide promeremur Deum …”84  (What is grace for grace?  By faith we render God 
favorable to us.)85  But Augustine does not define faith any further at this point.  Although Bede 
adopts this explanation, he greatly restructures Augustine’s discussion of faith.  Bede goes on to 
define faith as the works of faith: believing, loving, and more general good works.86  As Bede 
explains it, God gives the elect faith; the elect in gratitude return this faith to him in the form of 
good works; God rewards them with eternal life.87  The saints are those who respond to his gifts, 
in gratitude returning the grace given them for more grace, gratiam pro gratia. 
 By putting grace in the context of gift-giving, Bede is able to portray the relationship 
between God and man as exceptionally intimate; the superlative nature of God’s grace comes 
from the intimacy of the reciprocal relationship, one in which man and God work together 
through their mutual exchange of gifts to bring about man’s salvation and God’s glory: “In 
misericordia quippe et miseratione nos coronat quando propter bona opera quae nobis ipse 
misericorditer exercenda donauit supernae exercenda donauit supernae beatitudinis praemia 
retribuit”88  (He crowns us indeed in mercy and compassion when he repays us with the reward 
of heavenly blessedness for the good works which he himself has mercifully granted us to carry 
out)89 is one way that Bede sums up this relationship.  Because of this intimacy the fitting final 
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reward – the second grace in the two-fold scheme of grace Bede borrows from Augustine – is 
that the saints should see God face to face in order to contemplate the mysteries of the Trinity 
directly.  Bede defines immortality by using John 17:3, “Haec est autem uita aeterna ut 
cognoscant te.”  (Now this is eternal life: That they may know thee.)  This final, greatest gift 
“quoniam in huius saeculi uita fieri non potest.”90  (cannot happen in the life of this world.)91  By 
situating contemplation within the gift-giving relationship Bede removes the concept from its 
possible Neo-platonic resonances.  For Bede, the reward for a life lived in service of God is that 
one may finally see him whom one has served face to face. 
 Finally, Bede ends the homily by showing how the gift-giving economy of grace binds 
humanity together.  While some Christians gain the joy of paradise immediately upon death, 
others, “bona quidem opera ad electorum sortem praeordinati”92 (preordained to the lot of the 
elect on account of their good works) but polluted by evils, go to the “flammis ignis purgatorii”93 
(flames of the purging fire)94 to be cleansed of their vices.  Their time in purgatory can be 
lessened if those still on earth pray, give alms, fast, and weep in “hostiae salutaris oblationibus”95  
(saving sacrificial offering)96 for their friends.  Bede ends the homily by reflecting on the time 
when all of Christ’s elect will gain the gift of contemplation of God.  He modulates back to the 
theme of two-fold grace by folding his explication of the place of Moses’ law, introduced by the 
pericope, within this scheme: “cum tempore resurrectionis benedictionem dederit qui legem dedit 
ut ambulantes de uirtutem contemplationis uideant Deum deorum in Sion.”97  (at the time of 
resurrection he who gave the law will give blessing, so that, journeying from the virtue of faith 
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and hope to the virtue of contemplation, they may see the God of gods in Zion.)98  At this point, 
by “the law” Bede means that grace which is for the present manifested in the ability to do good 
works, signified by “faith.”99  This faith leads to the gift of contemplation.  Thus Bede clarifies 
that God does give grace in exchange for grace in superlative generosity: the future grace 
manifested in the favor of seeing God in exchange for the present grace which allows Christ to 
fulfill the law in his saints. 
 
HOMILIES I.3 AND I.4: GRACE ENACTED BY MARY 
Homily I.2 sets up the central reciprocity of the relationship between God and humans 
which Bede refers to or takes for granted throughout the rest of his homilies.  Both Homily I.3100 
on the Annunciation and I.4101 explicating the Magnificat present Mary as an example of one 
who enacts the reciprocity of twofold grace (although Bede does not use this specific term 
outside of Homily I.2).  In I.3 God favors Mary by recognizing her service to him through virtue 
and purity, and giving her in return the gift of his son.  In I.4 Mary responds to God primarily as 
a generous gift-giver.  Throughout, Bede emphasizes both Mary’s humble estimation of her own 
worth and her merit that brings further rewards.  That is, Mary’s gratitude is expressed in her 
response as she praises God for recognizing someone as lowly as she; part of God’s gratia is in 
recognizing and rewarding her worth.  Thus, both God and Mary give lavishly to each other, 
gratiam pro gratia. 
Bede’s account of the Annunciation negotiates the delicate doctrinal balance between 
grace and good works, making Mary a valued participant in the relationship with God through 
her humble use of the gifts given her, which then function as her return-gift to God.  After the 
angel’s greeting, Bede affirms: 
Vere etenim gratia erat plena cui diuino munere conlatum est ut prima inter feminas 
gloriosissimum Deo uirginitatis munus offerret.  Vnde iure angelico aspectu simul et 
affatu meruit perfrui quae angelicam studebat uitam imitari.  Vere gratia era plena cui 
ipsum per quem gratia et ueritas facta est Iesum Christum generare donatum est.  Et ideo 
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uere dominus cum illa erat quam et prius nouo castitatis amore a terrenis ad caelestia 
desideranda sustulit.102 
[And indeed, truly full of grace was she, upon whom it was conferred by divine favor 
that, first among women, she should offer God the most glorious gift of her virginity.  
Hence she who strove to imitate the life of an angel was rightfully worthy to enjoy the 
experience of seeing and speaking with an angel.  Truly full of grace was she to whom it 
was granted to give birth to Jesus Christ, the very one through whom grace and truth 
came.  And so the Lord was truly with her whom he first raised up from earthly to 
heavenly desires, in an unheard of love of chastity.]103 
The cycle is this: God favors Mary in allowing her to offer back to him the “gift of her virginity.”  
Because of this virginity, she is worthy of speaking with an angel.  Offering her virginity, she is 
further “granted to give birth to Jesus Christ.”  At the end of the passage Bede comes back full 
circle: Mary’s love of chastity was also one of God’s gifts.  She has responded to this gift by 
enacting it, giving her a “gift of virginity” to offer back to God, which draws her into a gratia-
cycle so intimate she becomes the mother of God’s own son.   
 The Magnificat is Mary’s response to God’s gifts.  After Elizabeth enumerates the 
blessings Mary has received, Mary “non amplius tacere potuit dona quae perceperat …”104  
(could no longer remain silent about the gifts which she had attained.)105  Then, “[q]uibus primo 
dona sibi specialiter concessa confitetur deinde generalia Dei beneficia quibus generi humano in 
aeternum consulere non desistit enumerae.”106  (With (the Magnificat) she first confesses those 
gifts which had been specially conceded to her, and then she enumerates too those ordinary 
kindnesses of God with which he does not stop consoling the human race forever.)107  The 
gratitude of Mary’s response is expressed not only in the words of the Magnificat; her thoughts 
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and deeds also align with the words: she “omnes interioris hominis sui affectus diuinis laudibus 
ac seruitiis mancipat qui obseruantia praeceptorum Dei semper eius potentiam maiestatis se 
cogitare demonstrae.”108  (commits all the affection of her interior self to divine praises and 
subjection, and by her observance of God’s commands she demonstrates that she thinks always 
of the might of his majesty.)109  That is, Mary’s grateful response is not merely words of praise, 
nor merely affection, nor merely service: it draws all aspects of the person together in a response 
focused on the worth of God.  The obligation God’s gifts lay upon her results as much from her 
internal emotional response to the situation as it is as it is the necessary response to one’s master.  
This response of grateful humility is what fits her for further divine gifts: “nequaquam se donis 
caelestibus quasi a se haec essent extulit sed ut magis magisque donis esset apta diuinis in 
custodiam humilitatis gressum mentis fixit … Ecce ancilla domini …”110  (in order that she 
might be fit for more and more divine gifts, she placed her steps firmly in the custody of humility 
of mind … “Behold, the handmaid of the Lord.”)111 Mary positions herself as God’s dependent, 
humbly expecting further gifts from her gracious master. 
 Central to the gratia relationship is Mary’s humility, which is an expression of the extent 
of her gratitude.  Her response to the angel, “Ecce ancilla domini,”112 shows, according to Bede, 
her 
[m]agnam quippe humilitatis constantiam tenet quae se ancillam sui conditoris dum 
mater eligitur appellat. …  nec se tamen de singularitate meriti excelsioris singulariter 
extollit sed potius suae conditionis ac diuinae dignationis in omnibus memor famularum 
se Christi consortio humiliter adiungit famulatum Christo deuota quod iubetur inpendit.  
Fiat, inquit, mihi secundum uerbum tuum; fiat ut spiritus sanctus adueniens me 
caelestibus dignam mysteriis reddat.113 
[great constancy of humility, since she named herself the handmaid of her Maker at the 
time when she was chosen to be his mother. … Nevertheless she did not extol herself in a 
singular way on account of the singularity of her higher merit, but being mindful instead 
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of her own condition and of God’s dignity, she humbly joined herself to the company of 
Christ’s servants and committed herself devotedly to Christ in what was ordered.  “Let it 
be done to me,” she said, “In accordance with your word” – “Let it be done that the Holy 
Spirit’s coming to me may render me worthy of heavenly mysteries.”]114 
The gratitude of Mary’s response and her humility, an expression of the extent of her gratitude, 
are part of Mary’s return-gift of service to God.  She acknowledges the generosity of God’s gift 
by placing herself among God’s servants rather than asserting any prerogatives as his mother.  
But, while Mary acknowledges her lowliness, this is not the way God names her; he calls her 
mother of his Son and gives her the honor due that position, responding to her gratitude with 
further gratia.  Both behave with perfect generosity toward each other.  God proves himself to be 
one who rewards his servants, those who use and return his gifts.  Thus, God honors Mary 
through his messenger: the angel greets her with a greeting “humanae consuetudini inaudita … 
beatae Mariae dignitati congrua.”115  (unheard of … in human custom … fitting to the dignity of 
blessed Mary.”)116  Furthermore, he privileges her in a special way: “Nec praetereundum quod 
beata Dei genetrix meritis praecipius etiam nomine testimonium reddit.  Interpretatur enim stella 
maris.  Et ipsa quasi sidus eximium inter fluctus saeculi labentis gratia priuilegii specialis 
refulsit.”117  (Nor should we overlook the fact that the blessed mother of God rendered testimony 
of her preeminent merits even by her name, for it has the meaning ‘star of the sea,’ and like an 
extraordinary heavenly body among the storms of this tottering world she shone brightly with the 
grace of her special privilege.)118 
 The passage just quoted exemplifies the dual way that Bede treats the issue of merit 
within the gratia relationship.  In Homily I.2 he carefully shows that all gifts humans have come 
from God and that everything humans do to merit the grace of God they do through his gifting in 
the first place, but his later treatment of the subject assumes both this and also that saints merit 
the favor of God.  Thus Mary gains the grace of special privilege through her preeminent merits, 
signified by her the name, “star of the sea.”  Mary’s humility is part of the extent of her gratitude.  
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But Bede does not speak of her as God’s lowly servant.  In Bede’s view, Mary is singular in her 
purity, obedience, and humility.  Her virtues are a gift from God, but they are merits insofar as 
she has made use of them.  That she has made use of them has merited her further singularity: 
she is singular in being given the literal gift of bearing Christ in her body.  Bede can recognize 
that Mary’s virtues have earned merits which God rewards.  This also becomes a part of God’s 
grace: that he himself ratifies this view of Mary, and attributes to Mary’s merit that which he 
gave her in the first place.  Mary “[n]il ergo meritis suis tribuit quae totam suam magnitudinem 
ad illius donum refert …”119  (therefore attributes nothing to her own merits, but she refers her 
whole greatness to (God))120 but there is, in Bede’s mind, no question that Mary is indeed great – 
she “[eum] cororaliter generare meruit.”121  (was worthy to bring him forth physically.)122  That 
is, there is a difference in the way Mary refers to herself and the way others refer to her.  While 
Bede reports that everything she had came from God, he, unlike Mary, attributes this merit to her 
own preeminence since he continually refers to her merit and her worth without continually 
mentioning that that was also God’s gift in the first place. 
 There is then some sense of the astounding nature of God’s gifts as Bede continues, 
drawing parallels between Mary and ordinary humans.  At the beginning of Homily I.3 Bede 
established that the annunciation is not just to Mary but to all the elect, especially, by 
implication, those committed to chastity:123 “Vt ergo ad promissae salutis mereamur dona 
pertingere primordium eius intenta curemus aure percipere.”124  (That therefore we may deserve 
to reach the gifts of promised salvation, we must take care to receive its beginning with an 
attentive ear.)125  For a moment he leaves ambiguous whether he means Christ as the beginning 
or origin of salvation, or the story of the annunciation and nativity as the beginning of the 
salvation process offered to humans.  Through this ambiguity, Bede implies an equivalence for 
his audience between receiving the story and receiving Christ; as the congregation hears the story 
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of the Annunciation they can replicate Mary’s conception of Christ126 by hearing the story of his 
nativity and internalizing it.   
He returns to this idea at the end.  As ordinary humans show themselves obedient to 
God’s commands they, like Mary, bring forth Christ into the world and through this merit a 
reward: “tamen in eadem uita perpetua beatitudinis locum et ipsi sint habituri qui eius fidem ac 
dilectionem casto in corde concipiunt qui sedula in mente praeceptorum eius memoriam portant 
qui hanc et in mente proximorum solerti exhortatione nutrire satagunt.”127  (those who conceive 
his faith and love in a chaste heart, who bear the recollection of his precepts in a sincere mind, 
and who busy themselves nourishing this recollection also in the mind of their neighbors by 
skillful exhortation, they too will have a place in the same everlasting life of blessedness (as 
Mary).)128  Inasmuch as Mary is a model for Christians, and especially those devoted to 
chastity,129 she presents a model for Bede’s audience to consider their own relationship with 
God.  This has special resonance for people, many of whom, like Bede himself, would not have 
chosen for themselves the monastic life of chastity.  Bede’s homily reorients thinking; chastity is 
not something imposed upon a person by the fate of the parental gift of a child to a monastery, 
but is rather a gift directly from God, given not in response to merit, but by God’s special grace.  
As Bede’s audience receives and enacts this gift already received, they too can share in the gift 
of bringing Christ into the world. 
 At the end of Homily I.3, Bede draws his hearers into a gift-relationship with God as well 
by calling on them to imitate Mary’s  
uocem mentemque nos … pro modulo nostro sequentes famulos esse nos Christi in 
cunctis actibus nostris motibusque recolamus … sicque perceptis eius munibus gratias 
recte uiuendo reddamus ut ad maiora percipienda digni existere mereamur.  Precemur 
seduli cum beata Dei genetrice ut fiat nobis secundum uerbum eius …130 
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[voice and mind … let us recall that we are Christ’s servants in all of our acts and 
motions. …  (S)ince we have received his gifts, let us give thanks by living properly, so 
that we may show ourselves worthy of receiving greater gifts.  Let us unremmittingly 
(sic) pray, along with the blessed mother of God, that it may be done to us in accordance 
with his word …]131   
As his audience accepts the gift of chastity they have been given, they are to realize that this gift 
puts them in a special relationship with God, as his servants.  Because they have already 
received his gifts, they must show gratia in return, by serving him.  Their response to God’s gifts 
precipitates further gift-giving, forging a relationship between them of lord and servants.  
Finally, God’s gift of his Son becomes assurance that God will listen to his dependents’ requests: 
“Nec dubitandum quin nos de profundis ad se clamantes citius exaudire dignabitur propter quos 
necdum se cognoscentes ipse ad profundam hanc conuallem lacrimarum descendere …”132  
([T]here is no doubt that he will very quickly deign to hearken to us who cry out to him from the 
depths, since for our sake, when we did not yet recognize him, he deigned to descend to this deep 
valley of tears …)133 
 For Bede the Magnificat is a direct response to God’s gifts.  It sets forward a model of a 
relationship that monks will enact every day at Vespers (as Bede mentions at the end of the 
homily)134 as they chant the Magnificat themselves as part of the liturgy.  Key to this model is a 
conception of humility and pride that centers on the human response to God’s gifts.  Chanting 
Mary’s hymn daily gives monks a chance to reflect on Mary’s example.  It prompts prayers and 
tears by which the mind cleanses itself.  It therefore gives a model for the intimacy of the 
relationship between human and God, an intimacy that can never be presumed upon because its 
primary condition is humility, the recognizing of gifts and favor unearned and unasked-for. 
 
The first four homilies especially introduce themes that are touched on and referenced 
again and again throughout the succeeding homilies.  Homilies 5 and 6 continue to build on these 
themes  as Advent transitions to Christmas.  Homily I.6, the first Christmas homily, details the 
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gift of Christ, but also presents other models available to Bede for conceptualizing the human 
relationship with God, namely taxation and servitude.  These models, however, never attain the 
same importance as the gift-giving model.  Through the motif of the giving of gifts, and the 
explication of grace and humility, Bede establishes a particular relationship between humans and 
God, one in which all good and all gifts proceed from God’s favor.  Bede contextualizes the gift-
relationship not as mercenary or as passive but as reciprocal, though initiated and cemented with 
gifts – God’s.  Humans in humility must recognize that all they have comes from God; they are 
then obligated to use these gifts in service of their Lord.  Once they recognize this, God endows 
them with even greater gifts, the ability to act in such a way as to deserve the future gifts of the 
heavenly kingdom.  Gift-giving is characterized by three stages: the initial gift of God’s Son, the 
continuing gifts of the Holy Spirit teaching us to live well, and the future, promised gift of 
eternal life in the heavenly kingdom.  It is within this particular kind of relationship that people 
pray to God. 
 
PRAYER WITHIN THE GRATIA-RELATIONSHIP 
Homilies I.2-4 establish the gratia relationship that believing people find themselves in 
when they respond to God’s gratia with gratia.  However, Mary never asks God for anything in 
Homilies I.3 and 4.  While she models the kind of relationship Christians have with God that 
frames petition, she does not seem to present a clear model of prayer.  At the same time, she does 
hope for future gifts from God, which she puts herself in a position of receiving through 
gratefully performing the good deeds she has been given.  It is in this important way that Mary’s 
example becomes key for an understanding of prayer in Bede: Bede’s conception of prayer is 
fundamentally oriented toward action within the gratia-relationship.  In addition, prayer is 
primarily the petition for salvation.  What Mary does is to enact the gifts given her in the hope of 
the future gratia of salvation.  For Bede, prayer, which encompasses all actions, thoughts, and 
even silences, is also a gift enacted and given back to God in the hope of future gratia. 
 Prayer works in a complex way in Bede because he pulls in elements from the penitential 
tradition of prayer (God as judge, prayer as cleansing), the ritual structure of praying the 
canonical hours as part of the church’s opus Dei (in Benedict’s term), and elements of the eastern 
tradition of the purifying and transforming function of prayer (although heavily modified, as 
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DeGregorio, in part, shows).  He does this all within the frame of the gift-relationship, and with a 
primary conception of prayer as gift and as the petition for gifts.  From this conception a strong 
sense emerges that prayer enacts belonging within God’s kingdom and before God’s presence, 
tying together both gift and transformation within prayer 
 Bede’s fifty-homily collection has a high number of homilies on prayer.  Homilies II.12 
and II.14 are both entirely about prayer.  The first explicates John 16:23135 and is primarily 
concerned to point out that this promise applies to anything pertaining to salvation, and to 
consider the reasons why a person’s prayer might not be answered.  The second focuses on Luke 
11:9-13 and considers the reasons for and effects of perseverance in prayer.  Homily II.10 begins 
with a passage on prayer as a gift to God, and Homily I.22 presents prayer for the forgiveness of 
sins of others and of oneself.  Because Bede makes some of the same points in different 
homilies, I will not go through these homilies one by one.  Instead, I propose to discuss some of 
the main points of Bede’s understanding of prayer as they appear in these homilies, and then 
conclude by applying these observations to Homily I.22, one of Bede’s more complicated 
discussions of the “psychology” of prayer. 
 
INTEGRATED PRAYER: WORDS, DEEDS, AND THOUGHTS 
 To understand Bede’s theory of prayer, it is key to realize first of all that prayer is for 
salvation, the only petition that God promises to hear and to grant.  In Homily II.12 this is how 
Bede explains the problematic promise in John 16:23, that anything asked in Jesus’s name will 
be given to the petitioner.  To the naïve this could seem to promise anything at all, from physical 
health to a pony for Christmas; petition would thus seem to center on the will of the petitioner 
rather than of the granter.  In response to this Bede teaches, “[I]llos solum in nomine saluatoris 
petere qui ea quae ad perpetuam salutem pertinent petunt.”136  ([T]hose people alone ask in the 
name of the Savior who ask for those things which pertain to eternal salvation.)137  Many of the 
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Fathers allow that people can ask for material things as well, so long as their requests are not 
excessive or greedy.  Bede also makes this allowance in II.14, but he takes a harder line:  
Male petunt et illi qui terrena magis in oratione quam caelestia bona requirunt ….  Neque 
enim prohibentur ciues patriae caelestis in terra peregrinantes pro pace temporum pro 
salute corporum pro ubertate frugum pro serenitate aurarum pro ceteris uitae huius 
necessariis dominum petere, si tamen haec non nimie petantur et si ob id solummodo 
petantur ut abundante uiatico in praesenti liberius ad futura dona tendatur.138 
[They also ask wrongly who in their prayers demand earthly rather than heavenly goods. 
… The citizens of the heavenly fatherland, while they are pilgrims on this earth, are not 
forbidden to ask the Lord for peaceful times, bodily health, abundant crops, good 
weather, and other necessities of this life, if these things are not asked for inordinately, 
and if they are asked for only for this reason, that with abundant food for the journey in 
this present life, they may more freely reach out toward future gifts.]139 
Compare this to Gregory:  
In domo enim Jesu Jesum non quaeritis, si in aeternitatis templo importune pro 
temporalibus oratis. Ecce alius in oratione quaerit uxorem, alius petit uillam, alius 
postulat uestem, alius dari sibi deprecatur alimentum. Et quidem cum haec desunt, ab 
omnipotenti Deo petenda sunt. Sed meminisse continue debemus quod ex mandato 
eiusdem nostri Redemptoris accepimus, Quaerite primum regnum Dei et iustitiam eius, et 
haec omnia adicientur uobis.140 Et haec itaque ad Iesu petere non est errare, si tamen non 
nimie petantur.141 
[You are not seeking Jesus in the house of Jesus if you are praying unreasonably for 
temporal things in the temple of eternity.  One seeks in his prayer for a wife, another a 
country estate, another for clothing, another prays earnestly for food.  We are indeed to 
ask these things from almighty God when we lack them.  But we must constantly 
remember what we have received from our Redeemer’s precept: Seek first the kingdom of 
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God and his justice, and all these things will be given you as well.  To ask these things of 
Jesus, then, is not to go wrong, if our requests are not excessive.]142 
While Gregory corrects his audience, he also assures them that they are free to pray for temporal 
things, so long as their requests are not excessive.  Bede makes the same concession; however, 
he emphasizes first that they ask “male” who demand earthly rather than heavenly goods at all; 
Gregory uses the slightly softer “importune.”  Bede then concedes that they are “not forbidden” 
to ask for material things, but ends by emphasizing once again that even these requests are to be 
made with an eye for eternal salvation. 
Part of the explanation for Bede’s sterner tone is because his audience is monastic (and 
therefore held to a higher standard of renunciation) whereas Gregory preached to mixed 
congregations.143  But partly this is also because prayer, in the works-encompassing definition 
preferred by Bede, can only become transformative if people are praying for transformation.  
That is, if people are praying for material goods, good works can become a means to that end, a 
do ut des bargain with God.  In Bede’s relational context for prayer such calculation debases the 
gratia relationship, introducing the possibility that people would serve God to aggrandize 
themselves in this world.  If, on the other hand, people pray for eternal life, good works enact 
that prayer as people perform the salvation for which they pray.  That is, as he did with Mary, 
God gives eternal life as a reward for good works.  As people perform good works, they both 
manifest their gratitude to God for previous gifts, and, as they pray, demonstrate their 
dependence upon him for future gifts. 
Because prayer is relational, expressed and enacted within a gratia relationship, the 
question of unanswered prayer takes on some urgency.  Unanswered prayer presents a danger to 
belief, and not only belief in God’s power: unanswered prayer could imply that the petitioner has 
fallen out of God’s favor.  In a later homily, Bede formulates the relationship thus: “Ipse rogari 
ut praestet amat qui animos inopum ad se rogandum largus donator erigit.”144  ((God) loves to be 
asked so that he can give – he who, as a generous donor, raises up the minds of the needy to ask 
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of him.)145  If God is unresponsive to the petition of one with whom he is in a gift-giving 
relationship and who is using the gifts given him properly, his unresponsiveness calls the whole 
relationship between God and that person into question.  God cannot selectively ignore the 
requests he does not want to hear; doing so implies that the petitioner is out of favor, that grace 
has been withdrawn, or that God himself does not keep faith with those who serve him.  That a 
petitioner is out of favor is, indeed, one reason Bede gives for God not hearing petitions.146  The 
other two reasons for unanswered prayer, however, explain it as a manifestation of God’s 
continued gratia.  In the first case, God’s grace keeps the petitioner from harm: “Quotiescumque 
ergo petentes non exaudimur ideo fit quia … contra auxilium nostrae salutis petimus ac propterea 
a misericorde patre beneficii gratia nobis quod inepte petimus negatur.”147  (Whenever we are 
not listened to when we ask, it happens … because we are are [sic] asking for something contrary 
to what would aid our salvation, and for this reason the grace of his kindness is denied us by our 
merciful Father because we are unsuitably asking.)148  In the last instance Bede clarifies that 
when Christians are unable to obtain the salvation of those for whom they pray, the petitioners 
might not have their specific request granted, but they will be rewarded for the love they have 
shown: “tamen cum aliorum erratibus misericorditer interuenimus praemium nostrae benignitatis 
restituet.”149  (when we mercifully intercede for the lapses of others, he will grant us a reward for 
our generosity.)150  Interceding for others, whether they personally “deserve” to be saved or not, 
is still a good work which will receive reward from God.  Bede assures that those praying to God 
have a particular kind of relationship in which the one with a right to petition cannot simply be 
ignored.151 
 Bede blurs the line between prayer and works by focusing prayer as the petition for 
salvation; another way he does the same thing is in his solution to the problem presented by the 
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command in I Thessalonians 5:17, to pray without ceasing.  Early Christian literature on prayer 
often addresses how one can do this.152  Teachers had various solutions to this problem.  Some, 
like Tertullian, understood it in part to mean that prayer was acceptable “[o]mni … loco quem 
opportunitas aut etiam necessitas importarit.”153  (in every place … which propriety or even 
necessity suggests.)  Many understood it as a command to pray continually (i.e., regularly); the 
Divine Office was one way to fulfill this command.154  Others, however, aimed for continuous 
prayer.  Augustine gave one solution:  
Numquid sine intermissione genu flectimus, corpus prosternimus, aut manus leuamus, ut 
dicat: Sine intermissione orate?  Aut si sic dicimus nos orare, hoc puto sine intermissione 
non possumus facere.  Est alia interior sine intermissione oratio, quae est desiderium. … 
Si non uis intermittere orare, noli intermittere desiderare.155 
[(C)an we be on our knees all the time, or prostrate ourselves continuously, or be holding 
up our hands uninterruptedly, that he bids us, Pray without ceasing?  If we say that these 
things constitute prayer, I do not think we can pray without ceasing.  But there is another 
kind of prayer that never ceases, an interior prayer that is desire. …  If you do not want to 
interrupt your prayer, let your desire be uninterrupted.  Your continuous desire is your 
continuous voice.]156 
For Augustine the “oratio, quae est desiderium” is an interior state of longing for the heavenly 
kingdom.  In the larger passage, he inflects this desire with a charity not obviously manifest in 
particular deeds, but in the cry of the heart.157  
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Bede’s solution to the same problem is notably different.  For Bede people fulfill the 
command to pray without ceasing by performing good works.  In Homily II.22 he says: 
quia quicquid boni operantur aut dicunt qui simplici intentione Deo deseruiunt totum 
profecto hoc uicem pro eis orationis adimplet quando deuotionem mentis eorum diuinis 
commendat aspectibus.  Neque aliter apostolicum illud praeceptum quo ait, sine 
intermissione orate, perficere ualemus nisi sic omnes actus sermones cogitatus ipsa etiam 
silentia nostra ita domino donante dirigamus ut singulahaec cum timoris illius respectu 
temperentur ut cuncta perpetuae nostrae saluti proficua reddantur.158 
[(W)hatever good work those who are zealous in their service of God perform or speak 
about with unfeigned intention fills for them the place of prayer, when it directs the 
devotion of their minds to the divine presence.  We are not otherwise capable of carrying 
out the command of the Apostle wherein he says, Pray without ceasing, unless we direct 
all our actions, utterances, thoughts, and even our silence, by God’s gift, in such a way 
that each of these may be carried out with regard to fear of him, so that all of them may 
be rendered profitable for our eternal salvation.]159 
If Augustine blurs the line between desire and prayer, Bede blurs the line between prayer and 
good works.  He does so in a way that integrates the interior state of “unfeigned (simplici) 
intention” and “thoughts” with the exterior “actions,” so that the prayer of good works becomes a 
type of service to God, because it “deuotionem mentis eorum diuinis commendat apsectibus.”  
The wording here seems to resonate faintly with Augustine’s “interior … oratio, quae est 
desiderium.”  Bede, however, emphasizes the way people perform their devotion to God through 
good works, in this way enacting what they are praying for through interiorizing and 
exteriorizing their prayer.  It is “good work” that brings about the “devotion of their minds.”  
Bede imagines prayer as bringing one into the divine presence, carrying out actions, utterances, 
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thoughts and silence with regard to the fear of God, and so gaining gratia that will bring further 
gratia. 
The interiorization and exteriorization of integrated prayer within the congruence 
between what one says, what one thinks, and what one does160 is a continual theme in Bede.  In 
the context of prayer, it comes up in each homily on prayer.  It is this congruence that makes 
petition effective through making the precators “worthy.”  In Homily II.14, for one example, 
Bede says:  
regnum caelorum non otiosis et uacantibus sed petentibus quaerentibus pulsantibus 
dandum inueniundum et aperiendum esse testatur.  Petenda est ergo ianua regni orando 
quaerenda recte uiuendo pulsanda perseuerando.  Non enim sufficit uerbis tantummodo 
rogare, si non etiam quaesierimus diligentius qualiter nobis sit uiuendum ut digni simus 
impetrare quae poscimus.161 
[(T)he kingdom of heaven is not to be given to, found by, and opened to those who are 
idle and unoccupied, but to those who ask for it, seek after it and knock at its gates.  The 
gate of the kingdom must be asked for by praying; it must be sought after by living 
properly; it must be knocked at by persevering.  It is not sufficient to ask in words only if 
we do not also seek diligently how we ought to be living, so that we may be worthy to 
obtain that for which we plead.]162   
It is the congruence between words and deeds (in this instance) that make a petition obtainable, 
but the two operate as more or less the same thing: both are integral parts to the petition for 
salvation.  On the one hand, since people are praying for admission into the kingdom, they must 
behave in a way congruent with those who belong in the kingdom – one cannot plead to be a 
subject of God without at the same time seeking to act like a subject.  On the other hand, these 
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good works enacted are themselves what allow people to gain the “worth” to obtain that for 
which they plead.  That is, the good deeds are not traded for entrance into the kingdom.  Rather, 
through them people gain the standing, a position, to gain the further gratia of having their 
petition addressed (and granted).  Good deeds become part of the gift and the promise of the 
petition.  In this passage salvation is thought of in terms of being-subject-to; petition and its 
attendant good works move a person from outside the kingdom to inside the kingdom through 
God’s gratia and through the way enactment of this gratia transforms the one praying.  As we 
will see, this same movement from outside to inside is conceptualized in terms of transformation 
and purity in Homily I.22.  In both cases integrated prayer places one in a position where one can 
be heard and can belong. 
 
HOMILY II.10: DEVOTION, GIFTS, AND PURITY IN PRAYER 
 It is tempting to call the congruence between word and deed by the name of sincerity; 
from this perspective, the congruence of word and deed acts as guarantee for the sincere 
intention of the one praying, of his “simplex intentio.”163  But Bede more commonly calls the 
congruence between word, thought, and deed by the name of purity.164  Homily II.10 most 
clearly shows the way that purity in the petitioning relationship works to transform the petitioner 
into that which he is petitioning to be, and it roots the concept of purity within the word-based 
nature of prayer that is then enacted exteriorly and interiorly as a gift to God.  Homily II.10 is an 
after-Easter homily on the women who come to Jesus’ tomb bearing spices on the morning of his 
resurrection.165  For the purposes of prayer, Bede’s explication of Luke 24:1 is the important 
part: “una autem sabbati valde diluculo venerunt ad monumentum portantes quae paraverant 
aromata.”166  (And on the first day of the week, very early in the morning, they came to the 
sepulchre, bringing the spices which they had prepared.)167   
At first, it looks like the women’s action presents a particular emotional model of devoted 
love that motivates their actions and which Bede’s audience is perhaps to emulate: “Quod autem 
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mulieres dominum quaesiturae ualde diluculo uenerunt ad monumentum magnam sui amoris 
erga illum deuotionem demonstrant.”168  (The fact that the women came to the tomb very early in 
the morning in order to seek the Lord proves the great devotedness of their love for him.)169  But 
when Bede applies their example to his audience he transmutes this “desire to find the Lord”170 
not into a call to emulate the women’s devotio amoris, but to perform good works and pray; he 
continually shifts devotion from an interior state to something to be enacted.  Bede’s audience’s 
devotion to the Lord is to be expressed through the gift of their prayers as enacted through their 
deeds and internalized in their thoughts. 
 Bede’s explication of this verse could be outlined thus: 
1. The women seek the Lord at dawn / We seek the Lord shining with good works. 
2. They bring spices / We bring the gift of spiritual prayer. 
a. Brought early in the morning / Accompanied by good works and inward 
compunction. 
b. Prepared beforehand / Having purged our thoughts of pointless thoughts. 
In his allegorical interpretation, Bede shifts the focus from the women’s supposed motive, 
devoted love, to what is “proper” for one seeking his Lord.  He thus shifts the emphasis from 
love as the source of action to the necessity for good works to accompany prayer.  While the 
women’s seeking of the tomb “sui amoris erga illum deuotionem demonstrant,”171 (proves the 
great devotedness of their love for (the Lord))172 Bede never specifically asks his audience to feel 
the amor associated with devotio, rather he asks them to perform devotio through the gift of their 
prayers: “Decet autem nos sicut operum bonorum luce fulgidos ita etiam spiritalium orationum 
gratia refertos dominum quaerere.”173  (Just as it is proper for us to seek the Lord shining with 
the light of good works, so also is it proper for us to seek him abundantly provided with the gift 
of spiritual prayers.)174  Prayer functions in a double way as both the gift a dependent brings as 
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acknowledgment of dependence and in hope of gaining a response to a request, as Bede makes 
clear in this negative example: 
Nam qui ad orandum ecclesiam ingressus inter uerba obsecrationis consuetudinem 
superfluae cogitationis ab animo repellere neglegit quasi dominum quaerens minus parata 
secum aromata detulit.175 
[One who enters a church to pray, and neglects to drive away from his mind its usual 
superfluous thoughts while he pours forth his words of entreaty, is like a person seeking 
the Lord without bringing with him the spices he has prepared.]176 
Relationally, this means that people confirm their place in the gratia relationship through 
bringing their petitions to their Lord.  Petition expresses their sense of their dependence on the 
Lord, while at the same time reinforcing the sense of privilege inherent in the freedom to come 
before him.  The gift of prayer that they bring binds together feeling and action as an expression 
of gratitude.  Prayer is also the request itself.  Bede describes these prayers in more detail: 
“Aromata etenim nostra uoces sunt orationum in quibus desideria cordis nostri domino 
commendamus.”177  (Our spices are our voices in prayer, in which we set forth before the Lord 
the desires of our hearts.)178  Exactly whose desires these are will be addressed in a moment.  For 
now, we notice that Bede once again shifts from desire to works.  Prayer is accompanied by two 
things, good actions first of all: 
Diluculo igitur aromata ad monumentum domini ferimus cum memores passionis ac 
mortis quam pro nobis suscepit et actionum bonarum proximis foris lucem monstramus et 
suauitate purae conpunctionis intus in corde feruemus quod et omnibus horis et tunc 
maxime fieri oportet cum ecclesiam oraturi ingredimur.179 
[We bear spices to the tomb of the Lord early in the morning when, mindful of the 
passion and death which he underwent for us, we show to our neighbor outwardly the 
light of our good actions, and are inwardly aflame in our heart with the delight of simple 
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compunction.  We must do this at all times, but especially when we go into church in 
order to pray.]180 
And, secondly, pure thoughts: 
aromata namque quae ad obsequium domini portemus prius parasse est adeo cor ante 
tempus orationis a superuacuis expurgare cogitationibus ut in ipso tempore orandi nil 
sordidum mente recipere nil rerum labentium cogitare nulla praeter ea quae precamur et 
ipsum cui supplicamus meminere nouerimus.181 
[(T)he earlier preparation of the spices we carry to perform our service to the Lord is the 
purging of our hearts from pointless thoughts before the time of prayer, so that at the time 
of prayer we are able to admit nothing unclean into our minds, and to think of nothing 
that concerns transitory matters beyond what we are making our entreaty for, and to 
remember who it is whom we are supplicating.]182 
Bede continually binds these three things together in his discussions of prayer: the words and 
actions of prayer itself, good works, and singleness of mind.  Bede gives here, not a formula for 
how to get what you want from God, but the way that prayer is transformative.  Bede does not 
frame the issue at stake in prayer as one of incongruence between the primary inner self, and 
action as a reflection of the self (i.e., the true, inner self is not expressed in prayer), but rather as 
one of understanding one’s position in relation to God, and that what one owes God be enacted 
both through the actions of good deeds and of thought.  This conception of the self is 
fundamentally relational – the individual is “true” or “pure” only as he enacts what he is 
expected to be, a devoted subject of his Lord. 
It is thus significant that when those praying express the desires of their hearts, they do 
not actually express desires originating with themselves in their prayers.  When Bede says, 
“Aromata etenim nostra uoces sunt orationum in quibus desideria cordis nostri domino 
commendamus,”183  (Our spices are our voices in prayer, in which we set forth before the Lord 
the desires of our hearts)184 he continues to identify these desires with the “mundissima 
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sanctorum praecordia,”185 (the purest inmost longings of the saints).186  These desires are not 
primarily the desires of the individual praying; rather, those praying adopt the desires of the 
saints captured and preserved within the prayers of the church which are then to be enacted by 
those praying. 
People earn the final reward of the heavenly kingdom through the purity of their lives, 
which must be understood in the context of integrated prayer.  Through this, Bede reforms the 
Cassianic notion of purity as apatheia – the monk’s disengagement from the material world and 
bodily desires – into a purity comparatively more engaged with the world, more integrated 
within community, and more concretely relational in its conception of God.  This is not a 
watered-down version of monastic prayer aimed at unsophisticated new Christians,187 but a 
coherent re-orientation of the relationship between humanity and God expressed in prayer as 
Bede moves away from Neo-platonic abstraction and toward a more concretely realized gift-
oriented relationship with God. 
For Bede, purity of thoughts and purity of works is linked in such a way that true pure 
prayer means congruence between what one is saying (prayer), doing (works), and thinking 
(thoughts) – an integrated performance of precators’ subjection to God.  As is consistent 
throughout Bede’s work, works and thoughts originate in the words of prayer.  Unlike the 
women, who seek Christ’s tomb early in the morning from devotion, many in Bede’s 
congregation would have found themselves in church first, devoted to such a life by their 
parents.  Furthermore, they would not be praying their own thoughts and feelings, but the 
prescribed prayers of the Divine Office.  It is these prayers that the person’s works and thoughts 
must conform to, and it is from this practice that devotion ideally springs, as the words and the 
practice of prayer are internalized.  Without this congruence prayer-as-gift is neither prayer nor a 
gift at all but rather a species of neglect.  As quoted above: “Nam qui ad orandum ecclesiam 
ingressus inter uerba obsecrationis consuetudinem superfluae cogitationis ab animo repellere 
neglegit quasi dominum quaerens minus parata secum aromata detulit.”188  (One who enters a 
church to pray, and neglects to drive away from his mind its usual superfluous thoughts while he 
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pours forth his words of entreaty, is like a person seeking the Lord without bringing with him the 
spices he has prepared.)189 
In this way prayer both expresses and creates devotion.  Bede presents the women who 
seek Jesus’ tomb as a model, but the way that he consistently displaces “devotio amoris” with the 
good works surrounding prayer in his discussion suggests that he understands devotion much as 
he understands humility and the response of gratia.  That is, devotion is not primarily a feeling, 
but is the dutiful, moral response to gifts that is expressed through good works and pure 
thoughts.  Bede’s audience is asked to emulate the women’s devotion by adopting the women’s 
story as a model for how they should approach the Eucharist, and to seek their Lord with the 
same devotion.  But in order for them to do this, the order of events is backward: the women 
come to seek the Lord because they are devoted.  Bede’s audience grows in devotion because, 
responding to God’s gifts, they come.   
 
HOMILY I.22 AND THE PYSCHOLOGY OF BELONGING 
Homily I.22 is one of Bede’s most detailed and psychological explications of prayer, and 
thus is an excellent way to bring together and conclude the preceding discussion of prayer.  In 
this Lenten homily Bede lays out the way that prayer is an essential expression of the dependent 
relationship of humans upon God, complemented by God’s reciprocal responsibility to hear the 
prayers of those whom he has deigned to call his own, and he situates prayer within what we 
might call the “psychology of repentance.”  Although focusing more explicitly on individual 
prayer than the other homilies, Homily I.22 situates prayer both within the community and 
within the individual.  Crucially, Homily I.22 also indicates the way that prayer is the essential 
means toward transformation from not-belonging to belonging, from slavery to sins instigated by 
the devil to obedience to the commands of Christ wherein lies full humanity.  Complicating this, 
the homily also apparently presents a complex “psychology” of sin and repentance that, for 
modern readers, is too easily read through a post-Romantic interiorization of the “true” self as 
the source of action. 
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The pericope for this homily is Matthew 15: 21-28, in which a gentile woman asks Jesus 
to heal her demon-possessed daughter.  Patristic authorities primarily represent the gentile 
woman as an example of humility.190  For Bede, the gentile woman affords an opportunity to talk 
about prayer in a far more detailed way than others do.  It is a nicely balanced and deceptively 
simple homily.  The gentile woman comes to Jesus to beg him to heal her demon-possessed 
daughter.  On the literal level of explication, this shows, for Bede, that she believes Jesus is God.  
She manifests this virtue of faith through three more virtues, patience, constancy,191 and 
humility.  As a result, those around her, including Jesus, recognize that she deserves (meruit)192 
to have her request granted.  On the allegorical level, the mother stands first for the Church, who 
pleads for her “daughter,” any soul in the Church who has fallen under the influence of malign 
spirits.  Since the Church cannot heal this soul herself, she prays for the “interius inspirando”193 
(interior inspiring) of Christ and enlists the help of the saints (represented in the literal story by 
the disciples) to gain her petition.  As the church manifests the same virtues manifested by the 
mother, her petition is granted.  Secondly, the mother stands for the individual praying for the 
healing of his “daughter,” his own demon-dominated conscience.  As he prays with tears, begs 
the saints (again represented by the disciples) for help, and manifests his faith, humility, and 
constancy, God may grant his request, restoring serenity of mind and purity of works, 
transforming him in the process from gentile dog to Israelite sheep.  Bede ends by emphasizing 
the necessity of congruence between word, thought, and deed: for prayer to be efficacious it must 
be prayed with attention.  An individual’s thoughts must agree with what his mouth is saying, 
and that this is best done if everything a person does and says reflect the desired purity. 
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The homily presents several layers of complexity.  While Bede states that the mother’s 
actions reveal her inner disposition of belief,194 interior disposition is de-centered as a motivation 
as Bede applies her example to his audience.  Toward the end of the homily he talks at length 
about attention in prayer.  When he gets to the application at the end his emphasis is not at all on 
the interior disposition that motivated the mother’s petition, but rather on the importance of not 
letting one’s mind wander as one is repeatedly praying.  This being the case, how exactly is 
prayer an exterior manifestation of either an individual’s interior disposition or his virtues?  As 
also happens in Homily II.10, prayer and the motivation to pray seem to work one way for the 
character in the story and quite another way for the audience.   
Furthermore, even though the woman seems motivated by interior disposition to seek the 
Lord as an individual, Bede’s first and most natural allegorization reads her as the Church as a 
whole rather than an individual Christian.  The first allegorization works on the level of doctrinal 
teaching to express the new relationship between Jesus, the Jews, and the inclusion of gentiles in 
a reconstituted Israel.  It explains the role of the Church as a whole in the salvation of the souls 
entrusted to her keeping.  On this level, the allegory “works” in a straightforward fashion.  The 
timeless and institutional Church, as a guardian of the true faith, shows her fidelity through 
particular instances of petition.  In this sense, belief comes before any particular instance of 
petition.  But in the second allegorization the two figures of mother and daughter represent one 
person, and the allegory does not so much present doctrine as it does practice – how to repent of 
sin and ask for pardon.  It therefore becomes possible to read the allegory as a particular type of 
interior psychological representation of the individual struggling to express his “true” self as 
determined by interior desire. 
Finally, the allegoresis presents an apparent challenge to my argument about the nature of 
prayer in Bede’s homilies.  I have been arguing that prayer in Bede is two things.  First, it is 
primarily situated within a reciprocal gratia-relationship with God in which prayer and good 
deeds are interior and exterior enactments of God’s gifts.  This means that in prayer the self is 
understood and constituted through its imagined relationships to God and through adopting the 
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prayers of the community of saints and living Christians.  As a result, and this is my second 
point, the self is primarily performed through enacting prayer and good deeds that create and 
reinforce these relationships.  Change in exterior action leads to interior change.  This makes the 
interior attributes of the mind or heart (feeling, emotion) not the causes of exterior change, but 
the products.  We would expect, then, to see an emphasis on doing (performing devotion, as in 
Homily II.10, or performing repentance) rather than on being (being devoted, as the women in 
II.10 are, or being penitent).  An initial reading of the repentant sinner seems to place emphasis 
on interior states as the source of repentance and of the “true self” that the penitent must reform 
and enact. 
As in Homily II.10, Bede initially situates prayer in the reciprocal relationship of lordship 
and petitioning.  This is evident from the beginning, where the problem is that the woman, as a 
gentile, has no apparent right to bring her petitions before Jesus, being “gentilis a diuinorum 
eloquiorum funditus erat segregata doctrinis.”195 (as a gentile … completely separated from the 
teachings of the divine thoughts.)196  Bede continues, explaining that, although this is the case, 
“nec tamen illis quas eadem eloquia praedicant priuata uirtutibus.”197 )she was nevertheless not 
deprived of the virtues which those thoughts proclaim.)198  The passive “nec … priuata” 
indicates that those virtues were something given her of which she could have been deprived.  
She manifests these four virtues (faith, patience, constancy, and humility) in her subsequent 
petitioning of Jesus to heal her daughter.  The manifestation of these virtues in her petition serves 
to prove to those watching, the disciples and the Jews, that the woman deserved to have her 
request granted because, fundamentally, she recognized that Jesus was God and recognized her 
position in relationship to him.199  That is, the woman’s virtues serve to gain for her the ability to 
have her petition heard.  At the same time, this is not something she presumes upon.  When Jesus 
implies she is a dog, that is, not one of his own, Bede takes this as a kind of test of her constancy 
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and humility.  She “confirmed the Lord’s statement, but nevertheless she did not rest from the 
audacity of her request.”200  She responds as she does because she relied upon the largess of 
Jesus’ grace: “Being unworthy to be refreshed by the meal of the Lord’s entire teaching, which 
the Jews had for their use, she nevertheless supposed that however small the grace imparted to 
her by the Lord might be, it could be sufficient for her salvation.”201  Paradoxically, it is her 
humble recognition that she has nothing to offer him to make him hear her petition, that she is 
thrown fully upon his grace, which she nevertheless believes is enough for her, that enables Jesus 
to extend his healing to her daughter.  In contrast to Mary, this woman thus comes from outside 
the gratia relationship, presuming to make her petition on the basis of her four virtues, but 
knowing that this is not enough to oblige Jesus to respond to her request.  Implicit is the idea 
that, because of her belief, the woman is transformed from a dog to a sheep, from one with no 
right to ask favors, to one with a right to ask.202 
 Bede’s first allegorization focuses on the role of the Church in bringing salvation for the 
souls entrusted to her care.  The woman represents the Church, praying for “anima quaelibet est 
in ecclesia malignorum magis spirituum deceptionibus quam conditoris sui mancipata 
praeceptis.”203  (any soul in the Church that is delivered up to the deceptions of malign spirits 
rather than to her Maker’s commands.)204  The “soul’s” central problem is that she has fallen 
under the influence of devils rather than obeying the commands of her “Maker,” who has 
authority over her.205  Here Bede understands that prayer works objectively; it cannot work 
without Christ’s intervention:  
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pro qua necesse est ecclesia mater dominum sollicita interpellet ut quam ipso foris 
monendo obsecrando increpando non ualet ille interius inspirando corrigat atque ab 
errorum tenebris conuersam ad agnitionem uerae lucis excitet.206 
[The Church, as a solicitous mother, must intercede for this soul so that since the Church 
is not capable of converting such a one by warning, entreating and rebuking her 
outwardly, Christ may convert her by inspiring her interiorly, and, when she has been 
turned from the darkness of error, he may rouse her to the acknowledgement of the true 
light.]207 
To be transformed, the deceived person must be brought to an awareness of her situation through 
the inspiration of Christ.  It looks as though the “interior” state of inspiration by Christ brings 
about the exterior transformation.  We can see how interior inspiration works in the next 
allegory, in which Bede shifts the allegorical signification so that the mother represents “quis 
nostrum”208 [one of us]209 and the demon-possessed daughter represents that one’s defiled 
conscience.  Up to this point in the homily, Bede’s presentation of the figure of the mother, 
whose perseveres in210 her “mentem” (mind) in entreaty, whose prayer springs from “intus gerat 
pectoris constantiam,”211 (constancy she bore within her inmost heart)212 and whose requests (as 
the Church) will be heard “si mentem ab intentione proposita non mutauerit,”213 (if she does not 
turn aside her mind from its proposed intention214) seem to challenge my contention that prayer 
in Bede works through exterior actions.  Furthermore, Bede says that the Church cannot convert 
an errant soul outwardly, but that Christ must convert her inwardly, thereby seeming to indicate 
that the individual’s action springs from interior disposition.   
But what does this look like as Bede applies it to his audience?  The second allegorization 
answers this question, and shows that Bede subtly shifts his emphasis onto action.  Bede is not 
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picturing a psychic split between consciousness and conscience, a body inhabited by dueling 
impulses, an id and a superego that the ego must choose between.  Rather, Bede imagines the 
soul more as a territory controlled either by devils or by God.215  He imagines the sinner as one 
seduced away from the commands of his true Lord, “cogitationem de corde progenitam 
diabolica”216 (by thoughts born of the devil’s heart),217 putting himself into the false position of 
serving his Lord’s enemy.  The individual’s primary problem is that he has responded to the 
thoughts (cogitatio) of the devil as though he were subject to him.  In this case, action does not 
follow interior disposition but instead follows a relationship, that is, the commands of one’s lord, 
imagined as an external force.  Action, both verbal and physical, is not an expression of one’s 
true interior self perceived as an independent subject; rather, action is a response to and acting 
out of one’s position as a subject to – in this case, either God or the devil.  From Bede’s 
perspective, responding to the devil is a sort of madness because the person under discussion is 
“one of us,” a subject of God.  Christ’s inspiration “converts” this person to recognize his crime.  
His conscience is polluted218 – but Christ causes him to become aware of his sin and of his 
devilish tormentor.  The individual’s pollution seems to come as he recognizes the disjuncture 
between what is and what ought to be.  His position is “in the church,” but in his state he is devil-
dominated.  
The moment of conviction is described as a moment in which the individual recognizes, 
not his error, not his incoherence or insincerity, not his failure to live by his best impulses, not 
even his guilt, but his crime.219  Naming sin “reatus” situates it within a legalistic relationship 
typical within penitential discourse.  The individual has trespassed against his lord, not against 
himself, by madly enduring the devil’s harassment rather than obeying the commands of his 
Lord.220  As mentioned in Chapter 1, the penitential relationship conceptualizing God as Judge 
                                                 
215
 I.e., a psychomachia rather than a psychology. 
216
 CCSL 122, p. 159, l. 111. 
217
 Martin, 219. 
218
 “pollutam,” CCSL 122, p. 159, l. 109. 
219
 Reatus, l. 119, primarily judicial guilt for the offense of which he stands charged rather than the subjective 
feeling of guilt.  See Lewis and Short, but also see Bede’s use of the word, which is judicial or assessed guilt.  This 
invokes penitential paradigms of imagining God as judge and sin as a crime against God. 
220
 Note the earlier formulation of this same idea: malignorum magis spirituum deceptionibus qaum conditoris sui 
mancipata praeceptis” (CCSL, vol. 122, p. 158, ll. 91-2).  The devil has no authority to give commands; his 
influence is spurious. 
  
102 
changes what the human has to offer from a gift to restitution, the payment for a crime.  Bede 
accordingly acknowledges the disruption of the gratia-relationship as the petitioner seeks to be 
reinstated into it:  
Ideoque necesse est talis ut reatum sum cognouerit mox ad preces lacrimasque confugiat 
sanctorum crebras intercessiones et auxilia quaerat qui pro animae eius salute rogantes 
domino dicant, precamur domine miserator et misericors patiens et multae miserationis 
dimitte eam quia clamat post nos dimitte reatum et dona gratiam.221 
[as soon as such a one has recognized his crime, he must flee to petitions and tears; he 
must seek the frequent intercessions and help of the saints, so that asking for the salvation 
of his soul, they may say to the Lord, “We entreat you, Lord who are compassionate and 
merciful, patient and full of compassion, pardon her because she is crying after us.  
Pardon her crimes and give her grace.”]222 
But Bede quickly moves back into a gratia-framed relationship with God as Benefactor, for this 
is where transformation is to be found: 
indubia mente de largitoris summi bonitate confidat quia qui de latrone confessorem de 
persecutore apostolum de publicano euangelistam de lapidibus potuit facere filios 
Abraehae ipse etiam canem inpudentissimum conuertere Israheliticam posit in ouem; cui 
merio donatae castitatis etiam uitae aeternae pascua largiatur, id est peccatorem 
conuersum a uia sua mala iustum facere dignetur quem merito bonae actionis ad regnum 
caeleste perducat.223 
[with his mind free of doubt let him trust in the goodness of the supreme Benefactor, for 
the one who could make a confessor from a robber, an apostle from a persecutor, an 
evangelist from a publican, and who could make sons for Abraham from stones, could 
turn even the most shameless dog into an Israelite sheep.  He may even bestow upon him, 
as a reward for chastity attained, the pasture of eternal life – that is, he may deign to make 
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righteous a sinner who has turned from his evil way, and as a reward for his good action 
he may lead him to the heavenly kingdom.]224 
The things that distinguish a confessor from a robber, or a dog from a sheep are the things they 
do in response to God’s gratia.  In gratia, God “deign[s] to make righteous,” and the sinner 
responds in gratia by turning from his evil way.  And it is what they do in this turning – attain 
chastity, turn from evil ways, or petition in humility and with persistence – that allows God to 
give the further gratia of the heavenly kingdom. 
Central to this transformation is repeated, persistent prayer and the enactment of the 
postures and affect that go with it.  This prayer is not accompanied by sorrow (inner affect) but 
by tears (an outward performance).  The one praying for the intercession of the saints is 
prostrate225 because that is the position in which a person begs.  His prostration is a result of his 
begging, of his realization of his crime, not of his intimus affectus, which then, rather than a 
cause of his action, is an accompaniment to it.  Feelings and thoughts are important for Bede.  
But as his ensuing discussion of the mechanics of prayer indicates, these things follow the fact, 
the gift, of prayer.  Prayer is situated within a relational context – the sinner responds to Christ, 
understands his crime, and begs to be cleared of his crime and have the relationship restored 
through the repeated action of prayer.  It is because of this that prayer is able to be 
transformational. 
 Bede ends the sermon by emphasizing the necessity of thoughts matching what one is 
praying.  For prayer to be transformational, it must be integrated into both actions and thoughts.  
The necessary persistence in prayer does not have quite the same function in each of these 
examples – the woman as the Church, and the woman as an individual sinner.  In the first case, it 
works objectively to bring the sinner to the position of recognizing the pollution of her 
conscience.  In the second case, the repeated action of prayer is transformative in and of itself (as 
a response to God’s grace).  Bede shows this by ending the sermon with a couple of practical 
points on the act of praying itself.  First, he emphasizes the necessary congruence between words 
and thoughts: “Notandum interea quod haec orandi pertinacia ita solum meretur esse fructifera, si 
quod ore precamur hoc etiam mente meditemur neque alio clamor labiorum quam cogitationum 
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scindatur intuitus.”226  ([T]his tenacity in praying can only deserve to bear fruit if what we ask 
for with our mouth we also meditate on in our mind, and if the crying of our lips is not cut apart 
in another direction from the focus of our thoughts.)227  Bede demands purity in prayer, that 
one’s thoughts match one’s actions.  But it is worth noting again that, for Bede, the act of 
praying (the words) comes before interior thoughts.  He assumes, with his monastic audience in 
mind, that they are already enacting prayer, and that these actions of prayer must be then 
interiorized so that thoughts match the action.  The one praying must discipline his mind to do 
what his body is already doing.  It is this congruence between actions and thoughts that then 
allow prayer to become transformative.  All of a person’s good works form the basis of that 
person’s prayer for salvation, entry into the heavenly kingdom, but they also help to realize that 
salvation in the present life.  As these just actions are interiorized, they are God’s means to effect 
the prayed-for transformation, to expel the “tumults of depraved thoughts” and loosen the bonds 
of sin.  All the actions of one’s life must be a preparation for prayer in order to attain this 
congruence between thoughts and words: “Quaecumque enim saepius agere loqui uel audire 
solemus eadem necesse est saepius ad animum quasi solitam propriamque recurrant ad 
sedem.”228  (Whatever things we are accustomed to do, speak, or hear most often, these same 
things will necessarily return to our mind most often as though to their accustomed and proper 
place.)229  In a petitionary model, preparation for petition easily slides into being petition itself. 
 Bede recognizes that the battle to control one’s thoughts is brought about “antiqui hostis 
instinctu,”230 (at the instigation of the ancient enemy)231 and that the ability to pray is itself, like 
any other good deed, a gift: “Sciens enim utilitatem orandi et inuidens hominibus gratiam 
inpetrandi.”232  (He (the enemy) is aware of the benefit of praying, and he envies human beings 
the gift of having their requests granted.)233  So Bede returns to the idea of the gift: all that 
humans have, even the transformational ability to pray itself, comes from the grace of the 
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supreme Benefactor.  This gift is one that is transformative as humans use it.  When, in humility 
they recognize that central fact of their relationship – that they can make no demands of God 
based on their own merits or anything they could offer to God – they enter into what is to Bede 
an astounding relationship with God, marked by a notable freedom to persist in prayer, to 
demand that he hear their requests. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Prayer within the gratia-relationship brings together both prayer as petition and gift, and 
prayer as transformation, as both are folded into the concerns of a relationship with God.  This 
relationship is primarily formed within the already-praying church, as individuals place 
themselves within the community of God’s servants and adopt the prayers of this community.  At 
the same time, in the way that prayer enacts the gratia of God’s gifts, enacting and thereby 
returning them to him, prayer is also transformational.  It brings the precators into a position 
God’s favor and transforms them into beings worthy in word, thought, and deed, of being 
favored by God. 
In a way, the method of using formal prayer as a means of transformation of the self 
seems close to the idea presented by Scott DeGregorio of King Alfred’s “textualization” of 
himself.  Arguing against reading Asser’s life of King Alfred as “a string of textual fictions,” 
DeGregorio “outlines a context for understanding Alfred’s spirituality as a functional process of 
living texts, or of ‘textualizing’ the self.”234  In keeping with the ancient idea that what people 
read is not something separate from their own experience, but is their experience,235 people 
should live out what they hear.236  This can easily be misunderstood to emphasize the mind as 
primary creator of the self, since now we commonly view reading as primarily a mental exercise.   
DeGregorio is not, in this case, talking about prayer, which, as I have been arguing, is a different 
activity from reading.  Although formal prayer is ultimately text-based in the way we experience 
it (that is, after all, our primary mode of access to long-gone cultures) in practice, prayer is rarely 
experienced as written text and tends to move from generation to generation through oral 
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transmission.237  Bede himself emphasizes the communal and active nature of prayer.  People 
learned the Psalms, for instance, as much from praying them as from reading them, and even 
private prayer is imagined as taking place within the Church and the community of saints.  
Another frame for considering prayer as Bede understands it is within the context of ritual action.  
The rituals of the Divine Office with its prayers, its actions, its silences, and of the monastic day, 
with its room for work, communal prayer, personal prayer, and reading create a ritual frame in 
which its participants experience and participate in the creation of time, the world, themselves. 
Rather than underlying meaning, ritual emphasizes doing.  Because early Christianity did 
in fact emphasize the necessity for interior transformation, early Christian ritual performance 
raises interesting questions regarding the tension between ritual enactments and questions of 
sincerity, a tension present in all cultures,238 and a tension that we see within Bede’s work as 
well.  Modern studies of ritual tend to place an “overly subjectivist and individualist emphasis on 
meaning and interaction,” according to Adam B. Seligman.  For Seligman this is problematic: 
“Such a view sees the ‘essential’ or constitutive arena of action (often read as intention) as 
something within the social actor or actors, with the external, formal ritual seen as but the marker 
of these internal processes.”  In contrast, he says, “Ritual … is about doing more than about 
saying something.”239   
Bede’s work on prayer speaks to this tension.  He emphasizes that petitions should be 
made with “simplici intentione”; he places further stress on devotion, and makes the point that 
what fills one’s mind should reflect the words on one’s lips.  In these ways, Bede seems 
curiously sincere.  But this would imply that, for Bede, congruence between words and deeds is 
primarily important as an indicator of interior disposition, that people’s interior understanding 
and devotion should come first.  This is the way Frantzen tends to read this type of evidence in 
his search for the affective individual before Anselm.240  Arguing that “affective piety” is to be 
found in the Anglo-Saxon penitentials, Frantzen says,  
                                                 
237
 This is one reason why there is so little early literature on prayer theory or praxis.  There are, of course, 
prayerbooks, an innovation that apparently began in England; these collections of prayers themselves gave no 
explicit theory of prayer and would not have been a common part of the normal experience of prayer. 
238
 Adam B. Seligman, et al.  Ritual and Its Consequences, 9. 
239
 Seligman, et al., Ritual and Its Consequences, 4, ital. orig. 
240
 Frantzen, “Spirituality and Devotion in the Anglo-Saxon Penitentials.”  
  
107 
Contrition is not something that happens to the penitent but is rather an affect he or she 
creates, as the focus on humility and on the weeping voice suggests.  Affectivity is the 
translation of idea into expressive gesture, and this moment is surely an affective one.  If 
the genuineness of a late-medieval spiritual experience is confirmed by its external signs 
– by its affectivity, in other words – we should extend the same criterion to the early 
evidence, where we find it works just as well.  
Frantzen’s language is slightly unclear here, however.  Whose idea is being translated into 
“expressive gesture”?  He seems to assume it is the penitent’s.  Indeed, if we are going to judge 
the “genuineness” of spiritual experience (including repentance), the criterion is usually some 
expectation of sincerity – i.e., that the “idea” comes from the interior state of the penitent 
himself, that his weeping springs from his own guilt and sadness which motivates his confession.  
But this is to judge the genuineness of spiritual experience by modern criteria of sincerity. 
In this chapter, I have argued that, for Bede, the ritual actions and words come first and 
are the elements out of which a coherent “self” is constructed.  There is no particular primary 
interior “self” who loves or is devoted to God before being transformed by God’s gratia, given 
through the “good deeds” of prayer, almsgiving, etc. that people are given to perform.  God’s 
way of transforming people is through good works for them to carry out.  Bede assumes that the 
words and actions of prayer come first.  That it is important to him that the words and deeds are 
internalized makes it easy to read him as sharing an essentially modern conception of sincerity.  
But Bede never conceptualizes congruence between thoughts, words, and deeds (which I have 
also called “integrated prayer”) as “sincerity,” but rather within the ritual category of purity: 
cleanness, lack of defilement.  The iterative recitation and actions of prayer – adopting words 
which are not one’s own – gives prayer its purifying potential.  In fact, to pray “sincerely” would 
defeat the purpose, for, in prayer, the precator would merely re-represent the self to the self 
rather than using the words given by God to transform a dog to a sheep, a sinner to a saint.  For 
Bede, purity is achieved as the individual becomes more integrated into the believing 
community, and as the thoughts and deeds of those praying become more coherently integrated 
to the words of prayer.  For Bede, God’s gratia is indeed what makes people fully human 
because God’s gratia is what gives them the means to become human. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ÆLFRIC AND THE COMMUNITY OF PRAYER 
 
Eall swa gelice se ðe gelyfð wiglungum 
 oððe be fugelum . oððe be fnorum . 
 oððe be horsum . oððe be hundum . 
ne bið he na cristen . ac bið for-cuð wiðer-saca . 
Ne sceal nan man cepan be dagum 
on hwilcum dæge he fare . oððe on hwylcum he gecyrre . 
forðan þe god gesceop ealle ða seofan dagas . 
þe yrnað on þære wucan oð þysre worulde geendunge . 
Ac seðe hwider faran wille . singe his paternoster . 
and credan . gif he cunne . and clypige to his dryhten . 
and bletsige hine sylfne . and siðige orsorh 
þurh godes gescyldnysse . butan ðæra sceoccena wiglunga.1 
[Also likewise he who believes in sorceries, either by birds or by sneezings or by horses 
or by hounds, he is not at all Christian, but is a despised apostate.  Nor may any man 
observe according to days, on which day he travel or on which he returns; because God 
made all the seven days which run through the week until this world’s ending.  But he 
who wishes to travel should sing his Paternoster and Creed, if he knows them, and call to 
his Lord, and bless himself, and travel safely through God’s protection without the 
devil’s sorceries.] 
 
 My initial interest in Anglo-Saxon prayer grew out of the specific passage in Ælfric’s 
famous sermon De auguriis, quoted above.  In it, Ælfric preaches against all forms of pagan 
practice, advocating that his audience turn to God instead.2  Striking in this passage is the way a 
                                                 
1
 LSI.xvii, ll. 88-99. 
2
 Since this sermon largely draws from sources by Caesarius of Arles, Martin of Braga, and others, it is somewhat 
doubtful whether the practices enumerated were practiced in Anglo-Saxon England.  See Audrey Meaney, “Ælfric’s 
Use of His Sources in His Homily on Auguries,” English Studies 66.6 (1985): 477-95.  Meaney believes, however, 
  
109 
sermon against sorcery and superstition seems to advocate a superstitious, charm-like use of the 
Paternoster, Creed, and the sign of the cross for protection while traveling.  Charms are 
substituted out, and the Paternoster et al. are substituted in, in what seems to be clear evidence of 
syncretism.3  Central to the perception that they are used like charms is the fact that the content 
of these prayers has little to no relation to their use – the LP is not about safety while traveling; 
the Creed (technically not a prayer at all) is a doctrinal précis.  Indeed, this seems to be prayer of 
the most objectively efficacious nature, working by formula or gesture alone to confer protection 
automatically. 
A similar moment occurs at the end of CH I.31, Passio S. Bartholomei Apostoli, where 
Ælfric again preaches against “unalyfed” practices for healing the sick.  Christians are not to 
seek healing from “nanum stane: ne æt nanum treowe buton hit sy halig rodetacen. ne æt nanre 
stowe buton hit sy hali godes hus. se þe elles deð he begæð untwylice hæþengyld”4 (any stone, 
nor from any tree unless it be the holy cross-sign, nor from any place, unless it be the holy house 
of God.  He who does elsewise, he undoubtedly engages in  idolatry).  And later: “Ne sceal nan 
man mid galdre wyrte besingan ac mid godes wordum hi gebletsian 7 swa þicgan”5  (Nor shall 
anyone enchant herbs with charms, but with God’s words bless them and so partake).  As De 
Auguriis seems to use the LP and Creed as a traveling charm, here God’s house is substituted in 
for pagan holy places, and God’s words for unallowed charms.  Although the source of power 
has evidently changed with Christianization, the underlying way of thinking has not.  But what is 
ironic – and is part of the reason I quote De auguriis above at such length – is that, in the very 
passages scholars point to as evidence of syncretism, Ælfric himself preaches adamantly against 
the combining of pagan and Christian systems, insisting that people not engage in pagan 
practices, and that one who does “ne bið he na cristen” but “wiðersaca” of Christ. 
These passages, however, should be situated within the larger context of Ælfric’s 
teaching, both his more explicit teaching on prayer and the way he imagines the relationship 
between humans and God enacted by prayer.  Ælfric begins the Catholic Homilies with a brief 
                                                                                                                                                             
that “we can accept what he has to say about idolatrous practices as referring to things current in the society that he 
knew” (495). 
3
 For a summary of this position and a more nuanced reading of the “syncretism” in Anglo-Saxon charms, see Karen 
Louise Jolly, Popular Religion in Late Saxon England. 
4
 CHI.31, ll. 313-5. 
5
 CHI.31, ll. 323-5. 
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history of the world up through Christ.  Rather than invoking gift and gratitude through the 
concept of gratia (OE gifu) Ælfric’s account grapples with the related theological conundrum of 
free will.  Gratia more obviously invokes a reciprocal relationship than does liberum arbitrium 
or, in Old English, agen cyre, since liber emphasizes the freedom of one’s choice (while gratia, 
paradoxically invokes the constraint of reciprocity), and agen emphasizes that the choice is one’s 
own to make.  Thus, it is harder to see how reciprocity is at work in CHI.1; in fact, Ælfric’s 
emphasis on God as Creator initially looks strikingly like the Augustinian formulation: all gifts 
come freely from God while all obligation is on the side of the human þeowas,6 who (by virtue 
of this status) are not free to leave if they so choose, agen cyre or no.  But as we will see, Ælfric 
uses this concept of freely-chosen service to God to place humans and God within a reciprocal 
relationship in which God rewards such freely-chosen obedience. 
With the relational frame established by CHI.1 in place, we will look at Ælfric’s most 
extended discussions of prayer, which occur in three homilies: CHI.19 represents his explication 
of a particular prayer (the Lord’s Prayer); CHI.18 explains the reason for a particular period of 
prayer (Rogationtide) and focuses on what people should ask for in prayer; CHI.10, a Lenten 
homily, explicates an example from the Gospels of someone petitioning God, which Ælfric then 
directly applies to his audience.  Ælfric’s explicit teachings on prayer derive primarily from 
Augustine and Gregory, whose works reflect Neo-platonic structures of thought to a great 
extent.7  Ælfric’s adaptations of these teachings systematically remove most of the Neo-platonic 
abstractions, replacing them with a coherently relational view of the bond between humans and 
God.  As he established in CHI.1, this bond is formed through human obedience to God, which 
God rewards.  As a corollary, prayer becomes more thoroughly objectively efficacious than it is 
in either Augustine or Gregory.  An outgrowth of this is that the formulae of prayer gain greater 
power both as words given by God, and as prayer is conceived as an action the performance of 
which places precators in a particular relationship with God – his obedient servants, deserving of 
God’s protection and worthy of future reward.  For Ælfric, the central tension and choice in 
human life is between subservience to the devil and obedience to God.  This tension structures 
                                                 
6
 CHI.1, l. 77. 
7
 Augustine’s De sermone Domini in monte (c. 393) is one of his earlier works, and as such is more overtly Neo-
platonic than works from the later part of his career. 
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his idea of how prayer functions, so that prayer becomes, at its most essential, about whom one 
prays to, and whom one obeys.  The act of praying itself, almost secondary to the content, 
becomes a statement of allegiance and a means to tap into the power of God.  In addition, the 
orientation of Ælfric’s prayer shifts strongly away from sanctus toward halig, a vision of 
communal wholeness and salvation oriented around a gift-network binding together all members 
of society as brothers with mutual ties of prayer and alms that similarly bind humans to God. 
 The theory of prayer we see emerging within these homilies is one in which prayers serve 
as an objectively efficacious means of expressing the precators’ allegiance to God instead of the 
devil – that is, Christians choose to serve their rightful Lord, the one who made and redeemed 
them, rather than the false (in both the sense that he is the wrong one, and in the sense that he is 
treacherous) lord, the devil.  Allegiance to God is characterized by both obedience to him and the 
fact that God is the one the precators turn to for protection and healing.  In this relationship gifts, 
comprehensively defined as prayer, almsgiving, and other good works,8 serve to strengthen the 
bonds between God and his people.  As a natural result of this service those who declare 
themselves to be in God’s kingdom while in this life will find themselves rewarded with 
inclusion in God’s kingdom in eternity.  For Ælfric the human relationship with God also has 
implications for humans’ social relationships with each other, not only in the fact that they 
should live at peace with each other, but in the way that prayer and almsgiving serve to bind 
together various strata of human society within an gift-relationship with God. 
 
CATHOLLIC HOMILY I.1 
Like Bede, Ælfric (c. 950-c. 1010) was one of the most learned men of his day.  His large 
body of work, much of it vernacular sermons,9 manifests a similar concern for pastoral care as 
                                                 
8
 CHI.3: “Ure gastlican lac sint ure gebedu. 7 lofsang. 7 huselhalgung 7 gehwilce oðre lac þe we gode offriað. þa we 
sceolun mid gesibsumere heortan. 7 broðorlicere lufe gode betæcan” (ll. 164-6) [Our spiritual offerings are our 
prayers and hymns and attendance at mass and whatever other offerings that we give to God, which we should 
entrust to God with peaceful hearts and brotherly love.] 
9
 Ælfric has two main sermon collections of 40 homilies each organized around the liturgical year, the Catholic 
Homilies I and II.  He rewrote some of these over the course of his life (for one example of his types of revisions, 
see Robert Upchurch’s article on the re-writing of CHI.17, “A Big Dog Barks: Ælfric of Eynsham’s Indictment of 
the English Pastorate and Witan,” Speculum 85 (2010): 505-33), wrote a further 40 or so homilies, and wrote an 
additional series mainly focusing on saints’ lives. 
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does Bede’s, and, like Bede, Ælfric’s work remained influential long after his death.10  Ælfric’s 
sermon series, the Catholic Homilies, was unusual in its day both in the scope of the collection 
and in his development of an Old English prose style for preaching.11  His series was an 
ambitious undertaking designed to be distributed throughout England in order to make orthodox 
teaching available to the unlearned – both those who did not adequately understand Latin, and 
those who could not read in any language.  Thus, Ælfric’s homilies are largely pitched to a much 
broader audience than Bede’s, not merely to monks and nuns but also to lay people.12  Like 
Bede, Ælfric situates prayer within a reciprocal relationship between humans and God, in which 
humans cooperate with God’s grace for their own salvation.13  And, like Bede, Ælfric begins his 
own sermon series by clarifying the relationship between humans and God.  While Bede does 
this by focusing the Advent homilies on the figure of Mary as a model of one who receives and 
uses God’s gifts, Ælfric does so by including an “extra” homily outside of the liturgical cycle 
that begins with creation and gives a brief summary of human history up to Christ. 
Indeed, Ælfric presents a much different God/human relationship that does Bede, one 
more apparently oriented around power and fiat, without the same sense of gratia-enabled 
intimacy with God.  In fact, Ælfric’s account of creation seems in some ways to emphasize 
human distance from God, who is presented as the powerful creator and disposer of all things – 
“ealra cyninga cyning. 7 ealra hlaforda hlaford. … ne mæg nan þinc his willan wiðstandan”14 
                                                 
10
 See Mary Swan, “Ælfric’s Catholic Homilies in the Twelfth Century,” in Rewriting Old English in the Twelfth 
Century, ed. Mary Swan and Elaine M. Treharne, Cambridge Studies in Anglo-Saxon England 30 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 62-82.   For an example of his influence following a particular homily (CHI.14) 
see Mary Swan, “Old English Made New: One Catholic Homily and Its Reuses,” Leeds Studies in English n.s. 28 
(1997), 1-18. 
11
 See Milton McC.Gatch, “The Achievement of Aelfric and his Colleagues in European Perspective,” in The Old 
English Homily and Its Backgrounds, ed. Paul E. Szarmach and Bernard Huppé (Albany: University of New York 
Press, 1978), 43-73: “No one before Ælfric or in the century after him produced or attempted to assemble in the 
vernaculars a coherent set of exegetical commentaries on the pericopes for the Christian year.  Thus Ælfric seems to 
be sui generis, without precursors or followers in his effort to provide a cycle of exegetical addresses ad populum 
for the Temporale” (60).  See also Mary Clayton, “Homiliaries and Preaching in Anglo-Saxon England,” in Old 
English Prose: Basic Readings, ed. Paul E. Szarmach (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000), 151-198.  She argues 
with Gatch by emphasizing the religious element of Ælfric’s audience: “What Ælfric is doing to an ever-increasing 
degree, therefore, is rendering ‘monastic’ material into the vernacular” (187). 
12
 For the complicated question of Ælfric’s audience, see Godden, Ælfric’s Catholic Homilies, xxi-xxix.  While the 
main audience for the Catholic Homilies is the laity, he also anticipated readers (xxii). 
13
 See Aaron Kleist, Striving with Grace, chapter 7, for Ælfric’s position on the doctrinal question. 
14
 Clemoes, ed., Ælfric’s Catholic Homilies, the First Series, Homily I, ll.8-9, 12-3.  All Ælfric quotations come 
from Clemoes and Godden; crossed þ will be silently expanded, and puncti elevati replaced with colons. 
  
113 
(king of all kings and lord of all lords. … nor can any thing resist his will)15 – rather than the 
kindly gift-giver from the sky.  Moreover, in some ways the angels seem to be God’s primary 
creation, who, when they sin, are replaced by humanity.  The one thing humans must do is obey; 
it is through the limits of this obedience that they are to define and know themselves: “hu mihte 
adam tocnawan hwæt he wære. buton he wære gehyrsum on sumum þincge his hlaforde; swilce 
god cwæde to him; Nast ðu þæt ic eom þin hlaford 7 þæt ðu eart min þeowa buton ðu do þæt ic 
ðe hate. 7 forgang þæt ic ðe forbeode.”16  (How could Adam understand what he was unless he 
were obedient in one thing to his lord?  As though God said to him, “You cannot know that I am 
your lord and that you are my servant unless you do what I command you and avoid what I 
forbid you.”)  Words for gifting, grace, or gratitude are not specifically used in this homily. 
Furthermore, Ælfric carefully avoids the heroic language of the lord-thegn relationship 
and gift-giving used in poetic accounts of the Creation and Fall.17  For instance, while Genesis A 
begins with the idea that praise is the only return-gift humans can give to God,18 and speaks of 
God exiling the fallen angels, giving them a lean in hell, and depriving them of their eðel,19 and 
while Genesis B focuses more tightly on the relationship between God and Lucifer as between a 
hearra and his retainer and on Lucifer’s violation of hyldo,20 Ælfric uses none of this 
terminology, even where it might seem most natural.21  In comparison to the fleshed-out 
                                                 
15
 Translations mine unless otherwise noted. 
16
 CHI.1, ll. 75-8. 
17
 See Jocelyn Wogan-Browne, “The Hero in Christian Reception: Ælfric and Heroic Poetry,” in Old English 
Literature: Critical Essays, ed. Roy M. Liuzza (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 215-35.  She examines 
the ways that Ælfric’s rhetorical forms and concerns might overlap with heroic literature, examining especially 
Ælfric’s presentation of martial themes, but she concludes: “In tenth and eleventh-century social structures there is, 
then, a version of the lord and retainer bond central to heroic verse, but it is a Christian society’s system of 
obligation and its terms of loyalty are common to legal and doctrinal discourses and to social history, rather than a 
prerogative of heroic poetry” (219). 
18
 Ruth Louise Coy, “The Gift in Old English Literature,” emphasizes God’s gifts and the human obligation to praise 
him for them in Genesis A.  Her work as a whole discusses the role of gift-giving in Genesis A, Christ II, and 
Beowulf. 
19
 Christ and Satan also mentions that God will never give the fallen angels an eard or an eðel. 
20
 For discussions of God and Satan’s lord/thegn relationship in Genesis A see Alvin A. Lee, The Guest-Hall of 
Eden.  Hugh Magennis, Images of Community in Old English Poetry, focuses on Satan as a traitor within Genesis B.   
 Coy makes the point in Genesis A (a repetition of Huppé, perhaps) that the poem is structured around gift-giving, in 
which the only possible return-gift people can offer God is their praise for his generosity. 
21
 For instance, in l. 9 he is “ealra hlaforda hlaford” rather than “ealra dryhtena dryhten.”  Again, he is referred to as 
Scyppend and God Ælmihtiga in the passage recounting Lucifer’s rebellion (ll. 22 ff) rather than drihten (this is a 
term Ælfric usually uses for Jesus rather than God the father, however) and the angels’ fall from heaven is not 
referred to either in the ironic terms the poets use (lean) or even as an exile.  Rather, “Ælmihtiga Scyppend” 
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personalities to be found in these poems, Ælfric’s account is much more driven by concerns for 
overt doctrinal explication.  Thus, he begins (as do the other poems, with the exception of 
Genesis B, for which Genesis A serves as a beginning) by emphasizing that God has power and 
sovereignty and that he is the origin of all things.  Unlike the other accounts, Ælfric also 
manages to briefly touch on the Trinity, the nature of the soul, and the necessity of free will 
during the course of the first part of his sermon.  This sort of difference is, of course, to be 
expected between poem and sermon.  Ælfric’s purpose is to provide his hearers with a grounding 
in the basics of the Christian mythos and doctrine rather than translating it into Old English 
poetic idiom.   
However, even though Ælfric’s primary interest is doctrinal, he still structures the story 
around the personalities and relationships between God and Lucifer and God and humans.  
Through this, he invokes forms of reciprocity that presuppose and draw upon affect for their 
power: loyalty and gratitude.  This stands out much more clearly when compared with the story 
as told by someone who is also interested in doctrine (of the most abstract kind) and who in 
many ways shaped the church’s understanding of the Fall: Augustine.  Augustine’s account of 
the angels’ fall in De civitate Dei book XI neither encourages an understanding of God or the 
devils as personalities nor makes much sense when read that way.22  Ælfric’s orientation is much 
more relational.  Acts of giving, taking, obedience, and refusing gratitude inform Ælfric’s 
narrative and help to structure the relationships between God and Lucifer, God and Adam and 
Eve, and Satan and Adam and Eve in ways that simultaneously teach humans “what they are.”  
“What they are” are subjects of God, recipients of his gifts, obliged to obey him, people  who, 
through fulfillment of that obligation, will earn the vacated seats of the fallen angels. 
Ælfric’s account of the Fall is informed by a gift-economy and its assumptions about 
agency, although not one cast in heroic terms.  Ever since the Pelagian controversy agency and 
its attendant questions of free will have been important concepts in Christianity, but while the 
terms of that debate were shaped by Greek and Roman philosophy, especially Neo-platonism and 
                                                                                                                                                             
“gearcode” hell torments for Lucifer and his companions (geferan, ll. 43-4) – again, God is referred to in terms of 
his power and creative ability. 
22
 That is, questions of interior psychology lie outside the framework of Augustine’s argument. 
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Stoicism,23 these abstractions did not evidently have much resonance in Anglo-Saxon England.  
Rather, agency in Ælfric is constructed relationally through giving, keeping, taking, and 
serving.24  One participates in such an economy by having something to give, whether gifts or 
service. This raises an obvious problem: everything created beings have is already given by God; 
nothing they have is not owed him, including their obedience.  Therefore, having nothing to give 
with which to assert any sort of reciprocity (and thus agency) in the relationship, they are in fact 
not free – not free to leave, not free to choose whom they will serve.  At the same time, as with 
the Augustinian formulation, God has no particular obligations to humanity.  In Ælfric’s case this 
is not because of his concern to protect God’s independence, but because, within the strictures of 
the creation account, humans have nothing to offer to God of their own with which to enter into a 
reciprocal relationship.  In Ælfric’s sermon, this problem is solved through agen cyre (“own 
choice”).  It is God’s gift of free will, and of the command through which to exercise it, that 
allows created beings a rooted sense of their identity, in which they are able to freely choose to 
serve God, for which service they will be rewarded in the end: “[M]id þære eaðelican 
gehyrsumnysse,” God says, “þu geearnast heofenan rices myrhðe. 7 þone stede þe se deofol of 
afeoll þurh ungehyrsumnesse.”25  (With this easy obedience you will earn the joy of the kingdom 
of heaven and the place which the devil fell from through disobedience).  Lucifer, Adam, and 
Eve26 withheld agen cyre from God, Lucifer by rebelling and Adam and Eve by obeying Satan 
rather than their rightful lord.  Through this, all of them put themselves in a position where God 
did not owe them anything; they were in no reciprocal relationship. 
                                                 
23
 Michael Hanby, Augustine and Modernity (New York: Routledge, 2003), 109. 
24
 While scholars like Cowell point to a difference between secular and ecclesiastical values surrounding both gift-
giving and identity formation, I would like to draw attention to the fact that I am eschewing this distinction.  Both 
Augustine and Ælfric seek to understand the human relationship with the divine; one does so through Neo-platonic 
abstraction; the other does so through a more concrete social way of thinking.  Neither of these is more intrinsically 
“Christian” than the other; and both approaches (one formulated by Augustine, the other represented by Ælfric) 
leave their mark on medieval Christianity. 
25
 CHI.1, ll. 80-2. 
26
 Issues of agen cyre in Eve’s transgression seem to be complicated by the fact that she was deceived.  Christian 
doctrine recognizes this as a problem in various ways.  However, I will be arguing that, for Ælfric, deception does 
not make a difference in either the outcome of Eve’s choice or the way its severity and impact is judged. 
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 The tension between God and the devil that Ælfric’s account of the fall establishes is 
situated within the doctrine of the ransom theory of atonement.27  Ransom theory was developed 
in the second century by the patristic writer Irenaeus to combat Gnostic beliefs in the absolute 
duality of good and evil.  Briefly summarized, he taught that because Adam obeyed the devil by 
eating the forbidden fruit instead of obeying God, his sin put humankind under the devil’s power, 
giving the devil legitimate claim to human souls.  The devil’s domination was only broken when 
Christ gave himself as a ransom paid to the devil to free humankind.28  As doctrine forged in 
apologetic fires tends to do, ransom theory ends up retaining the structures of the heresy it was 
developed against.  Thus, this model gives the devil a much more prominent role in humanity’s 
destruction and in God’s salvific work than does the later soteriological model, substitutionary 
atonement, developed by Anselm.29  Essentially, ransom theory makes God and the devil into 
rival lords.  This model was further popularized by Gregory the Great,30 and we can see specific 
references to it throughout the Anglo-Saxon corpus.  Both Chapters 3 and 4 show the importance 
of the way the ransom theory structures the relationship between humans, God, and the Devil 
within Ælfric’s conception of prayer.  CHI.1 establishes the nature of Lucifer’s rebellion, thus 
showing Ælfric’s audience what manner of lords they have to choose between. 
 
                                                 
27
 See Gustaf Aulén, Christus Victor.  Ransom theory was never doctrinally codified the way that substitutionary 
atonement later was; hence, it may be most usefully seen as the dominant metaphor for salvation in the early church.  
Substitutionary atonement is also a metaphor, but by the time of Calvin (and hence in modern theology), its 
metaphorical element was mostly lost; it is now usually seen as a literal explanation of Christ’s salvific act.  
Additionally, see Jeffrey Burton Russell’s multi-volume study of the historical development of the devil for a 
summary of Anglo-Saxon diabology, including Ælfric’s specifically, Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), chapter 6, although he conflates Ælfric’s presentations of devils with the Devil 
(Satan).  C.W. Marx, The Devil’s Rights and the Redemption in the Literature of Medieval England,  emphasizes the 
continuity in soteriological models through Anselm and afterward to argue that appearances of the ransom theory in 
late medieval English literature are not anachronisms. 
28
 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses V.1.1.  
29
 Ransom theory was the predominant metaphor of salvation for the first thousand years of Christianity until 
Anselm developed the doctrine of substitutionary atonement in the 12th century.  Substitutionary atonement removes 
the devil from the equation, so that man’s sin is no longer conceptualized as placing him in thrall to the devil, and 
Christ’s sacrifice is no longer imagined as ransoming humanity from the devil’s just claims.  Rather, man’s sin is 
seen as an affront to God’s honor; the debt he owes is owed to God, and Christ’s sacrifice pays humanity’s debt to 
God.  Substitutionary atonement also conceptualizes God as a lord, but the model used for sin and debt is legal 
rather than more personally relational model of ransom theory.  In this case, good deeds and other gifts are 
conceptualizes as the payment of a debt rather than gifts that express a dependent relationship upon god.  Anselm 
did not develop substitutionary atonement wholecloth; rather, it makes use of two models already available within 
Christian practice: the substitutionary sacrifice re-enacted in the Eucharist, and the practice of penance. 
30
 For instance, in his Homily 25, CCSL 141, 8.226-48, for Easter Day. 
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Lucifer’s Fall 
After the account of creation, the homily takes up the cautionary example of one who 
resisted God’s will: Lucifer.  Lucifer’s relationship with God is not parallel with humans’ 
relationship with God, and yet in some ways it sets the pattern against which Adam and Eve’s 
fall is to be read.  The lack of symmetry is partially because the conditions of Lucifer’s 
continuing favor with God are not set forth so clearly beforehand, and partially because Lucifer 
makes a bid for independence that is not open to Adam and Eve.  Lucifer reaches for autonomy 
from God through his attempt to claim an identity for himself outside of God’s gift and withhold 
gratitude (although it is not named that) from God.  But Lucifer’s struggle with and rebellion 
from God sets the conditions for humanity’s own disobedience and that frame the terms of 
human bondage or freedom thereafter. 
But before Lucifer, we come to the problem of God.  As I have mentioned, Ælfric’s 
opening statements emphasize the supremacy and self-sustaining nature of God: “An angin is 
ealra þinga þæt is god ælmihtig. he is ordfruma 7 ende; He is ordfruma for ði þe he wæs æfre; he 
is ende butan ælcere geendunge. for ðon þe he bið æfre ungeendod.”31  (There is one beginning 
of all things, that is God Almighty.  He is beginning and end.  He is beginning because he always 
was; he is end without any ending because he will always be endless).  Ælfric emphasizes the 
coherency of all things within God’s design (“angin”), and that, while God contains beginning 
and end, he himself is outside of and encompasses all things.  They are dependent on him for 
existence.  Not only is God not reciprocally dependent on these things, he also extends beyond 
ordfruma into æfre and beyond ende into æfre ungeendod.  His being is separate from that which 
he has brought forth.  Within the frame of gift-economy, Ælfric’s narrative presents God as the 
only truly independent actor.  He owes no one anything.  He creates out of his own will; once the 
universe is created, he sustains it out of his own will, against which will “mæg nan þinc … 
wiðstandan.”32  (nothing can resist).  God is an individual independent of either the obligation to 
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 CHI.1, ll. 6-8. 
32
 CHI.1, ll. 12-3. 
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give or receive gifts, who need answer to no-one, who is essentially “non-social” in that he is not 
tied to anyone by gift-bonds.33    
For people whose expectations of divine behavior have been formed within the Christian 
tradition, the self-sufficient nature of divine beings is axiomatic.  It is therefore worth noting that 
self-sufficient deities are not necessarily the norm.  Ancient Greeks saw themselves as being in 
reciprocal relationship with their gods, as did Romans.34  Anglo-Saxon paganism is not as well 
attested, but we have little reason to doubt that they felt fundamentally the same about their own 
gods: gods are to be approached with gifts, and this gift-giving somehow obliges those gods to 
act in the behalf of the petitioner, perhaps to preserve the gods’ own honor or reputation as much 
as anything else.35  If there is no fundamental reason to think of the gods as outside normal bonds 
of reciprocity, the kind of deity Ælfric presents is, relationally speaking, fundamentally outside 
of systems of reciprocal morality because he does not “owe” his creation anything.  Rather, God 
gives freely and humans owe him everything – but the only one who has a true choice in this 
relationship is God.  This does not present much of a problem for Augustine; because his notion 
of God is more abstract, God most obviously does not operate within a human economy.  But for 
a society unaffected by the higher flights of Neo-Platonic fancy, and whose idea of morality is 
built upon the notion of reciprocal relationships, this is potentially unsettling.  Insofar as God is 
independent of his creation, autonomous, owing nothing to those who serve him, he is at the very 
least distant, and can seem amoral.  This creates a potential tension in an understanding of God – 
between a being who fundamentally owes humans nothing (although he voluntarily heaps gifts 
and graces upon humankind) and humans who owe God service but have no real claim on God 
(thus God can seem distant, uncaring, and immoral).  There is, then, always a tendency to see at 
least some of God’s gifts as given out of moral obligation, and there is always a tendency to see 
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 This is what Louis Dumont’s definition of an individual is getting at: an “independent, autonomous, and thus 
essentially nonsocial moral being” (Essays on Individualism, 25), someone who exists outside of the “normal” (for a 
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some of these things as earned through human effort.  Outside of Augustine, this circle is often 
squared by conceptualizing God as one who voluntarily enters into a reciprocal relationship with 
humankind; we saw how this worked in Bede, and we can now see how this works in Ælfric’s 
homily.  
Within Old English accounts of the Fall, the only other being who strives for similar 
independence is Lucifer.  “Like” God in thinking of himself as an autonomous agent,36 he 
fundamentally oversteps by trying to be “betera þonne he gesceapen wæs,” (better than he was 
created) leading him to say “þæt he mihte beon þam ælmihtigum gode gelic.”37  (that he could be 
like the Almighty God).  Lucifer at times seems like he wants to be equal to God (gelic) and 
share rulership with him (“dælan rice wið god”),38 almost inserting himself as a strange fourth to 
the completely self-sufficient Trinity,39 but Lucifer’s desire for equality is inseparable from 
actual dominance over God.  If Lucifer wants to be more essentially the same as God, he aspires 
to the same kind of singular sovereignty that God has.  Lucifer wants the ability to determine his 
own fate, which, by nature of being creator and thus determiner of all fates, only God can do.  
The nature of this dominance is the more striking as Lucifer meditates ways to “dælan rice wið 
god.”  Dælan’s primary sense is to divide or separate, and then (often) to distribute the parts, but 
the attitude toward this distribution can be various: it can mean a willing sharing, giving out (as 
treasure or alms), or dividing and handing over (as in land in charters).  This dividing is usually 
done by someone who has the right or at least the ability to do the dividing.40  What dælan does 
not mean is taking – and this is what Lucifer actually proposes to do, not to share power with 
God, as though Lucifer had any right to do the dælende, but to take it.  In fact, in spite of the 
potential slippage in gelic and dælan, Lucifer does not want to be equal to God or share power, 
acting as co-ruler in the north part of heaven, but to have “anweald 7 rice ongean gode 
ælmihtigum”41 (authority and a kingdom against God Almighty), to be the one to do the 
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dælende.  Lucifer does not want any power that God hands over willingly; he in fact already has 
that.42  To assert independence from God, his power has to be taken by force. 
Andrew Cowell, in his book on gift-giving and the formation of a secular individual 
identity in the 11th- and 12th-centuries, points to various historical and literary instances of people 
refusing gifts, giving splendid counter-gifts, and attempting to claim and keep symbolic property 
for themselves (or their family) independent of a lord’s bestowal43 as part of a strategy to declare 
or keep one’s autonomy when threatened by a lord of equal or greater power.  Those who have 
the power and social position to give gifts while not receiving them (except in certain clearly-
defined instances), or to outgive someone who gives gifts to them, and, most importantly, to 
claim property of their own safe from the demands of a gift-economy are able to function outside 
the normal social bonds restricting autonomy.44  It is within this sort of system that Lucifer 
attempts autonomy.  Lucifer’s position is difficult in that he cannot reject God’s gifts, since one 
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 As the “teoðan weredes ealdor” (l. 29, “leader of the tenth host”), according to Ælfric.  In other sources Lucifer 
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sense, Beowulf’s generous gesture repays this debt.   Hrothgar’s later generous gifts both elevate and honor Beowulf 
while putting him in his place as one who, even through monster-slaying, cannot outgive the Danish king.  When 
Beowulf returns to Geatland, his gifts to Hygelac are both a statement of loyalty and a challenge – one which 
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cycle.  Thus, since Satan is the only character presented as reaching for autonomous individuality (although some 
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to reflect a belief that sort of independence is in some sense diabolical and problematically anti-social rather than 
admirable.  What is more difficult to say is whether this reflects the values of the culture at large, or whether this 
reflects the values of AS churchmen. 
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of them is his very existence, and because all he has is given him by God (and all that exists was 
made by God).  To keep these things is to keep his identity as God’s servant, and yet he has no 
way of refusing them. 
  It is therefore significant that in Ælfric’s homily Lucifer asserts his independence by 
taking his beauty as an essential attribute belonging to himself – something particular of his own 
which he makes central to his identity and uses to set himself apart from the other created beings.  
As Ælfric says, he was 
swiðe fæger 7 wlitig gesceapen. swa þæt he wæs gehaten leohtberend.  þa began he to 
modigeanne for ðære fægernysse. þe he hæfde. and cwæð on his heortan. þæt he wolde 
and eaðe mihte beon his scyppende gelic.45 
[created very fair and beautiful, so that he was called Lucifer.  Then he became prideful 
because of the fairness that he had, and said in his heart that he desired and easily could 
be like his Creator.] 
By claiming something that “he hæfde” as his own, independent of God’s gift, Lucifer is able to 
understand himself as independent of God, precipitating his desire to usurp God’s place.  Able to 
imagine himself as independent on the basis of his own singular beauty, he asserts this 
independence by seeking to dælan power. 
Significantly, in Ælfric’s sermon, God’s first reaction to Lucifer’s rebellion is to change 
all the rebel angels “of ðam fægeran hiwe þe hi on gescapene wæron. to laðlicum deoflum,”46 
(from the fair forms in which they were created to loathly devils) attacking the source of Satan’s 
pride.  Ælfric emphasizes the fitness of this punishment: “And swiðe rihtlice him swa getimode. 
þa ða he wolde mid modignysse beon betera þonne he gesceapen wæs”47 (And very rightly it so 
befell him, when he wished with pride to be better than he was created).  Satan, understanding 
his beauty as his own, had plotted how he might take a kingdom for himself as well; God’s 
actions respond to both these attempts at independence: 
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hwile þe he smeade hu he mihte dælan rice wið god. þa hwile gearcode se ælmihtiga 
scyppend him 7 his geferan hellewite. 7 hi ealle adræfde of heofenan rices myrihðe. 7 let 
befeallan on ðæt ece fyr þe him gegearcod wæs for heora ofermettum.”48 
[while he considered how he could share out power with God, the Almighty Creator 
prepared hell torments for him and his companions, and drove them all out of the joy of 
the heavenly kingdom and allowed to fall into the eternal fire which was made for them 
for their pride.] 
God removes the beauty Lucifer had taken for his essential attribute, and prepares a place for all 
the fallen angels so that even in their punishment they cannot escape being in a God-created 
place.  At this point, Ælfric also switches from considering Lucifer as an individual to grouping 
him with the rest of the devils who fell. 
 This is notably different from Augustine’s treatment of the same subject.  In De civitate 
Dei, Augustine traces the devils’ fall back to pride, which he defines as a created beings’ 
preference for himself over his creator: the bad angels “ab illo, qui summe est, auersi ad se ipsos 
conuersi sunt, qui non summe sunt; et hoc uitium quid aliud quam superbia nuncupatur?”49  
(abandoned Him whose Being is absolute and turned to themselves whose being is relative – a 
sin that can have no better name than pride).50  In Augustine’s thought this pride is the root cause 
of their evil decision; there is no deeper cause: “Huius porro malae uoluntatis causa efficiens si 
quaeratur, nihil inuenitur.”51  (If one seeks for the efficient cause of their evil will, none is to be 
found).52  Throughout this discussion Augustine’s thinking is obviously imbued with Neo-
platonic ideas of mutability and immutability.  This world of abstract, Neo-platonic reasoning is 
far removed from the concerns of Ælfric’s treatment of the subject.  Unlike Augustine’s 
treatment of the fallen angels as a unit, Ælfric focuses on Lucifer, setting his fall apart from that 
of the other angels who “ealle to ðam ræde gebugon,”53 (all assented to that counsel) and Ælfric 
also assigns a cause for Lucifer’s pride: he seeks power and independence from God on account 
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of his singular beauty.54  Ælfric then has a subtly different understanding of pride than does 
Augustine.  While for both of them pride involves violating a hierarchy, for Augustine the 
hierarchy is between the relative values of the mutable and immutable.  Pride is turning to the 
self (which is created, hence mutable) and valuing it above the immutability of God, an evil will 
for which there is no cause.  For Ælfric, Lucifer’s pride is rooted in his sense of preeminent 
singularity – valuing himself in a very concrete, specific way –  and rooting his identity in 
something that sets him apart from the rest of the communion of angels.  This singularity causes 
him to rise even higher and seek to become “betera þonne he gesceapen wæs.”  Situated within a 
gift-giving economy, Lucifer takes his beauty as a singular attribute belonging essentially to 
himself, thus as a marker of his individuality upon which further independence can be claimed, 
rather than understanding it as a gift bestowed through God’s generosity.55 
It is within this context that agen cyre is significant.  While choice, like all things, is a 
gift of God (God “let hi habban agenne cyre”),56 it is through freedom of choice that God’s 
creatures can either break with God or accept their identity as his dependents.  Still, they need 
something to exercise this choice upon.  Lucifer, like the other angels, had no specific commands 
to obey; he can only turn away from God into himself.  In the situation of the fallen angels agen 
cyre primarily works in Ælfric the same way that it does for Augustine.  For Augustine the fact 
that God gave the angels liberum arbitrium allowed them the choice whether to follow God or 
not.  In Augustine’s thinking this free choice is instrumental, a doctrinal device intended to 
absolve God from having created evil or the necessity for evil.57  Ælfric emphasizes much the 
same thing.  Concerned to clarify that God did not create evil, he initially says that Lucifer, like 
the rest of the angels, was created “ealle gode. 7 [God] let hi habban agenne cyre. swa hi heora 
scyppend lufedon 7 filidon. swa hi hine forleton.”58  (completely good, and God allowed them to 
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have own choice, so they loved and followed their Creator or they abandoned him).  Ending the 
account, Ælfric further emphasizes: God  
let hi habban agenne cyre. 7 hi næfre ne gebigde ne ne nydde mid nanum þingum to ðam 
yfelan ræde. ne næfre se yfela ræd ne com of godes geþanc. ac com of ðæs deofles. swa 
swa we ær cwædon.59 
[allowed them to have own choice, and he never neither forced nor compelled them in 
any way to that evil counsel; neither did the evil counsel come from God’s thought, but it 
came from the devil’s, just as we previously said.] 
The only (and limited) way that Lucifer can be autonomous is insofar as God has given him, with 
the rest of the angels, his “agen cyre.”  Lucifer uses this choice to break with God, forming his 
sense of identity through a beauty he claims as his own rather than recognizing it as God’s gift 
for which the moral response is gratitude.   
 Gratitude, as Georg Simmel pointed out, can have the taste of bondage if the desired state 
is independence.60  Lucifer’s fundamental problem is that he does not want the relationship with 
God that comes from accepting his gifts.  His desire for independence shifts the focus from the 
love and joy that gifts should engender to power.  The primary point at which power relations are 
likely to be a problem is when the recipient of gifts feels himself to be equal or near equal to the 
giver.61  In this case, the giver’s generosity threatens the recipient’s own conception of himself.  
Ælfric’s account of Lucifer’s fall reveals the specious nature of Lucifer’s claims in that all 
Lucifer had was given him.  Lucifer’s failure of gratitude is a moral failure, a refusal of the ideals 
of reciprocity.  He insists on casting his relationship with God in terms of power rather than 
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love,62 thus reducing God’s gifts to a power play instead of understanding them through personal 
affection.  In an ironic twist, what Lucifer takes as autonomy is really a warped dependence.  He 
set himself up in opposition to God (“ongean,” l. 33).  Locking himself into being God’s 
opposite, he can never truly break free.  It is as God’s opposite, a wicked lord in contrast to 
God’s good lordship, that Satan operates in the world of humans, and it is within the tension of 
this relationship that human prayer functions to declare the precator’s subservience to one lord or 
the other. 
 
Adam and Eve 
Adam and Eve are also given agen cyre but their case is not precisely parallel to 
Lucifer’s.  Whereas Lucifer tries to gain an independent identity through claiming his beauty as 
his own particular possession, Adam and Eve are given a specific command to follow, and 
identity for them never holds the promise of independence.  As is the case with the angels, Ælfric 
uses this term at a point when he wants to clarify that God is not responsible for creating Adam 
with evil desire: “Næs him gesceapen fram gode. ne he næs genedd þæt he sceolde godes bebod 
tobrecan. ac god hine let frigne. 7 sealde him agenne cyre. swa he wære gehyrsum. swa he wære 
ungehyrsum.”63  (He was not created thus by God, nor was he compelled to break God’s 
command, but God allowed him freedom, and gave him own choice, whether he would be 
obedient, or he would be disobedient).  Ælfric clarifies what Adam has to choose between: 
obedience or disobedience.  Unlike the angels, God had given Adam a specific command, not to 
eat from the fruit of a certain tree.64  It is this command that, paradoxically, gives Adam and Eve 
something of their own, hence freedom of choice.  As they choose to obey God, God intends that 
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“mid þære eaðelican gehyrsumnysse. þu geearnast heofenan rices myrhðe. 7 þone stede þe se 
deofol of afeoll þurh ungehyrsumnesse.”65  (with that easy obedience you will earn the joy of the 
heavenly kingdom and the position that the devil fell from through disobedience).  That is, Adam 
and Eve’s obedience allows them to enter into a relationship with God in which he promises to 
reward their obedience to him.  But their ability to choose to obey, their agen cyre, gives 
obedience meaning enough to be reciprocated. 
According to Annette B. Weiner, inalienable possessions are the ones people cannot lose 
without losing some sense of their identity: 
Some things, like most commodities, are easy to give.  But there are other possessions 
that are imbued with the intrinsic and ineffable identities of their owners which are not 
easy to give away.  Ideally, these inalienable possessions are kept by their owners from 
one generation to the next within the closed context of family, descent group, or dynasty.  
The loss of such an inalienable possession diminishes the self and by extension, the group 
to which the person belongs.66 
While Wiener is speaking out of her field research of specific things, as we saw in Chapter 1, gift 
theory can accommodate service within the category of gift.67  Furthermore, as Tertullian’s 
statement about prayer replacing sacrifice indicates, Christianity tends to “spiritualize” what 
were once concrete gifts and sacrifices to the gods into actions, prayers, and dispositions.  To 
Weiner, Godelier adds that the strongest sense of identity rooted in gifts traces those gifts back to 
the divine realm.68  Accordingly, Adam and Eve are not given an object to mark their identity or 
their connection with God, rather, they are given a tree and a taboo.  This command gives Adam 
his identity, teaching him “hwæt he wære”:  
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hwi wolde god swa lytles þinges him forwyrnan. þe him swa micle oðre þincg betæhte;  
gyse. hu mihte adam tocnawan hwæt he wære. buton he wære gehyrsum on sumum 
þincge his hlaforde; swilce god cwæde to him; Nast ðu þæt ic eom þin hlaford and þæt ðu 
eart min þeowa buton ðu do þæt ic ðe hate. 7 forgang þæt ic þe forebeode.69   
[why would God prohibit him such a little thing when he entrusted so much greater 
things to him.  Yes, how might Adam know what he was unless he were obedient in one 
thing to his Lord.  As if God said to him: “You do not know that I am your lord and that 
you are my servant unless you do what I command you and avoid that which I forbid 
you.”]  
Adam’s identity is thus bound up in his dependent relationship with God.  The command gives 
him something upon which to exercise his agen cyre, as he can choose whether to maintain an 
identity centered on keeping God’s taboo, or to disobey him.  And Adam’s own choice to keep 
the taboo allows him to enter into a reciprocal relationship with God.  When Adam chooses to 
listen to Satan rather than to God, he gives up this marker of his identity, gives up his status as 
God’s servant, and gives up any claims to God’s protection.  Adam loses his identity.  In so 
doing, however, he does not become free (not even in the negative sense of lordless), he instead 
becomes thrall to Satan, the one he listened to: “He wearð þa deofle gehyrsum. 7 gode 
ungehyrsum. 7 wearð betæht he 7 eal mancynn æfter ðisum life into hellewite. mid þam deofle 
ðe hine forlærde.”70  (He became obedient to the devil and disobedient to God, and he and all 
mankind were given up after this life to hell torments with the devil who led him astray).  Rather 
than independence, “agen cyre” gives Adam and Eve an avenue to self-knowledge through 
obedience.  It allows Adam “tocnawan hwæt he wære,” which, in Ælfric’s mind, is far more 
important than independence because it gives Adam a place in the created order.   
The tree itself cannot impart self-knowledge to Adam and Eve.  God does not name the 
tree from which they are forbidden to eat, and the only consequence he gives for disobedience is 
death; it holds no promise of knowledge in itself.  In her transgression, Eve mistakes the fruit of 
the tree for the thing itself – knowledge of good and evil – rather than as the symbolic object it 
is, a marker of humanity’s relationship with God, the not eating of which brings the knowledge 
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they need – an understanding of their relationship with God.  That is, by not eating the fruit they 
know good, but in eating it, as Ælfric goes on to say, they come to know evil.  It is Satan’s 
promise that the fruit will give Adam and Eve knowledge of good and evil, making them like the 
angels: “gif ge of ðam treowe geetað. þonne beoð eowere eagan geopenode. 7 ge magon geseon 
7 tocnawan ægðer ge god. ge yfel. 7 ge beoð englum gelice.”71  (if you eat from the tree your 
eyes will be opened, and you will see and know both good and evil, and you will be like the 
angels).  The tragedy is that, in reaching to be like the angels Adam and Eve were reaching for 
something that God already intended to give them within a reciprocal relationship with him, 
earned through humility and obedience: the vacated seats of the fallen angels.   
 Within a conception of agen cyre oriented around gift-giving and keeping, it does not 
really matter that Eve’s disobedience was occasioned by deception.  While deception might (and 
does) lead to questions of culpability within the context of free will (how free of a choice does a 
person make who is deceived?), it does not matter one way or another if a person is deceived into 
giving up something she knew she was supposed to keep, since it is the status of the kept thing 
that is important rather than the conditions of turning it over.72  Within the rest of Ælfric’s corpus 
this is a significant point, since people are often deceived into worshiping idols.73  Of course, 
after Adam, the human situation is reversed, in that they are in thrall to Satan, and all the human 
choice in the world cannot change this fact.  The surprising thing, then, is that in some ways 
Lucifer’s rebellion was successful.  Insofar as he wanted to have “anweald 7 rice ongean gode” 
he gains exactly this in his domination over humans who serve him.  Ælfric’s point, then, is that 
humans who listen to the devil must realize they are serving a traitor rather than the true Creator 
of all things.   
Ælfric’s CHI.1 establishes the relationship between humans and God oriented around 
obedience and choice.  For Adam and Eve, choice is given through a taboo: by keeping this 
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 CHI.1, ll. 134-6. 
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 It is interesting to note that Eve’s temptation in Genesis B does not work according to the same model.  In that 
case, she transgresses out of the best intentions and her deception engenders a great deal of sympathy for her. 
73
 Within this homily, for example, after the Tower of Babel, people make idols who become inhabited by demons 
who then claim that they are gods.  The people “weorðodon hi. 7 him lac ofredon. … 7 þæt beswicone mennisc feoll 
on cneowum to þam anlicnyssum and cwædon ge sind ure godas …” (CHI.1, ll. 215-16, 217-19, “worshiped them 
and offered them offerings … and that deceived race fell on their knees before the idols and said, ‘You are our 
gods.’” ). 
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taboo inviolate humans gain knowledge of their identity, their connection to God as his servants 
whom God intends to reward for obedience.  Thus, in preserving this choice, humans both 
preserve their fullest identity and enter into a reciprocal relationship with God wherein he 
rewards them for obedience by giving them a place in heaven.  As we will see in the following 
chapters, for Ælfric, petition happens within this relationship and is a marker of that choice: 
people petition the one whom they acknowledge as lord.  To pray to God is to acknowledge him 
as lord, whereas to pray to devils is to renounce God and claim the devil as lord.  The devil, as 
Ælfric makes clear, is a lesser lord, whose rule is based on deception.  To serve him is to serve 
one who rejected gifts rather than the God who created all things and who considers “hu he 
mihte his 7 ealles mancynnes eft gemiltsian.”74  (how he might have mercy on him and all 
humankind). 
 
CATHOLIC HOMILY I.19: THE LORD’S PRAYER 
 From the relational context provided by CHI.1, I turn now to Ælfric’s most explicit 
homilies on prayer.  Because of its central place in Christian practice and catechetical teaching, I 
first examine Ælfric’s homily on the LP.  This homily, CHI.19, is unique in a several ways.75  
First, it is one of the few homilies on the LP not addressed to catechumens; second, it is the only 
extant Old English homily on the LP (aside from a translation and brief encouragement to pray it 
by Wulfstan76); third, it emphasizes the idea that God’s fatherhood makes all Christians brothers 
much more than any of the other treatments of the prayer; and, fourth, it introduces the devil to 
the discussion in a much more structured and pervasive way than any of the other treatments, 
emphasizing the role of the devil as a counter-lord to God to an extent unusual within the 
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 CHI.1, ll. 160-1. 
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 For a summary list of early Western writings on the LP see Karlfried Froehlich, “The Lord’s Prayer in Patristic 
Literature.”  For a more complete treatment, see K.B. Schnurr, Hören und Handeln: Lateinische Auslegungen des 
Vaterunsers in der Alten Kirche bis zum fünften Jahrhundert, Freiburger Theologische Studien 132 (Freiburg: 
Herder, 1985). 
76
 In Bethurum VII, De fide catholica, Wulfstan uses the PN to go into an explication of the Creed.  Every Christian 
should know both things, he says, and he mentions that the PN contains 7 petitions for everything needful that 
people can pray privately to God.  But then he asks how a man can pray inwardly to God if he does not believe truly, 
and he goes from there into an explication of the Creed.  The following “sermon,” VIIa gives a translation of the PN 
and the Creed, although it might be noted that Wulfstan’s translation of the prayer is very odd if he really intends 
this to be the version that Christians should pray – highly alliterative and ornate, it is not the most literal of 
translations. 
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tradition of teaching on the LP.  While this homily has no particular source, Godden identifies 
some affinities to Augustine’s commentary on the LP in De sermone Domini in monte.77  But 
while Ælfric’s sermon is certainly influenced by Augustine – one might even say it is broadly 
Augustinian – the differences in emphasis are quite striking when one compares it either to 
Augustine’s commentary or his sermons to catechumens.   
Augustine’s most detailed exposition of the prayer is in his commentary on the Sermon 
on the Mount.  Because it is in a commentary it is necessarily intended for a different sort of 
audience than Ælfric’s sermon, and it is situated in a different interpretive context, bounded by a 
set of preoccupations seemingly directed by the text preceding the prayer itself.78  However, the 
way Augustine situates the prayer within the context of purity echoes catechetical teaching and 
the liturgical use of the prayer.  When he states, regarding the “eye” of the heart through which 
God is seen, “Huic autem oculo magna ex parte mundato difficile est non subripere sordes 
aliquas”79 (But even when this eye is in great part cleansed, it is difficult to prevent certain 
                                                 
77
 “Förster suggested that Ælfric was drawing on Augustine’s sermons ad competentes, numbers 55-9 [sic], as well 
as material traditionally used in teaching in the monastic schools.  The sermons do contain similar material, but the 
same points are made more fully in Augustine’s commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, which includes some 
passages very close to Ælfric.  … Occasional similarities of phrasing in the sermons, especially 59, suggest that 
Ælfric may have known those too, but the debt could be indirect.  … There remains much however for which no 
source is yet in evidence,” Godden 154 (Augustine’s sermons ad competentes are actually numbers 56-9).  
Augustine has four explications of the LP extant (counting all the sermons as one): his commentary De sermone 
Domini in monti secundum Mattheaum (CCSL 35), four catechetical sermons on the prayer (CCSL 41Aa, numbers 
56-59), and expositions on it both in his Letter CXXX Ad Probam (CCSL 31B, pp. 212-37.  This letter is the closest 
thing Augustine wrote to a treatise on prayer; his discussion of the LP is very brief indeed, but the letter includes 
much of interest on a theory of prayer), and in his anti-Pelagian text De dono perseverantiae (PL 45, col. 993-1000).  
Augustine’s explication in De dono perseverantiae uses Cyprian’s treatise to show that the Catholic church’s 
historical understanding is that perseverance is a gift from God; thus, he interprets every petition except the fifth as a 
petition for perseverance.  This raises some interesting questions regarding the theory of prayer.  Chiefly, in the 
statement, “Imperavit autem Deus, ut ei sancti ejus dicant orantes, Ne inferas nos in tentationem. Quisquis igitur 
exauditur hoc poscens, non infertur in contumaciae tentationem, qua possit vel dignus sit perseverantiam sanctitatis 
amittere” (vi.11, PL 45, col. 1000, “But God commanded that His saints should say to Him in prayer, ‘Lead us not 
into temptation.’ Whoever, therefore, is heard when he asks this, is not led into the temptation of contumacy, 
whereby he could or would be worthy to lose perseverance in holiness,” NPNF, ser. 1, vol. 5, ch. 11).  Is this 
because the person praying is expressing a sort of submission that is at impossible odds with contumacy?  Or is it 
because of a more direct protection of God in response to this prayer?  
78
 Matthew 6 begins by stating that almsgiving should be done in secret rather than for the praise of men (6:1-4) and 
moves to prayer, which should be private and brief (6:5-8).  At this point the LP is given (9-13), followed by 
instructions on fasting (16-18), and further teaching on the correct relationship to material wealth (19-34).  Verse 22, 
“lucerna corporis est oculus si fuerit oculus tuus simplex totum corpus tuum lucidum erit,” [The light of thy body is 
thy eye. If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome] is the idea that Augustine uses to begin his 
discussion (as seen in the quote given below), and it governs his discussion of the passage. 
79
 De sermone Domini in monte, CCSL 35, II.i.i7-8. 
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defilements from creeping insensibly over it),80 the reference here echoes the function of baptism 
that cleanses the catechumen of all his sins, and then to the daily praying of the LP that cleanses 
the precator from the small defilements that creep over him.81  Therefore, Augustine’s relation of 
purity to prayer comes as much from the typical context for teaching on (in baptismal catechesis) 
and praying the LP (in the communion cycle) as it does from the contextualizing passage in 
Matthew, which does not introduce the idea of purity that Augustine uses to start his discussion 
until verse 22.82 
Augustine’s primary focus on the cleansing of the heart through prayer and almsgiving 
situates prayer within the private realm of the individual’s heart.  Augustine defines cleansing of 
the heart as what happens as one’s motives become rightly aligned, when one does what one 
does for the praise of God rather than other people.83  The secrecy of spiritual practice clarifies 
motive; therefore, Augustine situates prayer within the heart of the one praying.84  But the 
incorporeal nature of the heart and of desire give it natural affinity with the spiritual realm.  
Through these associations, he links the sacred with the private and interior parts of the person,85 
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 NPNF II.i.i. 
81
 This idea is found in all his sermons on the LP, but for example: “Remissio peccatorum una est quae semel datur 
in sancto baptismate, alia quae quamdiu uiuimus hic datur dominica oratione” (Augustine, sermon 58, CCSL 
41Aa.6123-5, “There is one forgiveness of sins that is given only once in holy baptism; another which, as long as we 
live here, is given in the Lord’s Prayer,” Hill, 58.6). 
82
 And need not necessarily govern the discussion on the passage.  Compare Jerome’s commentary on Matthew. 
83
 “Pertinet ergo ad oculum mundum non intueri in recte faciendo laudes hominum et ad eas referre quod recte facis, 
id est propterea recte facere aliquid, ut hominibus placeas.  Sic enim etiam simulare bonum libebit, si non adtenditur 
nisi ut homo laudet, qui quoniam uidere cor non potest, potest etiam falsa laudare. Quod qui faciunt, id est qui 
bonitatem simulant, duplici corde sunt.  Non ergo habet simplex cor, id est mundum cor, nisi qui transcendit 
humanas laudes et illum solum intuetur, cum recte uiuit, et ei placere nititur qui conscientiae solus inspector est” 
(CCSL 35, II.i.1.24-33) [It belongs therefore to the pure eye not to look at the praises of men in acting rightly, i.e., to 
do anything rightly with the very design of pleasing men.  For thus you will be disposed also to counterfeit what is 
good, if nothing is kept in view except the praise of man; who, inasmuch as he cannot see the heart, may also praise 
things that are false.  And they who do this, i.e. who counterfeit goodness, are of a double heart.  No one therefore 
has a single, i.e. a pure heart, except the man who rises above the praises of men; and when he lives well, looks at 
Him only, and strives to please Him who is the only Searcher of the conscience]  (NPNF 6, II.i.1). 
84
 “VOS AVTEM CVM ORATIS, inquit, INTROITE IN CVBICVLA VESTRA. Quae sunt ista cubicula nisi ipsa 
corda” (II.iii.11.233-4) [“But when ye pray,” says He, “enter into your bed-chambers.”  What are those bed-
chambers but just our hearts themselves?]  (NPNF vi, II.iii.9). 
85
 “Parum est intrare in cubicula, si ostium pateat importunis, per quod ostium ea quae foris sunt inprobe se 
inmergunt et interiora nostra appetunt. … Claudendum est ergo ostium, id est carnali sensui resistendum est, ut 
oratio spiritalis dirigatur ad patrem, quae fit in intimis cordis, ubi oratur pater in abscondito” (II.iii.11.237-40, 243-6) 
[It is a small matter to enter into our bed-chambers if the door stand open to the unmannerly, through which the 
things that are outside profanely rush in and assail our inner man.  … Hence the door is to be shut, i.e. the fleshly 
sense is to be resisted, so that spiritual prayer may be directed to the Father, which is done in the inmost heart, where 
prayer is offered to the Father which is in secret]
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a conception of sanctus-oriented prayer that is also strikingly individual.  All of this adds up to a 
theory of prayer that emphasizes prayer’s subjective efficacy: the discipline of praying retrains 
desire.86 
Augustine’s focus throws Ælfric’s preoccupations into relief and show the marked ways 
he differs from explications that are more closely Augustinian.  Even though traditional teaching 
lurks behind all aspects of Ælfric’s homily, he reworks the sermon to reflect a relationship 
imagined between God and humans oriented around obedience and protection, and he places his 
explication within a different complex of concerns, namely those of the praying community.  
Through all of this, Ælfric largely excises Augustine’s conception of purity as detachment from 
the material world and replaces it with a vision of a reciprocal community made whole through 
prayer and almsgiving. 
Like most sermons on the LP, Ælfric’s sermon about the central Christian prayer says 
almost nothing explicit about the practice of prayer, and says very little about a theory of prayer, 
especially when compared to treatises like Origen’s and Cassian’s, and even Augustine’s 
commentary.  Ælfric opens with the disciples’ request to learn how to pray; he introduces and 
concludes the homily by considering what it means that God is the father of Christians, pointing 
out that God’s fatherhood makes all Christians brothers and thus all have equal access to God.  
The middle section is literal line-by-line explication of the seven petitions of the LP.  From the 
very earliest examples, this type of explication is always at the heart of teaching on the LP.    
Ælfric mentions the devil in the explication of seven out of the eight phrases of the 
prayer, and mentions hell-torment in the remaining phrase.  In effect, the devil’s prominence sets 
up the devil’s power as a rival to God’s.  The rivalry between God and the devil mirrors the 
relationship between the two established in the ransom theory of salvation.  Within the ransom 
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 “Sed rursus quaeri potest – siue rebus siue uerbis orandum sit –, quid opus sit ipsa oratione, si deus iam nouit, 
quid nobis sit necessarium, nisi quia ipsa orationis intentio cor nostrum serenat et purgat capaciusque efficit ad 
excipienda diuina munera … . [S]ed nos non semper parati sumus accipere, cum inclinamur in alia et rerum 
temporalium cupiditate tenebramur. Fit ergo in oratione conuersio cordis ad eum qui semper dare paratus est, si nos 
capiamus quod dederit, et in ipsa conuersione purgatio interioris oculi” (II.iii.14.281-5, 288-92) [But again, it may 
be asked (whether we are to pray in ideas or in words) what need there is for prayer itself, if God already knows 
what is necessary for us; unless it be that the very effort involved in prayer calms and purifies our heart, and makes 
it more capacious for receiving the divine gifts ….  (B)ut we are not always ready to receive, since we are inclined 
towards other things, and are involved in darkness through our desire for temporal things.  Hence there is brought 
about in prayer a turning of the heart to Him, … and in the very act of turning there is effected a purging of the inner 
eye] (NPNF vi, II.iii.14). 
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theory formulation God and the devil are rivals for human obedience; as we saw in CHI.1, the 
question is which one humans will obey.87  After Christ’s atoning work, the devil has no longer 
any legitimate right over people, but he still seeks to control them by tricking them into assuming 
a relationship subordinate to him.  Ælfric specifically references the ransom theory in a passage 
from his homily on Palm Sunday.88  But, as CHI.1 indicates, it really underlies much of Ælfric’s 
presentation of humanity’s relationship with the devil.   
The devil’s introduction to the exposition has the effect of clarifying that humans must 
make a choice between serving God or serving the devil.  Like Adam and Eve’s choice, human 
choice to obey and pray to God gives them some amount of agency within the relationship, so 
that their choice to obey is rewardable: as they decide to serve God in this life, this decision is 
rewarded by inclusion in the kingdom of God in the next life.  As we would expect, throughout 
the homily Ælfric makes the case that God is both humans’ rightful lord, and the better of the 
two to serve.  Although Ælfric presents the two as rival powers, he undermines any sense of 
legitimacy to the devil’s rule, or any idea that he might function in the same way as God does, as 
a lord or father who rewards those who serve him. 
 Ælfric’s homily on the LP begins by reminding his hearers that God “asend his agen 
bearn us to alysednysse” (sent his own son to free us) when we were “forwyrhte”89 (forfeited), a 
reference to the ransom theory’s idea that Christ delivered humanity from ruin, bondage to the 
devil.  Ælfric’s presentation of the devil as a rival lord is the case is initially obscured by the fact 
that Ælfric uses the terminology of the LP – God as father – and the terminology of the standard 
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 “He wearð þa deofle gehyrsum. 7 gode ungehyrsum. 7 wearð betæht he 7 eal mancynn æfter ðisum life into 
hellewite. mid þam deofle ðe hine forlærde” (CHI.1, ll. 157-9) [(Adam) was obedient to the devil and disobedient to 
God, and he was delivered with all mankind after this life into hell torment with the devil who led him astray]. 
88
 “cristes rihtwisnys. is swa micel þæt he nolde niman mancynn. neadunga of ðam deofle buton he hit forwyrhte; 
He hit forwyrhte þa ða he tihte þæt folc to cristes cweale þæs ælmihtigan godes; 7 þa þurh his unsceððian deaðe 
wurdon we alysede: fram þam ecan deaðe. gif we us sylfe ne forpærað; … [deofol] geseh þa mennyscnysse on 
criste. 7 na ða godcundysse: Þa sprytte he þæt iudeisce folc to his slege. 7 gefredde þa ðone angel cristes 
godcundnysse þurh þe he wæs. to deaðe aceocod. 7 benæmed ealles mancynnes þara þe on god belyfað” (CHI.14, ll. 
167-71, 175-8) [Christ’s justice is so great that he would not take mankind by force from the devil unless he 
forfeited them.  He forfeited them when he incited the people to the death of Christ the Almighty God.  And through 
his innocent death we were freed from the eternal death, if we do not destroy ourselves. … The devil saw the human 
nature in Christ and not the divinity.  Then he incited the Jewish people to his slaying and then felt the hook of 
Christ’s divinity through which he was choked to death and deprived of all mankind, of those who believe in God]. 
89
 CHI.19, l. 25. 
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explications – human as dwelling, God as leader, etc. – to set up the tension between God and 
the devil.  In regard to God, he says: 
[W]e men sind godes bearn for þan ðe he us geworhte. 7 eft þa ða we forwyrhte wæron 
he asende his agen bearn us to alysednysse; Nu sind we godes bearn. 7 crist is ure broðer 
gif we þam fæder on riht gehyrsumiað 7 mid eallum mode hine wurþiað.90 
[We are God’s children because he made us, and then, when we were ruined, he sent his 
own son to free us.  Now we are God’s children, and Christ is our brother, if we rightly 
obey the Father and honor him with all our mind.] 
God’s authority is based on his right to his own creation.  In spite of human disobedience, he 
mercifully freed humanity, but for people to actually become God’s children it is necessary for 
them to obey God and honor him; that is, to respond to his gift with their service, a service that 
places them in a familial relationship.  Ælfric then contrasts the situation of the children of God 
to those who are children of the devil:  
[W]itodlice se man þe deofle geefenlæcð. se bið deofles bearn. na þurh gecynde. oððe 
þurh gesceapennyse. ac þurh ða geefenlæcunge. 7 yfelum geearnungum; And se man þe 
gode gecwemð he bið godes bearn. na gecyndelice ac þurh gesceapenysse. 7 þurh godum 
geearnungum.91 
[Truly, the one who imitates the devil, he is the devil’s child, not in the natural way or 
through creation but through imitation and evil deeds.  But the man who serves God he is 
God’s child, not in the natural way, but through creation and through good deeds.] 
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 CHI.19, ll. 23-7. 
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 CHI.19, ll. 34-8.  As Godden points out, this idea is similar to one found in Augustine’s Tract., 42.15.11-14, 37, 
which Ælfric uses in CHII.13: “Et ex Deo sunt, et ex Deo non sunt; natura ex Deo sunt, vitio non sunt ex Deo: 
natura enim bona quae ex Deo est, peccavit voluntate, credendo quod diabolus persuasit, et vitiata est. … imitando 
diabolum, filii diaboli facti erant” (Godden 468) [They (the Jews) are both of God, and not of God. By nature they 
are of God: by depravity they are not of God; for the good nature which is of God sinned voluntarily by believing 
the persuasive words of the devil, and was corrupted. … imitating the devil, they had become the children of the 
devil] (NPNF vol. 7, Homilies on the Gospel of John, sect. 15).  Jerome also links the idea of sonship and obedience 
in his commentary on Matthew, right before the LP section: “Vt sitis filii Patris uestri qui in caelis est.  Si Dei 
praecepta custodiens filius quis efficitur Dei, ergo non est natura filius sed arbitrio suo” (CCSL 77, I.706-8) [“So 
that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven.” If one becomes a son of God by keeping God’s commands, 
then he is not a son by nature but by his own choice] (comm. on 5.45, p. 85).  In neither case is the correspondence 
especially close.  Augustine’s explication is much longer, and focuses on explaining why Jesus called the Pharisees 
children of the devil.  Jerome’s context is closer to Ælfric’s, but in Ælfric the idea of being a son by one’s own 
choice is buried within the concept of making oneself acceptable to God (“se man þe gode gecwemð,” CHI.19, l. 
36). 
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That people become children of the devil through imitation, but children of God through service, 
is striking.  Imitating the devil causes humans to bear his likeness as children bear the likeness of 
their parents, but it does not necessarily establish a hierarchy (geefenlæcan, to emulate, to make 
equal).  Within geefenlæcan there is no particular sense that the devil recognizes this imitation.  
Furthermore, the devil has no inherent rights over people, because he has not created any of 
them.  Therefore, Ælfric does not imply any particular mutual obligation or relationship resulting 
from that imitation.  In contrast, good deeds put one in a position of “gecwemende” God, which 
implies not only that the person serves him but also God’s response to this service.  This does 
establish a mutual relationship. 
Ælfric continues the contrast of God with the devil throughout the homily.  In the 
explication of the third petition, he presents the devil as an alternate indweller, saying: “se goda 
man bið þæs halgan gastes templ; swa eac þærtogeanes se fordona man bið deofles templ 7 
deofles wunung”92  (the good man is the temple of the Holy Spirit; so contrariwise, the corrupted 
man is the devil’s temple and the devil’s dwelling).  And then in the discussion of the sixth 
petition, the devil is an alternate leader: “Se man þe wile gelomlice syngian. 7 gelomlice betan. 
he gremað god; And swa he swiðor syngað. swa he deofle. gewyldra bið. 7 hine þonne god 
forlæt. 7 he færð swa him deofol wissað”93  (The one who often sins and often amends, he angers 
God.  And the more he sins, the more he will be in the power of the devil, and God will abandon 
him and he will go as the devil directs).  Once again, the word Ælfric chooses to convey the 
devil’s direction, “wissað,” depersonalizes the relationship.94  Those who follow the devil’s 
direction are not rendering service to him; rather, they have fallen under his influence, an 
influence that carries with it no inherent promise of protection or reward.  Thus, the devil is not 
presented as a lord who rewards and protects his own, but rather a leader whose doom they share 
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 CHI.19, ll. 67-8. 
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 CHI.19, ll. 160-3. 
94
 Ælfric often uses wissian in somewhat depersonalized instances, such as when God guides the magi to Bethlehem 
through the star: “Eaþe mihte god hi gewissian þurh ðone steorran to þære byrig” (CHI.7, l. 83, “God could easily 
guide them through the stars to the town”), or when something is controlled by a sort of animating force, as the soul 
controls the body, “Heo is ungesewenlic. ac þeahhwæðre heo wissað þone gesewenlican lichaman” (CHI.10, l. 121-
2) [She is invisible but nevertheless she directs the visible body], or when the Holy Spirit directs those who believe 
in God: “hi sind þurh þone halgan gast gewissode” (CHI.7, l. 178-9) [they are directed through the Holy Spirit].  He 
also uses it in a more direct sense in collocation with “geweardan,” to rule; for instance: “of þe cymþ se heretoga. se 
þe gewylt 7 gewissað israhela folc (CHI.5, ll. 19-20) [from you will come the leader, he who will rule and direct the 
people of Israel]. 
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as they fall under his control.  Although Ælfric’s language for God and the devil (father, dweller-
within, etc.) borrow from the prayer, the Bible, and standard explication, the underlying tension 
in the homily is within the formulation of the ransom theory.  If humans imitate the devil, God 
abandons them to his lordship.  The devil’s domination does not bring promises of closeness or 
reward; his is a rather atomized, dysfunctional family.  On the other hand, those who serve God 
become members of an orderly family in which obedience is rewarded with further belonging.  
Ælfric again returns to this opposition at the end of the homily while discussing “deliver us from 
evil.”  He makes clear what kind of lords both God and the devil are: 
Alys us fram deofle 7 fram eallum his syrwungum; God lufað us. 7 deofol us hatað;  God 
us fet 7 gefrefrað. 7 deofol us wile ofslean gif he mot. … for þi we sceolon forbugan 7 
forseon þone lyþran deofol mid eallum his lotwrencum. for þan ðe him ne gebyrað naht 
to us. 7 we sceolon lufian 7 fyligan urum drihtne. se þe us læt to þam ecan life.95 
[Deliver us from the devil and from all his tricks.  God loves us, and the devil hates us.  
God feeds and comforts us, and the devil will kill us if he can. … Therefore, we should 
flee from and reject the wicked devil with all his deceits, because he is of no concern to 
us at all, and we must love and follow our Lord, he who leads us to the eternal life.] 
Within the structure of this rivalry Ælfric emphasizes people’s duty to obey God in order to call 
him Father or Lord – this, again, is the language Ælfric uses when talking about Adam’s fall, and 
in this homily, it is the condition under which people can call God father (even though he made 
and redeemed them): “gif we þam fæder on riht gehyrsumiað”96 (if we will rightly obey the 
Father) and, several lines later: “we magon cuðlice to him clypian swa swa to urum breþer. gif 
we þa broðerrædene swa healdað … þæt is þæt we ne sceolon na geþafian. þæt deofol mid 
ænigum unþeawum us geweme fram cristes broþorrædene”97  (we may familiarly cry to him as 
to our brother, if we so observe our brotherhood … that is, that we should not allow the devil 
with any evil practices to seduce us from the brotherhood of Christ).  Obedience and the 
relational position to petition go hand in hand; brotherhood with Christ is conditional upon 
people recognizing the favors he has proffered and responding in obedience. 
                                                 
95
 CHI.19, ll. 179-85. 
96
 CHI.19, ll. 26-7, emphasis added. 
97
 CHI.19, ll. 30-3 (emphasis added). 
  
137 
 Ælfric’s homily thus situates the primary Christian prayer within a relationship with God 
in which the individual chooses, on the basis of his actions (his obedience to God or his imitation 
of the devil) with whom he is allied.  Prayer becomes a part of and a characteristic of this 
relationship in which precators enact their choice of lords, rather than a subjectively efficacious 
means of attaining purity.  Gustav Aulén’s summary of the difference between ransom theory 
and Anselm’s doctrine of substitutionary atonement helpfully highlights the difference in 
concern attendant on ransom theory:  
[I]t scarcely needs to be said that this “dramatic” type stands in sharp contrast with the 
“subjective” type of view.  It does not set forth only or chiefly a change taking place in 
men; it describes a complete change in the situation, a change in the relation between 
God and the world, and a change also in God’s own attitude.  The idea is, indeed, 
thoroughly “objective”; and its objectivity is further emphasised by the fact that the 
Atonement is not regarded as affecting men primarily as individuals, but is set forth as a 
drama of a world’s salvation.98  
Most notably, the ransom theory predisposes people to think in terms of God as a lord, and 
salvation as a matter of allegiance to one lord or the other predicated upon which lord one obeys 
– that is, a change in the situation of the one obeying.  In these terms, obedience is not a matter 
of learning to purify one’s inner eye or training the desires, nor does it focus on a change in the 
inner disposition from unwilling and unable to please God, but rather it brings about release from 
a prior condition of bondage and makes humans free to serve their rightful Lord.  Within this 
structure, however, Ælfric systematically undermines any sense of closeness or reward attendant 
upon following the devil.  Being a child of God implies a close relationship; being a child of the 
devil does not, because the devil “us wile ofslean gif he mot.”   
 As Aulén mentions, the ransom theory also tends to see the Atonement as affecting the 
world, and, we might say, the community, rather than people as individuals.  This brings us to 
Ælfric’s other strikingly different focus, which is his emphasis on the brotherhood of believers in 
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his introduction and conclusion.  The basic idea of brotherhood can be found in Augustine’s 
commentary and sermons:99  
Admonentur hic etiam diuites uel genere nobiles secundum saeculum, cum christiani facti 
fuerint, non superbire aduersus pauperes et ignobiles, quoniam simul dicunt deo: pater 
noster, quod non possunt uere ac pie dicere, nisi se fratres esse cognoscant.100 
[Here (in the salutation) also there is an admonition to the rich and to those of noble birth, 
so far as this world is concerned, that when they have become Christians they should not 
comport themselves proudly towards the poor and the low of birth; since together with 
them they call God “Our Father,” – an expression which they cannot truly and piously 
use, unless they recognise that they are brethren.]101 
The idea of brotherhood in Augustine is conveyed in two sentences that do not gain much 
emphasis within the explication.102  In contrast, the idea of brotherhood essentially forms the 
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introduction and conclusion to Ælfric’s sermon.  He begins by discussing the significance of 
God’s fatherhood for the brotherhood of all Christians: “For þi nu ealle cristene men ægðer ge 
rice. ge heane. ge æðelborene ge unæðelborene. 7 se hlaford 7 se þeowa ealle hi sind gebroðra 7 
ealle hi habbað ænne fæder on heofonum”103  (Therefore now all Christians, whether rich or 
poor, noble-born or common, both the lord and the servant, all are brothers and all have one 
Father in heaven).   For Ælfric this equality is primarily manifest in the boldness with which all 
people can address God as father: “Ealswa bealdlice mot se þeowa clypian god him to fæder 
ealswa se cyning”104  (Just as boldly may the servant call God his father as the king).  The only 
thing that gains people higher standing before God is through the same obedience that Ælfric 
continually emphasizes is necessary to enter into a relationship with God: “ealle we sind gelice 
ætforan gode. buton hwa oðerne mid godum weorcum forþeo”105  (we are all alike before God, 
unless one outserve the other with good works).  Indeed, good works have the possibility of 
reversing the normal social order: “oft bið se earma betera ætforan gode þonne se rica”106  (often 
the poor is better before God than the rich).  And, finally, this brotherly bond has radical 
implications for the way different members of society treat each other, so that: “ælc oþerne lufige 
swa swa hine sylfne. 7 nanum ne gebeode þæt he nelle þæt man him gebeode”107 (each loves the 
other just as himself, and commands no one anything that he does not wish someone command 
him).  Although Ælfric speaks of a fundamental equality of all Christians, clearly he does not 
envision a leveling of social roles.  Rather, he calls for people to act toward each other with 
“soþan sibbe”108 (true peace), enacting true kinship bonds toward each other that, as we will see 
in CHI.18, he characterizes through the mutual exchange of gifts and services. 
At the end of the homily he returns to the idea of unity for another forty lines or so.  His 
main point is that all Christians need each other; the rich especially need the poor.109  As Godden 
notes, this is an appropriate theme for Rogationtide, when the whole community might be 
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expected to gather in church,110 but it also has the effect of situating prayer in a complex of 
communal concerns focused on peace and unity rather than on the purification of the individual 
as in Augustine.111  Ælfric seems to use as his starting point an idea found toward the beginning 
of Cyprian’s treatise on the LP, which presents the LP as a “public and common” prayer on the 
basis of the plural pronouns used throughout: 
Non dicimus: Pater meus, qui es in caelis … Publica est nobis et communis oratio, et 
quando oramus, non pro uno sed pro populo toto rogamus, quia totus populus unum 
sumus. Deus pacis et concordiae magister qui docuit unitatem, sic orare unum pro 
omnibus uoluit, quomodo in uno omnes ipse portauit.112  
[For we say not “My Father, which art in heaven”… .  Our prayer is public and common; 
and when we pray, we pray not for one, but for the whole people, because we the whole 
people are one.  The God of peace and the Teacher of concord, who taught unity, willed 
that one should thus pray for all, even as He Himself bore us all in one.]113 
Ælfric echoes the same ideas: “Ne cwyð na on þam gebede. min fæder. þu ðe eart on heofonum. 
ac cwyþ ure fæder … On þam is geswutelod hu swiðe god lufað annysse. 7 geþwærnysse on his 
folce”114 (It is not said in the prayer, “My Father, you who are in heaven,” but it is said, “Our 
Father” …  In this is revealed how much God loves unity and concord in his people).  While 
Cyprian follows the passage above with a catena of biblical quotations developing this theme, 
Ælfric moves on into the metaphor of the human body from I Cor. 12: “Æfter godes gesetnysse 
ealle cristene men sceoldon beon swa geþwære. swilce hit an man wære”115  (According to 
God’s decree all Christians should be so united as though they were one man).  In emphasizing 
community over the individual what Ælfric emphasizes is a sense of communal wholeness, an 
idea of the halig, as opposed to sanctus.  Thus, while both Augustine and Ælfric teach that God’s 
name needs to be hallowed in each of us, Augustine says “ut sanctum habeatur ab hominibus, id 
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est ita illis innotescat deus, ut non existiment aliquid sanctius, quod magis offendere timeant”116  
(that it may be held holy by men; i.e., that God may so become known to them, that they shall 
reckon nothing more holy, and which they are more afraid of offending).117  In sermon 56 
Augustine defines “hallowed” more specifically for his congregation: “Quid est sanctifectur?  
Sanctum habeatur, non contemnatur”118  (What does ‘hallowed be’ mean?  May it be treated as 
holy (sanctus), not disdained). 119 Augustine’s idea of sanctificatio situates the concept within 
the realm of taboo/sacred, that which a person fears to defile or transgress, and thus shows proper 
respect to.  His teaching correspondingly focuses on set-apartness, on purity, on detachment from 
the material world. 
On the other hand, Ælfric says,  
Ac þis word is swa to understandenne þæt his nama sy on us gehalgod. 7 he us þæs 
getiþige þæt we moton his naman mid urum muþe gebletsian. 7 he us sylle þæt geþanc. 
þæt we magon understandan þæt nan ðing nis swa halig swa his nama.120  
[But this word should so be understood that his name be in us hallowed, and he grants to 
us that we may bless his name with our mouth, and he gives us that thought that we can 
understand that nothing is so holy as his name.] 
Ælfric’s teaching notably situates the idea of holiness within a more positive context, associating 
it, not with fear of offending God, but with blessing him.  Furthermore, the ability both to bless 
God and to understand his holiness is considered a gift from God.  Rather than something to be 
feared, Ælfric sees the holy as something to be praised, and notes that holiness comes from God 
to man: “he us ealle gebletsað and gehalgað”121 (he blesses and hallows all of us), and then is 
returned from man to God as people strive to live holiness and to speak blessings back to God.  
Ælfric’s ideal community is one that exists in a cycle of gift and return gift, being blessed and 
blessing.  Thus, for Ælfric, prayer functions as part of the individual’s identifying himself with a 
particular community.  Certain obligations go along with belonging to this community, both 
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toward obeying God and toward realizing one’s fundamental equality with other believers and 
thus one’s obligations towards them. 
 This concern for holiness thus plays out in Ælfric’s idea of human relations bookending 
the sermon, although halgung/halgian is not a word he uses in his discussion of relationships 
among Christians.  The result of this wholeness, however, is that 
on eallum þingum we sceolon healdan sibbe and annysse. gif we wyllað habban þa 
micclan geþincþe. þæt we beon godes bearn se þe on heofonum is: on þære he rixað mid 
eallum his halgum. on ealra worulda world.122 
[in all things we should hold peace and unity if we wish to have the great privilege that 
we be God’s children, he who is in heaven where he rules with all his saints through all 
ages]. 
Ælfric’s hearers can expect to partake in this situation if “hi mid earfoðnyssum. 7 mid geswince. 
geearnian þæt ece rice 7 þa ecan blisse mid gode. 7 mid eallum his halgum”123  (they with 
humility and with toil earn that eternal kingdom and the eternal bliss with God and with all his 
saints). 
 In many ways then, Ælfric’s teaching on the central Christian prayer hardly seems to be 
about prayer at all, and barely addresses theoretical concerns about what prayer is.  What Ælfric 
does emphasize is the particular relationship between Christians and God that is manifested 
through prayer and enacted as people cry out to Christ as brother and God as father.  This 
relationship has, for Ælfric, real social implications for the members of a community constituted 
by and oriented around the continual reiteration of the central Christian prayer.  
 
CATHOLIC HOMILY I.18: THE COMMUNITY AT PRAYER 
Like CHI.19, CHI.18 was written for Rogationtide, the three days before Ascension when 
a large proportion of the community could be expected in church.124  CHI.18 explains the origins 
of Rogationtide, but the last half focuses on petitioning God.  This homily also notably situates 
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prayer within a three-way gift exchange between the rich, the poor, and God, deepening the ideal 
of communal wholeness presented in CHI.19.  CHI.18 deepens the communal orientation of 
prayer presented in CHI.19 through presenting prayer – the petition for salvation – as a three-
way gift-cycle involving the community and God.  This gift-cycle involves both prayer and 
almsgiving.125  Within gift-theory, alms are the perfect representation of the “free” gift, given by 
the donor out of no obligation to a recipient with whom he has no particular ties and from whom 
he expects no return.126  As we have seen up to this point, in some ways almsgiving most 
perfectly represents the relationship between God and humans: all gifts come freely from God; 
humans have nothing with which to reciprocate since all they have (including life itself) comes 
from God.  Humans are therefore God’s beggars, dependent on God’s gratia but in no way able 
to approach intimacy of relationship with him.  As with all “free” gifts, alms negate a 
relationship by calling attention to the disparity in situations between the donor and the recipient.  
In practice, the hierarchy alms establish between donor and needy calls attention to the inequality 
that exists between them.  Thus: “The unreciprocated gift debases the recipient,” according to 
Parry.127  But alms are more debasing to the recipient in a situation in which the recipient feels 
the social distance between the donor and himself is closer than the act of almsgiving implies.  
At the same time, this is a conceptualization of the relationship between God and humans that 
Anglo-Saxon teaching on prayer tends to resist.  Because of gratia in Bede and the closely 
related concept of agen cyre and gehyrsumness in Ælfric, humans are able to enter into a 
reciprocal relationship with God in which they give God gifts for which he rewards them. 
 As Boniface Ramsey’s account of early almsgiving makes clear,128 almsgiving in the late 
antique church was quickly subsumed into do ut des exchange in which alms are sacrificed to 
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God (via the poor) for the cleansing of sins and salvation of the donor.129  That is, the transaction 
that takes place can be seen as one essentially between the donor and God in which the poor are 
instrumental rather than essential partners.  However, early Christian teachings on prayer often 
emphasize the way that the poor can also give alms to those less fortunate than themselves, or 
through acts of service to the wealthy, such as helping stranded travelers.  This gives alms a 
leveling effect, but still makes the primary transaction one between the donor and God.  As 
Angenendt and others have pointed out, almsgiving and other donations pro anima become 
significant forces in the medieval economy.130  Alms and prayer become subsumed more and 
more into a model of exchange in which sins and cleansing all have their prices calculated in 
prayers and good deeds.  Ælfric avoids this, and it is to a large extent the structures of gift-
exchange that allow him to do this. 
 But before looking at Ælfric in more detail, it is worth spending a moment with 
Augustine’s commentary on almsgiving in the prayer passage from De sermone Domini in 
monte.  For Augustine (as for most early writers on prayer), both almsgiving and prayer operate 
on the same plane of action, since both are good works oriented toward salvation.  Specifically, 
within this text, both of these works bring the practitioner of them to the purity necessary for 
salvation.  Almsgiving, then, is essentially a matter between the one giving alms and God, but it 
is not a do ut des relationship, nor are alms conceptualized relationally.  Almsgiving is subsumed 
into the same concern for purity manifest in his teaching on prayer: giving alms for the praise of 
God rather than men leads to cleansing of the heart.  In fact, almsgiving is an important part of 
this cleansing: through almsgiving the individual demonstrates (and perhaps helps bring about) 
his detachment from the material world – a conception of the holy oriented around sanctus.  
Augustine asks: “Simplex autem quomodo erit, si duobus dominis seruit, nec una intentione 
rerum aeternarum purificat aciem suam, sed eam mortalium quoque fragiliumque rerum amore 
obnubilat?”131  (How will [the heart] be single, if it serves two masters, and does not purge its 
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vision by the striving after eternal things alone, but clouds it by the love of mortal and perishable 
things as well?)132  Through giving secretly, as the Gospel commands, the one giving 
demonstrates his detachment both from material things and from the praise of men.  Almsgiving 
shows that the one giving alms is not ruled by his own possessions, and it acts as a purificatory 
practice in training the eye of the heart to be single. 
Augustine’s idea of alms thus resonates strangely with Derrida’s idea of the pure gift.  In 
Derrida’s thinking, a pure gift is one from which the giver gains nothing, including praise or 
even her own satisfied feeling.  The main difference between alms in this passage and Derrida’s 
pure gift133 is that, for Augustine, detachment transfers the function of the alms from the 
mundane to the spiritual realm.  Within the gift-theories of sacrifice, this sort of transference is 
usually what differentiates a gift from a sacrifice.  However, for Augustine, the gift transferred to 
the spiritual realm has no function there.  One does not, in this passage, give alms as a gift to 
God in return for purity; one gives alms to people as a means to purification.  The gift disappears 
and all that is left is the single-hearted pure eye, an achieved state of affinity with or likeness to 
God.  Thus, almsgiving brings about a change in the giver that leads to further ability to see God, 
but the alms themselves have no relational function binding together donor and recipient or even 
the giver and God.  This also is unlike anything Ælfric does. 
Unlike the other two homilies this chapter examines, CHI.19 and CHI.10, CHI.18 is an 
amalgamation of many different elements.  In the first part of the sermon, Ælfric explains the 
origins of Rogationtide, which itself incorporates two different traditions, beating the bounds and 
penitential practices intended to ward off natural disasters.  In the second part he explicates the 
pericope for the day (Luke 11:5-13), on God’s willingness to grant requests, by adapting two 
Augustinian sermons.134  The first sentence of the homily brings all these elements together: 
 Þas dagas sind gehatene. letaniae. þæt sind gebeddagas. on þisum dagum we  
sceolon gebiddan ure eorðlicra wæstma. genihtsumnysse: 7 us sylfum gesundfulnysse 7 
sibbe. 7 þæt git mare is ure synna forgifenysse.135 
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[These days are called Litaniae, that is, Prayer Days.  In these days we ought to pray for 
abundance of our earthly fruits, and health for ourselves, and peace, and, what is yet 
more, our sins’ forgiveness.] 
Foremost, the days are set aside for praying for material blessings, but, as is typical, Ælfric 
moves quickly from this to “þæt gyt mare is,” spiritual blessings.  After giving a history of 
Rogationtide, including an excursion through the story of Jonah, Ælfric shifts attention to prayer, 
asking for favors from God. 
  The pericope, which follows Luke’s version of the LP, gives two parables designed to 
assure precators that God is willing to hear and grant requests.  In the first of these, a man asks 
his neighbor for bread.  Persistence is the main point of the story: “dico vobis et si non dabit illi 
surgens eo quod amicus eius sit propter inprobitatem tamen eius surget et dabit illi quotquot 
habet necessarios”136  (Yet if he shall continue knocking, I say to you, although he will not rise 
and give him, because he is his friend; yet, because of his importunity, he will rise, and give him 
as many as he needeth).  In the second parable, Jesus likens prayer to God to a child asking his 
father for food, assuring his hearers of God’s good intentions toward them:  
quis autem ex vobis patrem petet panem numquid lapidem dabit illi aut piscem numquid 
pro pisce serpentem dabit illi aut si petierit ovum numquid porriget illi scorpionem si 
ergo vos cum sitis mali nostis bona data dare filiis vestris quanto magis Pater vester de 
caelo dabit spiritum bonum petentibus se.137   
[And which of you, if he ask his father bread, will he give him a stone? or a fish, will he 
for a fish give him a serpent?  Or if he shall ask an egg, will he reach him a scorpion?  If 
you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will 
your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask him?] 
Augustine, allowing no parable to go unallegorized, interprets the various food-stuffs in 
the parables (the bread in the first, the bread, fish, and egg in the second) as spiritual gifts, belief, 
and faith, hope, and charity.  In Sermon 61, he takes care to point out that temporal goods are 
“[b]ona ergo secundum tempus”138 (good for a time),139 but that the truly precious things are the 
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spiritual gifts, and he considers at some length the relationship Christians ought to have to 
material possessions: “Est ergo bonum quod faciat bonum; et est bonum unde facias bonum. 
Bonum quod facit bonum, Deus est”140  (So there is a good that can make good, and there’s a 
good with which you can do good.  The good that makes good is God).141  He then continues to 
develop a metaphor of trading one’s goods for justice:  
Magis eroga pecuniam, ut habeas iustitiam. A quo enim habebis iustitiam, nisi a Deo, 
fonte iustitiae?  Ergo, si uis habere iustitiam, esto mendicus Dei, qui te paulo ante ex 
euangelio ut peteres, quaereres, pulsares monebat.142 
[Rather, I’m telling you, disburse money in order to get justice.  After all, whom will you 
get justice from if not from God the fountain of justice?  So if you want to get some 
justice, be a beggar to God, who a little while ago was advising you in the gospel to ask, 
to seek, to knock.]143 
 Ælfric follows Augustine’s major points fairly closely; however, as in CHI.19, he 
reorients the alms-mediated relationship between people.  In Augustine’s explication, almsgiving 
is primarily a matter between the giver and God; he emphasizes the ethical responsibility of the 
wealthy to care for the poor, but as far as righteousness (justitia) is concerned, the goods given to 
the poor become part of an exchange between the wealthy and God.  That this metaphor is 
broadly painted and not perfect in the details can be seen in the non-personal way he imagines 
alms functioning in De sermone Domini in monte.  Furthermore, the exchange metaphor involves 
a little finessing on Augustine’s part to clarify that he is not suggesting that people can buy 
justice from God.  This can be seen in the way he switches the terms of the exchange in the 
passage above: justice comes from begging God for it – a petition where the precator has nothing 
to offer himself – not, ultimately, from giving away one’s goods.144   
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In Ælfric’s homily, in contrast, the poor become essential partners in the exchange.  
Although Ælfric does not use the term “ælmesse” in this homily, the rich giving to the needy is a 
central concept.  As we have seen, alms are an important part of petitionary practice, sometimes, 
as in Augustine’s commentary, associated with purificatory practices, and sometimes, as here, 
presented as part of an exchange relationship with God.  But Ælfric’s explication of Luke 11.5-
13 primarily emphasizes the unidirectionality of God’s gifts.  While in both parables the 
petitioner asks within a pre-existing relationship, in both cases the petitioner asks for ben without 
apparently appealing to or offering anything in return.  Ælfric emphasizes this: “þy he cwæð na 
for freondrædene. for ðan þe nan mann nære wurðe ne ðæs geleafan. ne ðæs ecan lifes gif godes 
mildheortnys nære ðe mare. ofer mancynne”145  (So he says, “Not for friendship,” because no 
one is worthy of belief nor eternal life if God’s mercy were not the greater over mankind).  
Ælfric uses the unidirectionality of God’s gifts to make the point that “Ealle we sind godes 
þearfan”146 (We are all God’s needy).  That is, because God’s gifts are unidirectional rather than 
reciprocal, the relationship between humans and God is one in which humans are dependent 
upon God’s alms as beggars, having no particular claim upon him and able to offer him nothing 
in exchange, so that every gift springs from God’s unconstrained generosity – an appropriately 
Augustinian idea for a sermon based on Augustinian sources. 
At the same time, Ælfric presents a model of exchange in which humans do return gifts to 
God through the linkage of almsgiving and prayer.  Ælfric uses “Ealle we sind godes þearfan”  
(We are all God’s needy) to remind the wealthy that they are obliged to hear the petitions of the 
poor who ask of them if they want God to hear their own petitions: “Uton for ðy oncnawan þa 
þearfan þe us biddað: þæt god oncnawe us. þonne we hine biddað ure neode”147 (Let us therefore 
acknowledge the needy who petition us so that God may acknowledge us when we ask him for 
our needs).  In this model of almsgiving Ælfric does not appeal to any idea of purification or 
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disassociation from the material world,148 but to a sense of reciprocity in that people should act 
toward each other as they wish God to act toward them and a sense that all are brothers: “Hu 
mihtu for sceame. æniges þinges æt gode biddan: gif ðu forwyrnst þinum gelican. þæs þe ðu 
foreaðelice him getiðian miht”149  (How can you for shame ask anything from God if you refuse 
those like you that which you could easily grant them?)  Unlike Augustine, however, Ælfric does 
not present the needy as having nothing of their own to offer the rich in return for their alms.  
Rather,  
Se rica 7 se þearfa sind him betwynan nydbehefe; se welega is geworht for ðan þearfan. 7 
se þearfa for ðam welegan.  þam spedigum gedafenaþ þæt he spende 7 dæle. þam wædlan 
gedafenað þæt he gebidde for ðam dælere; Se earma is se weig. þe læt us to godes rice. 
Mare sylð se þearfa þam rican: þonne he æt him nime.150  
[The rich and the needy are necessary to each other.  The wealthy is made for the needy, 
and the needy for the wealthy.  It is fitting for the prosperous that he give and distribute; 
for the poor it is fitting that he pray for the giver.  The poor man is the road that allows us 
into God’s kingdom.  The needy gives more to the rich than he takes from him.] 
Ælfric presents a model of interdependence in which the wealthy trade their material goods to 
the poor in exchange for righteousness.  However, the poor for Ælfric are not merely recipients 
of goods in a relationship transaction that does not fundamentally involve them; instead, they 
reciprocate by praying for the wealthy – an action Ælfric calls more valuable than the material 
provision.  In this way, the poor are set up as intercessors for the rich to petition on their behalf 
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for entry to the kingdom.151  They are essential participants in the gift-cycle instead of (as in 
Augustine’s teaching) instruments in the relationship between the rich and God.  Ælfric’s idea of 
the righteousness or goodness that almsgiving brings has little in common with Augustine’s idea 
of purity, or even with Augustine’s ideas of almsgiving as laid out in these sermons; rather, as in 
CHI.19, he envisions goodness as a sort of communal wholeness, a right use of goods oriented 
around relationships, where every person has a role to play in ensuring the welfare, both material 
and spiritual of his “equals.”  This shifts the emphasis from Augustine’s sermons, in which the 
central relationship is God and the wealthy almsgiver.  The acts of generosity the almsgiver 
performs are done essentially in the sight of God, whereas for Ælfric, the prayers of the poor 
serve as testimony to the deeds of the rich.  Their prayers mediate the good deeds of the rich. 
Ælfric’s inclusion of the poor as essential participants in the alms-exchange makes 
petition and almsgiving into a complex three-way gift-giving cycle that binds together God and 
the human community.  “We,” Ælfric says, are God’s needy (having nothing to give, and 
therefore receiving everything by charity).  Reflecting the reality of this relationship, “we” have 
nothing to give God; rather “we” give in the human realm to the destitute.152  The needy do have 
something to return – prayer – transforming the relationship between rich and poor from charity 
to reciprocity.  This, in turn, is read back onto the human/God relationship.  In addition to 
bonding people together, however, the cyclical nature of the exchange creates a deferral that 
keeps gifts separate from commodities: the rich do not trade their wealth to God for salvation, 
nor do the poor trade their prayers.  Rather, the gift binds everyone together within a web of 
reciprocal generosity and the joy of the gift.  Because gifts and return-gifts are never fully 
commensurate and equal, the gift cycle creates imbalances of debt and obligation rather than the 
zero-sum balance found in commodity exchange that dissolves relationships.  The never-fully-
equal nature of gift-exchange creates productive space between gift and counter-gift in which 
relationships can form through ties of mutual obligation and gratitude.  Because of this, the 
whole human community is necessary to one another, moving together toward salvation. 
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The preceding discussion emphasizes prayer as a thing exchanged, a gift the poor can 
give in return for gifts from the rich.  But what effect is prayer supposed to have in and for those 
praying?  The point of the first parable in the Luke passage is that people should be persistent in 
prayer, not because God does not wish to give, but in order to increase the value of his gifts.  
Augustine addresses this in both of his sermons, linking persistence in prayer to growth in desire, 
as he puts it in Sermon 105: “Dare vult: tu pulsans nondum accepisti; pulsa, dare vult. Et quod 
dare vult, differt, ut amplius desideres dilatum, ne vilescat cito datum”153  (He really wants to 
give; while you are knocking, you haven’t yet received.  Go on knocking, he wants to give.  And 
he puts off giving what he wants to give, to increase your desire for the gift deferred, else if 
given at once it might lose its value).154  As we saw in Chapter 2, desire is, for Augustine, at the 
heart of prayer.  Persistence in prayer is subjectively efficacious as it retrains the precator’s 
desires, orienting them toward divine things.155  Ælfric’s wording shifts the emphasis from desire 
to gift: 
þeah he us þærrihte ne getiðie. ne sceole we for ði þære bene geswican; he elcað. 7 wyle 
hwæðere forgifan; þy he elcað. þæt we sceolon beon oflyste. 7 deorwurðlice healdan 
godes gyfe; Swa hwæt swa man eaðelice begiit. þæt ne bið na swa deorwurðe swa þæt 
ðæt eorfoðlice bið begiten.156 
[Although he does not grant to us immediately, we should not therefore cease that 
petition.  He delays, and yet wants to give.  He delays so that we should be eager for and 
hold as precious God’s gift.  Whatever people obtain easily, that is not so precious as that 
which is gotten with difficulty.] 
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Augustine emphasizes above all that God wants to give, repeating three times in this short 
passage, “dare vult … dare vult … dare vult.”  God delays in order to increase desire; for 
Augustine, desire itself has value.  Ælfric, however, repeats that God delays (“he elcað … he 
elcað”).  In this case, God delays so that his gift is valued.  Thus, Ælfric’s wording centralizes 
the fact that it is God’s gift more than Augustine’s does.  The effect is to emphasize that there is 
something precious about the source of the gift.  But it is also notable that, in the way Ælfric 
structures his sermon, his precators are not asking for the same thing as Augustine’s precator.  
Augustine’s sermon 61 does not address the content of the petition when he speaks of desire, 
merely the reason God delays in answering petitions.  In his sermon 105, the precator petitions 
for a better understanding of that in which he has believed.  In Ælfric’s sermon, the petition is for 
belief (geleafan) itself.157  Belief and prayer become closely bound up together: but how can one 
pray without first believing, at least to some extent?  And why imagine belief as something one 
can have in a greater or lesser quantity? 
In Ælfric’s teaching, the process of prayer does not subjectively move one toward belief 
(i.e., one’s belief does not grow as a result of persistence in prayer).  Nor does persistence in 
prayer make one worthy of belief, as though it is somehow owed: “him getiþað þæs þe he bit. na 
for freondrædene. ac for his unstilnesse; þy he cwæð na for freondrædene. for ðan þe nan mann 
nære wurðe ne ðæs geleafan. ne ðæs ecan lifes gif godes mildheortnys nære ðe mare”158  (he 
grants him that which he asks for, not for friendship but on account of his disturbance.  He says, 
not for friendship, because no one is worthy of that belief, nor of that eternal life if God’s mercy 
were not the greater).  This, admittedly, does not make much sense if one takes “belief” as 
“belief that God exists,” or as the intellectual knowledge of correct doctrine.  Rather, as in 
CHI.19, one petitions the one to whom he subordinates himself.159  Belief resonates with 
allegiance, “geleafan” and “freondræden” take on very similar meanings.  Prayer expresses one’s 
desire to be subordinate to God, a “freondræden” of which no one is worthy.  What God 
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eventually grants is belief, a particular relationship with him, which then leads toward eternal 
life.  Between “geleafan” and “ecan lifes” there is, however, an elision: everything that happens 
in this life, the enactment of the declared belief.  Thus, persistence in prayer becomes continual 
enactment of the precators’ submission to God.  And, “[æ]lc þæra þe geornlice bitt. 7 þære bene 
ne geswicð. þam getiðað god þæs ecan lifes”160  (every one who zealously asks and does not 
cease from that petition, to them God will grant that eternal life).  As Ælfric conceives it, belief 
is actively enacted through prayer.  Salvation, the attainment of eternal life, is a process of 
believing and enacting belief.  Belief is both a cause and an answer to petition. 
Within the context of CHI.18 prayer is connected to almsgiving in a fundamental way, 
but not in its standard association with the reorientation of desire as found in Augustinian 
teaching.  Rather than purity, prayer functions to place the precators in a particular relationship 
to God, his dependents and subordinates, who then enact that dependency and subordination 
through their persistence in turning to God with their petitions.  The rich give alms to the poor 
recognizing that they themselves are in the same dependent position upon God, modeling the 
treatment they would like to be shown.  Prayer – the prayer of the poor for the rich – transforms 
the almsgiving relationship into a reciprocal one in which both parties are essential for the 
salvation of the other.  As people enact generosity toward each other in almsgiving and prayer, 
they in turn give back to God within a complex cycle of exchange, enacting a belief for which 
God will eventually give them eternal life.  Almsgiving and prayer are not a personal matter 
between the petitioner and God in Ælfric’s teaching, but rather a social matter binding together 
rich and poor in a community-wide statement of belief and petition for salvation. 
 
CATHOLIC HOMILY I.10: PRAYER AS FOLLOWING 
Catholic Homilies I.18 and I.19 both use Augustinian sources, and both teach on prayer 
within the context of the praying community.  We turn now to CH.10, a homily based on a 
source by Gregory that presents prayer within a penitential context, a context that might 
presumably orient prayer more towards the individual and toward purity, and perhaps toward 
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subjective efficacy in prayer. Thus, CHI.10 is in some ways the odd man out in Ælfric’s sermons 
on prayers, and is in some ways Ælfric’s counterpart to Bede’s Homily I.22.161 
The source, Gregory’s homily II,162 is a much more psychological treatment of prayer 
and penance than is usual for explications of the LP, or than we find in Ælfric’s other treatments 
of prayer.  Like Augustine’s Tractatus, it is clearly influenced by Neo-platonic patterns of 
thought, in this case through the symbolism of the visible/material/transitory vs. the 
invisible/spiritual/eternal and through the imagery of light and sight.163  Gregory’s homily also 
shows interest in the interior work of penitential prayer; key to this prayer’s work is persistence 
and a full commitment to crying out for healing and Jesus’ mercy: “clamet medullis cordis, 
clamet et uocibus mentis”164 (let him cry from the bottom of his heart, let him cry also with his 
whole mind).165  Persistence in prayer is what overcomes the crowds of “desideriorum 
carnalium”166 (bodily desires) that disturb the thoughts and muddle the words in the precator’s 
heart as he prays.  Gregory presents the penitential self as potentially divided:  
Saepe namque dum conuerti ad Deum post perpetrata uitia uolumus, dum contra haec 
eadem exorare uitia quae perpetrauimus conamur, occurrunt cordi phantasmata 
peccatorum quae fecimus, mentis nostrae aciem reuerberant, confundunt animum, et 
uocem nostrae deprecationis premunt. … in ipsa nos nostra oratione conturbant.167 
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[We often wish to be converted to the Lord when we have committed some wrong.  
When we try to pray earnestly against the wrongs we have committed, images of our sins 
come into our hearts.  They obscure our inner vision, they disturb our minds and 
overwhelm the sound of our petition … and throw us into confusion in the very act of 
praying.]168 
This persistence eventually brings it about that “ad orationis opus conuertimur”169 (we are 
converted to the work of prayer), when the vices the precator used to enjoy now seem 
burdensome.  Persisting in prayer performs the work of prayer by fixing Christ in the heart of the 
one praying: “Cum uero orationi uehementer insistimus, stat Iesus”170 (when we persist ardently 
in prayer, Jesus stands).  Once Christ is fixed in the heart, he can then be followed or imitated.  
Gregory emphasizes that imitating Christ means suffering with him who suffered for humanity: 
“Quid itaque homo pro se pati debet, si tanta Deus pro hominibus pertulit?”171  (What must we 
not suffer on our own behalf if God bore so much for us?)172 and longing for the “uiam 
amaritudinis”173 (way of bitterness)174 so that we might come to the eternal joys.  This life’s 
bitter sufferings perform a penitential/purgative function that prepares people for the joys of 
heaven.  As we will see, what all this adds up to is an understanding of the work of prayer 
strongly structured by the association of the spiritual realm with the unchanging divine and the 
material realm with the changeable human.  Perseverance is thus, for Gregory, an essential part 
of prayer’s work insofar as, through perseverance, the precator “fixes” Christ in his heart, 
stabilizing the heart and allowing it to take part in the unchangeable nature of the divine.  
Gregory’s emphasis on the heart as the location of prayer is also key because of the heart’s 
potential affinity with the spiritual realm. 
While Ælfric picks up much of this language, he tends to replace interiority with greater 
emphasis on good deeds and with a more concretely relational idea of the petitioner’s connection 
to Christ.  Because of this, prayer is less subjective, and Ælfric lessens the tension between the 
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transitory nature of the material world and the permanence of the spiritual realm. The clearest 
passage in which to see the different ways each author works out the way prayer functions is 
when they explain that the crowds who try to silence the blind man are the images of his past 
sins.  Ælfric’s changes tend to dissociate the strong link between the material world and the vices 
and to move the “location” of prayer from the heart to the voice.  He also makes the precator 
more active in praying for Christ’s help, and Christ’s aid in overcoming temptation more direct.  
As part of this, he once again adds the devil to his discussion of prayer. 
  It is not that Gregory is against including the devil on principle.  His soteriological 
views also align with the ransom theory,175 and he also has passages considering the devil’s role 
in the psychology of temptation.176  But in this homily the governing tension is between the 
permanence and immutability of the divine/spiritual versus the changeable transitoriness of the 
mundane world.  The contrast between the two is perhaps most clearly seen when he considers 
the significance of Christ’s passing by the blind man on the way to Jericho and his standing still 
to heal him.  As Gregory explicates it, Christ’s passing is his taking on of human flesh, entering 
into this transitory world.  It is the fact that Christ took on human flesh that allows him to hear 
the cry of the blind man and have pity on him.  But it is Christ’s standing still that represents the 
immutable nature of his divine power through which he is able to heal the blind and bring about 
spiritual sight of the eternal light. 
The tension between mutable and immutable, then, is helpful to keep in mind when 
reading the passage in which Gregory discusses the psychology of prayer and temptation,177 a 
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passage that most clearly exemplifies the sorts of ways Ælfric changes his discussion of prayer.  
Gregory begins by interpreting the crowds as “desideriorum carnalium turbas tumultusque 
uitiorum” (the crowd of fleshly desires, and the tumult of vices), aligning them with the material, 
fleshly, world, and opposing them to the desirable, but not yet attained, state when “Iesus ad cor 
nostrum ueniat”  (Jesus comes into our heart).  The result is that these vices “uoces cordis in 
oratione perturbant” (confuse the utterances of the heart in prayer).  Gregory then presents prayer 
as a process, beginning when “contra haec eadem exorare uitia quae perpetrauimus conamur” 
(we undertake to prevail against these same vices which we commit), when the one praying 
begins to make an effort to “be turned” (converti) to the Lord.  According to Gregory, the 
precator first desires to be turned to the Lord after having committed some wrong, but when he 
begins to try to prevail against his vices, then images of past sins come into the heart, disturbing 
the mind and overwhelming the sound of his petition.  Gregory’s solution is that the precator 
should persist through this confusion, crying out all the more.  Eventually his mind is turned 
from the world to God, converted to the “opus orationis”; past sins no longer seem pleasurable 
but seem burdensome. 
In Gregory’s homily, this kind of prayer and the struggle it potentially involves is 
something that occurs within the heart, as though the heart is its own kind of space that can be 
occupied either by vices or by Jesus; that is, it can be aligned either with the physical world or 
with the spiritual.  The heart has a voice, and it is this “uox cordis” in persistent prayer that 
partially determines who eventually occupies the heart.  But the agency portrayed is ambiguous.  
Prayer is presented as active, something that the one praying must firmly persist in to overcome 
the clamorous crowds of vices: “Ecce quem turba increpat ut taceat magis ac magis clamabat, 
quia quanto grauiori tumultu cogitationum carnalium premimur, tanto orationi insistere ardentius 
debemus” (Lo, how the one the crowd rebuked that he be silent cried out the more, because the 
                                                                                                                                                             
quatenus cogitationis illicitae tumultum superet, atque ad pias aures Domini nimietate suae importunitatis erumpat.   
In se, ut suspicor, recognoscit unusquisque quod dicimus, quia dum ab hoc mundo animum ad Deum mutamus, dum 
ad orationis opus conuertimur, ipsa quae prius delectabiliter gessimus importuna post et grauia in oratione nostra 
toleramus.  Vix eorum cogitatio manu sancti desiderii ab oculis cordis abigitur, uix eorum phantasmata per 
paenitentiae lamenta superantur.  Sed cum in oratione nostra uehementer insistimus, transeuntem Iesum figimus.  
Vnde illic subditur: Stans autem Iesus iussit eum adduci ad se.  Ecce stat qui ante transiebat, quia dum adhuc turbas 
phantasmatum in oratione patimur, Iesum aliquatenus transeuntem sentimus.  Cum uero orationi uehementer 
insistimus, stat Iesus ut lucem restituat, quia Deus in corde figitur et lux amissa reparatur,” (Hom. II, CCSL 141, 3-
5.40-75). 
  
158 
more we are pressed by the burdensome tumult of our fleshly thoughts, the more we must 
ardently persist in prayer).  In this sense, prayer seems to be subjectively efficacious; the 
discipline of prayer itself reforms the one praying, perhaps in part because this persistence 
repudiates the changeableness of the human condition and replicates the stability of the spiritual 
world the precator is aiming for.   
But Gregory also recognizes that the spiritual condition is something people need help 
outside themselves to be converted to; they need to be “conuerti ad Deum.”  This mixed agency 
is portrayed in the active/passive combination of verbs here: “dum ab hoc mundo animum ad 
Deum mutamus, dum ad orationis opus conuertimur” (when we remove the soul from this world 
to God, then we are turned to the work of prayer).  “We” actively change or move the soul from 
this world to God, but then “we” are passively turned to prayer.  Within that mutans the nature of 
human mutability accompanying mortality is emphasized, both through the necessity of change 
resulting from the human condition and the need to change to a more spiritual (hence, stable) 
condition.  Changeableness constrains humans; they can turn to God, but (because of their 
mortality) they cannot fix themselves in this turning; they must turn their minds to God, but they 
must also be turned.178  They can persist, but Christ must come into their hearts: “Sed cum in 
oratione nostra uehementer insistimus, transeuntem Iesum figimus. … Cum uero orationi 
uehementer insistimus, stat Iesus ut lucem restituat, quia Deus in corde figitur et lux amissa 
reparatur” (But when we earnestly pursue Jesus, who is passing by, in our prayers, we fasten him 
in our minds.  … Truly, when we earnestly persist in prayer, Jesus stops so that he restores the 
light, because God is fixed in the heart, and the lost light is restored).  Elsewhere in the homily, 
Gregory refers to this as “homo ad diuina subleuatur”179 (humans are raised to divinity).  
Through persistence in prayer, Christ is fixed in the heart in his divine nature; humans are 
brought to the stability that comes with participating in the divine nature. 
Thus, for Gregory, prayer must be “of the heart.”  The emphasis here is not so much on 
sincerity, or even on a particular type of emotional affect, but on the heart’s potential affinity 
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with the spiritual realm.  Prayer – true, efficacious prayer – for Gregory, then, is “of the heart”; it 
is the kind of speech through which one communicates with the spiritual realm because it 
potentially partakes in those same spiritual characteristics. 
While Ælfric reproduces some of the language reflecting the tension between the spiritual 
and material worlds,180 he actually excises much of it.  Consequently, his idea of prayer is not 
informed by the same framework.  So, for instance, rather than moving from the significance of 
the name Jericho to the idea of divinization, as Gregory does, Ælfric entirely drops the 
divinization.181  Later on in the homily, where Gregory states “et quia rerum corporalium 
delectatione a gaudio interno cecidimus, cum qua amaritudine illuc redeatur ostendit”182 (And 
because we were cut off from internal joy by delight in corporeal things, he showed with what 
bitterness we should return to it).  Ælfric instead says, “Nis þeos woruld na ure eþel: ac is ure 
wræcsið; for ði ne sceole we na besettan urne hiht on ðisum swicelum life: Ac sceolon efstan 
mid godum geearnungum to urum eðele. þær we to gesceapene wæron. þæt is to 
heofonanrice”183 (This world is not our homeland, but it is our exile.  Therefore, we should not 
set our hope in this deceitful life, but we must with good deeds return to our homeland which we 
were created for, that is, to the heavenly kingdom), replacing the tension between material and 
spiritual with the idea of exile.184 
 One place where Ælfric fairly faithfully reproduces a discussion of the relationship 
between the spiritual and material is the passage on the relationship of the soul to the body, 
although he does not seem to make the same basic assumptions about what is apparent to his 
audience.  Whereas Gregory represents the idea that the soul animates the body as obvious 
(“Everyone can make brief reply to this thought”), Ælfric does not appeal to common sense: “Nu 
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cweðe ic to ðam men …”185 (Now to that one I say …).  Gregory says that “nec tamen se dubitat 
animam habere, quam non uidet”186 (we do not doubt we have a soul that we do not see); at the 
same point, Ælfric merely states that the soul is invisible.187  Where Gregory briefly states “Si 
auferatur quod est inuisibile, protinus corruit hoc quod uisibile stare uidebatur”188  (If what is 
invisible be taken away, what was visible and appeared to be lasting immediately perishes), 
Ælfric expands on the body’s helplessness without the soul, and adds discussion of the soul’s 
corresponding helplessness without God.  Gregory ends the passage with the rhetorical question: 
“esse uita inuisibilis dubitatur?”189  (Can we doubt that invisible life exists?)  Apparently 
Ælfric’s audience could; he skips the question and instead focuses on the eternal nature of the 
sinful soul.  That is, Ælfric does not present the relationship between soul and body as such an 
intuitively obvious one as Gregory does, and he shifts the focus to the necessity of God’s support 
of the soul for good works.  Shifting the emphasis to God and to good works seems to govern 
Ælfric’s strategy throughout the homily. 
 Thus, when we move to the passage on the psychology of temptation, we are not quite 
moving within the same cosmology as is in Gregory’s sermon.190  This is evident immediately 
when Ælfric replaces Gregory’s desideriorum carnalium and tumultus vitiorum with unlustas 
and leahtras,191 moving away from the association of the fleshly with evil to that which is more 
generally forbidden (un-).  Thus, the heart is involved, but does not fill the same role as the site 
of communication with the spiritual realm.  For Ælfric, the vices occupy the heart; Jesus never 
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promises to do so.  For Gregory, Jesus is the eventual occupant; the crowds of vices do not 
occupy the heart itself, but their images disturb it (obscure its inner vision, disturb the mind).  
Gregory’s vices interfere with the words of prayer; Ælfric’s interfere with zealousness in prayer.  
Ælfric’s precator is more active that Gregory’s – rather than being turned, Ælfric’s precator 
“wyle yfeles geswican: 7 his synna gebetan. 7 mid eallum mode to gode gecyrran”192 (wishes to 
cease from evil and amend his sins, and with all his mind to turn to God).  He still needs Christ’s 
assistance, but Christ’s assistance is more direct: “we scolon hryman swiðor 7 swiðor to ðam 
hælende þæt he todræfe þa yfelan costnunga fram ure heortan”193 (we should cry more and more 
to the Savior, that he drive the evil temptations from our hearts). 
 Ælfric’s passage contains the idea of perseverance, but his precators are more often told 
to “hryman swiðor” to the Savior.  In Gregory’s case, it is persistence in prayer that matters; for 
Ælfric, it is something like volume.  This fits with the pattern in which Ælfric emphasizes the 
voice more while Gregory emphasizes the heart.  Furthermore, in Ælfric, the vices “gedrefað his 
mood 7 willað gestillan his stemne: þæt he to gode ne clypige”194 (trouble his mind and wish to 
still his voice so that he cannot call to God), a more direct appeal to God’s aid than in Gregory, 
who emphasizes the act of praying: “uocem nostrae deprecationis premunt”195 (crowd out the 
voice of our petition).  Ælfric also introduces the devil as the agent of trouble, setting him up as 
Jesus’ opponent: “Swa we sculon eac don gif us deoful drecce mid mænigfealdum geþohtum. 7 
costnungum”196 (So we should also do if the devil afflicts us with manifold thoughts and 
temptations).  Thus, Jesus’ aid at once gains victory for him over the devil, and victory for the 
precator over the thoughts and temptations that trouble him.  Prayer is thus more directly an 
appeal to God, who will “todræfe þa yfelan costnunga fram ure heortan”197 (drive the evil 
temptations from our heart), playing a more active and direct role than for Gregory, for whom 
the discipline of prayer itself seems to be part of the equation, as it trains the heart in persistence, 
aligning it with spiritual stability. 
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For Gregory the “voice” that the vices interfere with is the heart’s; for Ælfric the voice is 
not specifically in the heart; the penitent need to persevere in their gebed, in their set prayers, in 
order to gain Jesus’ attention.  Jesus’ role is also more direct in Ælfric’s version, countering the 
devil’s actions, which Ælfric introduces.  Jesus himself will drive the evil temptations away, and 
Jesus himself will enlighten the hearts, replacing the temptations with good and clean thoughts.  
Jesus’ intervention is more direct, combating the temptations through his gifu rather than through 
the reorienting process of prayer itself. 
Still, Ælfric does leave room for that reorienting process of prayer.  At the end of this 
passage, he says, “Gif we þonne þurhwuniað on urum gebedum. þonne mage we gedon mid 
urum hreame þæt se hælend stent”198 (If we then persevere in our prayers then may we bring 
about with our cry that the Savior stands), although once again, he focuses on the sound of the 
cries: Christ “wyle gehyran ure clypunge”199 (will hear our crying).  Later, when he discusses 
why Jesus asked the blind man what he wanted, even though he, being divine already knew, he 
gives the standard Augustinian answer (also found in Gregory, though not worded quite the same 
way): “þurh þa gebedu. bið ure heorte onbryrd: 7 gewend to gode”200 (through prayer our heart is 
moved and turned to God).  However, compare this to Gregory: “ad hoc requirit ut cor ad 
orationem excitet”201 (to this end he questions, that the heart might be roused to prayer) and one 
can see the same shift in emphasis.  Whereas Gregory emphasizes the process of prayer itself, 
Ælfric emphasizes turning directly to God, the relationship rather than the discipline. 
 Finally, Ælfric very much departs from Gregory’s emphasis at the end of the homily.  
Whereas Gregory emphasizes the need for suffering with Christ – “Quid itaque homo pro se pati 
debet, si tanta Deus pro hominibus pertulit?”202 (What therefore ought humans suffer for 
themselves, if God bore so much for humans?) – Ælfric chooses to discuss the “sticolan weig”203 
(narrow way) that leads to life, emphasizing first, not what one must leave behind, but what sorts 
of virtues the narrow way entails, mercy, chastity, etc.  While Ælfric presents the narrow way as 
difficult, he does not present it within the same penitential, purificatory framework as Gregory 
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does, of needing to suffer on our own behalf to gain the kingdom.  Ælfric picks up on the “way” 
(from earlier in the sermon), so that his emphasis is on following Christ in difficulty more than 
suffering like he suffered.  Ælfric ends with a call to penitence and confession. 
Within this treatment of prayer, then, we can see ways in which Ælfric de-emphasizes or 
removes the alignment Gregory sets up between the spiritual/invisible/eternal and the 
mundane/visible/temporary.  The precator is more active in praying for Christ’s help, and Christ 
gives his help more directly.  Rather than the emphasis on more abstract suffering, Ælfric 
emphasizes the necessity of following, creating a more personally relational connection between 
the precator and Jesus.  Because of these changes, Ælfric’s conception of prayer is consistently 
more objective; prayer works on Jesus to cause him to intervene rather than reforming the one 
praying through the discipline of prayer itself. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We return to the passage on praying over picking herbs from CHI.31 that this chapter 
began with: “Ne sceal nan man mid galdre wyrte besingan ac mid godes wordum hi gebletsian 7 
swa þicgan”204  (Nor shall anyone enchant herbs with charms, but with God’s words bless them 
and so partake).  In this passage, Ælfric does not specify which particular words are God’s words 
that should be said when picking medicinal plants.  Based on evidence such as the charms, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the LP is at least one of these prayers.  In this case, this prayer, 
replacing unallowed “galdor,”205 specifies a different relationship with nature than the charm 
does, as, in stating the herbalist’s allegiance to God, it appeals to a right relationship between the 
herbalist and God, and the herbalist and the healing plants to which God “þone cræft forgeaf”206 
(gave that power). 
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Thus, the view of prayer presented in this sermon is largely within a relational context of 
lordship, in which the petitioner implicitly promises allegiance to the person to whom he prays.  
Within this relational context, the rightness or trueness of prayer is determined not so much by 
what one is praying, but in the petitioner’s attitude of submission.  And within this context it is 
easy for the content of prayer to become divorced from its purpose, so that a statement of belief 
can serve to protect a traveler from devils because it enacts the believer’s relationship with God, 
and the recitation of the LP over herbs can have effect because it enacts the picker’s relationship 
with God the creator and the things created.  This symbolic use of prayer is not a simple 
substitution of Christian words for pagan words, the Christian God for pagan gods to bring about 
whatever the petitioner desires, because it also involves a re-orientation of the believer’s 
responsibilities, and it acknowledges that, within this relationship, the petitioner must be content 
with whatever way the grantor chooses to fulfill a request.   
 In Catholic Homily I.19 the way that Ælfric’s homily situates petition within the context 
of the ransom theory, with God and the devil as rival lords, shifts the theoretical frame for prayer 
away from purity towards allegiance – geleafa in CHI.18 – and away from the individual and 
individual notions of purity toward the community and ideas of communal coherence.  Each of 
his major homilies on prayer moves the understanding of prayer presented in this direction.  Both 
of these shifts tend to present an idea of prayer that is more objectively efficacious, and that 
allows room for the formula of prayer to have its own particular efficacy.  At the same time, for 
Ælfric the meaning of the LP is important – he spends most of the sermon explicating it in a 
fairly literal way in order to correct potential misconceptions as to its meaning, so that people 
may understand one of the two texts “Ælc cristen man sceal … cunnan”207  (every Christian must 
know).  Like CHI.18 and CHI.10, the sermon on the LP does not offer any instruction on how to 
actually pray (apart from the fact that it is, presumably, to the east)208 except insofar as a verbal 
formula is seen as a sufficient answer to that question.  That is, for Ælfric what words one should 
say seems to be sufficient answer to the question of how to pray.  Although he explicates the 
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fuller version of the LP found in Matthew, Ælfric introduces his explication with the disciples’ 
request to learn how to pray found in Luke.  This makes the LP, then, a direct response to the 
request: “leof tæce us hu we magon us gebiddan”209 (sir, teach us how we should pray), but 
Ælfric rewords Jesus’ response.  Whereas in the Vulgate, Jesus responds: “illis cum oratis Pater 
sanctificetur …” (with this you pray, “Father, hallowed be ...”) and whereas Augustine takes this 
to be in what manner one should pray – Augustine quotes Jesus as saying, “Sic itaque orate 
vos”210 (after this manner, therefore, pray ye)211 – in Ælfric’s homily Jesus says, “Gebiddað eow 
mid þisum wordum …”212 (Pray with these words …)  Both authors take the slightly different 
approaches to clarifying the meaning.  Augustine focuses on manner, which is consistent with 
his commentary’s idea of the LP as a framework for petition, while Ælfric focuses on the words 
themselves. 
 But, for Ælfric, the words imply a particular disposition as well: the prayer indicates that 
humans are children of God, but praying it does not make them children of God, or make them 
more children of God than they were formerly.  What makes them children is obedience and a 
correct disposition toward honoring God: “Nu sind we godes bearn … gif we þam fæder on riht 
gehyrsumiað 7 mid eallum mode hine weorþiað”213  (Now we are God’s children … if we rightly 
obey the Father and with all our minds honor him).  That is, the prayer is an expression of this 
reality.  In this sense, it is neither precisely subjectively or objectively efficacious.  It does not 
construct reality or seek to change it, but expresses a reality enacted through obedience to God 
and right behavior towards one’s fellow-Christians, and bound together as Christ’s body and 
Christ’s brothers: 
Crist is ure heafod 7 we sind his lima: … for þi we magon cuðlice to him [Christ] clypian 
swa swa to urum breþer. gif we þa broðerrædene swa healdað swa swa he us tæhte. þæt is 
                                                 
209
 CHI.19, ll. 8-9. 
210
 De sermone Domini in monti, CCSL 35, II.iv.15.300. 
211
 NPNF, vol. vi, II.iv.15. 
212
 CHI.19, ll. 9-10.  The OE Gospels read: “Ða cwæþ he to him: cweðað þus. Þonne ge eow gebiddað; …” (Luke 
11:2) and “Eornustlice gebiddað eow ðus …” (Matthew 6:9).  The Old English Version of the Gospels, ed. Roy 
Liuzza.  EETS vol. 304 (Oxford, 1995).  The Vulgate Matthew is “sic ergo vos orabitis Pater noster …” 
213
 CHI.19, ll. 25-7. 
  
166 
þæt we ne sceolon na geþafian. þæt deofol mid ænigum unþeawum us geweme fram 
cristes broþorrædene.214 
[Christ is our head and we are his limbs … therefore we can familiarly call to him, just as 
to our brother, if we so hold our brotherhood just as he taught us, that is, that we should 
not allow the devil with any evil practices to lead us astray from Christ’s brotherhood.] 
Brotherhood is something that is lived-into through obedience in prayer and in good deeds.  
Within the terms of the ransom theory, with humanity’s redemption from the devil already 
carried out, there is something both already-answered and yet-to-be-eternally answered about the 
petition to be subject to God: “hwæt is þæt rice þæt he betæcð his fæder buton ða halgan men 
ægðer ge weras ge wif. þa ðe he alysde fram hellewite mid his agenum deaðe”215  (what is the 
kingdom that he delivers to his Father unless the holy people, both men and women, those whom 
he freed from hell torments with his own death).  In this, Ælfric’s idea seems close to the idea 
found in Bede, that prayer is all the actions of a just man.  But whereas for Bede, these actions 
constitute part of the prayer for salvation, for Ælfric these actions signify a particular relationship 
with God characterized by obedience and honor which prayer then expresses and affirms.  How 
exactly this works, we will pick up in the next chapter. 
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 CHI.19, ll. 25-6, 29-33. 
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 CHI.19, ll. 90-2. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LAC: PRAYER IN ÆLFRIC’S NARRATIVES 
 
 [Þ]a ða hi to him bugon þa geswac he þære lichamlican gedrecednysse. 
for þan ðe he. ahte þa heora sawla.1 
[Then when they bowed to him he ceased their bodily affliction, because he owned their 
souls.] 
 
Ælfric’s three major homilies on prayer represent prayer as objectively efficacious: the 
act of praying itself, and the obedience that goes with the receipt of favors, rather than 
interiorization of the words prayed, puts the petitioner under God’s protection.  Precators, as 
God’s faithful dependents, become worthy of the reward of the eternal kingdom.  Ælfric’s 
narratives, however, give insight into the way prayer works within the believing community and 
in mediating the relationship between saints and God.  What Ælfric’s narratives allow us to do 
that his teachings on prayer do not, is to look at how prayer is “lived” in the lives of various 
saints.   
 This presents problems of its own.  First of all, because saints’ lives are representative 
and stylized – fictionalized, we would say – they obviously are not “living” prayer at all, as the 
usual focus of scholarship on prayer attests.2  From reading Ælfric’s Life of St. Bartholomew we 
                                                 
1
 CHI.31, ll. 15-6.   
2
 Few study Ælfric’s sermons on prayer (and those who do study them tend to focus on other elements than prayer); 
Ælfric’s narratives tend to get more attention.  Donald G. Bzdyl, “Prayer in Old English Narratives,” is the most 
comprehensive study of prayer in Ælfric’s (and other) narratives.  Bzydl addresses the prayers of eight of Ælfric’s 
saints, examining how their prayers compare to the English devotional prayer tradition, the rhetorical structure of the 
prayers, and how they are deployed in narrative in order to create distinct characters (reflecting their special virtues 
or vices overcome or providing insight into their emotional states), reveal self-characterization or (more usually) 
authorial characterization, or function as narrative devices unifying events in the story, heightening suspense by 
deferring action, or are used to teach important doctrinal concepts to the audience.  Jonathan Wilcox, “Famous Last 
Words: Ælfric’s Saints Facing Death,” Essays in Medieval Studies 10 (1993): 1-13, addresses several prayers that 
perform the function of last words in order to show the changes that can be rung on this narrative convention.  Thus, 
study of narrative prayers tends to focus on prayers’ rhetorical form, narrative function, and the way prayers 
characterize their speakers.  What is rarer is exploration of narrative prayers’ ideological or doctrinal content or the 
social ties negotiated through those praying (usually saints), the believing community, society at large, and the 
relation of all these people to God.  (An example of this sort of study can be found in Fred C. Robinson, “God, 
Death, and Loyalty in the Battle of Maldon”.)  Robinson discusses the doctrinal content of the prayer and relates it 
to the themes of the poem as a whole as Byrhtnoth’s men make the choice whether to loyally die with him or to run 
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do not know, for example, how Bartholomew actually either prayed or experienced prayer, but 
only how Ælfric represented that experience as he received and adapted it from his sources. To 
that extent, however, Ælfric’s representation evidences how he understood the lived prayer of the 
saint, and how he thought it could be relevant to and instructive for his audience.  Yet because 
saints are exceptional, they do not necessarily give a sense of how actual people prayed or were 
expected to pray.  This perhaps explains one of the most striking things about reading saints’ 
lives looking for prayer: saints pray with surprising infrequency.  This is not to say that saints do 
not pray; most lives will contain at least one prayer,3 and saints are often reported as having 
prayed.4  Most strikingly, few of Ælfric’s saints’ final words are prayers; in fact, most of those 
who do meet death with prayer (according to Jonathan Wilcox’s list, which does not claim to be 
exhaustive5) are biblical figures: Mark, Stephen, Peter, John the Evangelist, and Andrew.  Most 
of these pray some version of Christ’s last words in Luke 23:46, “in manus tuas commendo 
spiritum meum” (into your hands I commend my spirit).  More often, according to Wilcox’s 
account, saints’ last words express defiance to their tormentors (Laurence, as we will see, 
manages to do both). 
 Within three of Ælfric’s lives, however, prayer is centrally situated: CHI.31, the Passio S. 
Bartholomei Apostoli, which presents the saint’s conflict with the demonic inhabitants of some 
Indian idols; CHI.29, the Passio Beati Laurentii Martyris, which presents the martyr’s death as a 
gift to God; and LSI.3, Depositio Sancti Basilii espiscopi, in which prayer proves central to 
solving the conflicts presented in each episode and to mediating the text’s central concern with 
the nature of belief.6  A major element in these saints’ prayers is their relationship to gifts: 
                                                                                                                                                             
away).  Particular theories of prayer reflected – that is, prayer’s special status as prayer not just as regular speech – 
is also largely ignored.   
3
 Although some do not.  Guthlac in Guthlac A, for example, is reported as praying (he moves out to Crowland to do 
that, after all), but no prayer-text is ever given.  The closest he comes to a prayer is expressing his allegiance to God 
to the devils outside the entrance to hell.   
4
 Bartholomew is characterized by a report of his frequent prayers, for instance.  Juliana, we are told, spends her 
night in prison in prayer. 
5
 Wilcox, “Famous Last Words. 
6
 A complicating factor in a study of Ælfric’s narratives is his relationship with his sources, which is often much 
more faithful than in his homilies on prayer.  This means that much of our discussion about Ælfric’s presentation of 
prayer is about how Ælfric follows his sources, and how those sources allow him to think about prayer.  Both the 
passio of Laurence and the life of Bartholomew were written in Latin in the Western church; the life of 
Bartholomew was purported to have been written in Hebrew by Abdias, the first bishop of Babylon, and translated 
into Greek by one of his disciples; however, it has been known since the nineteenth century that the work was 
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prayers are lac, lac function as petitions, saints function as gifts, and people offer saints gifts in 
order to get them to pray.  In each of these lives gift-exchange – whether offerings to idols or to 
God, or offerings from people to saints – is prominent, and prominently entangled with prayer.  
In fact, lac is prayer: both the words and the offering that accompanies it are part of the petition 
made for salvation.  Put another way, petitions are made with words and with gifts. 
The three lives studied here each present different variations of the gift-relationship.  In 
Bartholomew’s passio, pagans expect something specific from their gods – healing – and give 
lac to achieve it.  The apostle takes the gospel to India, where men worship the devil-inhabited 
idol Astaroth who is engaged in a soul-entrapping exchange relationship with his devotees.  
Exchange with devils most fully articulates the way that prayer is a declaration of allegiance, 
since when those in need of healing offer lac7 to Astaroth, they lose the protection of God and 
forfeit their souls.  Asking for favors implies dependence; when people offer lac to the idols, 
they enter into a relationship with them, turning away from a dependent relationship with God.  
Yet within the narrative there is not a strict parallel between the way that humans come to be 
under the domination of devils as opposed to the way that they come under God’s protection – in 
this narrative, lac is not offered to God in the same way that it is offered to devils; furthermore, 
evidently uncomfortable with the narrative’s implicit promise of physical healing to those who 
transfer their allegiance to God, Ælfric ends with a coda that complicates both the exchange 
relationship set up in the narrative and the symbolic way that prayer is used.  By teaching that 
                                                                                                                                                             
originally written in Latin no later than the sixth century.  See Frederick M. Biggs, “Martyrdom of Bartholomew,” in 
Sources of Anglo-Saxon Literary Culture: The Apocrypha (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 2007).  The 
life of Basil was one of the few originally Greek lives and strongly reflects the more philosophical concerns of its 
original writing, and the different role Basil played in the Eastern than in the Western church. 
7
 Lac is one of those OE words with a very broad range of meanings: play, sport; battle; sacrifice, offering; gift, 
present; booty.  BT says, “The idea which lies at the root of the various meanings of [lac] seems to be that of 
motion,” and he quotes Grimm: “Grimm notes the association of dancing and playing with offerings and sacrifices,” 
which specific meaning is then generalized further to “gift.”  Within Ælfric’s corpus, lac is generally offered from 
humans to God (or devils), although they can also be given between humans.  In CHI.31, l. 73 Bartholomew refuses 
the lac that Polymius offers him.  This usage allows us to see that lac usually come from the inferior (in this 
particular situation Polymius is inferior because Bartholomew has just healed his daughter, quite aside from the 
question of the relative social situations of king and apostle) to the superior.  Sometimes, as in the life of 
Bartholomew, lac are given in expectation of some return; sometimes they seem to have no particular expectation of 
return and yet seem to express submission (for instance, the magi’s lac given to Jesus in CHI.7, l. 33); at other times 
they function as purificatory sacrifice (as in the purification of Mary in CHI.9, l. 74), which also sometimes also are 
part of an exchange (“mid lace his clænsunge gode þancian,” CHI.8, ll. 64-5).  Because of the potentially differing 
theoretical concerns between gift and sacrifice, which nevertheless are not tremendously illuminating here, for 
clarity’s sake I will either translate lac as “offering” or leave it untranslated. 
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Christians should not expect healing from God he clarifies the way that the gift is symbolically 
oriented toward the recognition and reward of honor. 
In Laurence’s passio pagans expect nothing from their gods; lac seem to function as 
much to buy independence as anything else.  By contrast, the passio sets up martyrdom as a lac 
of its own that parallels the prayer-consecrated Eucharistic sacrifice offered to God, a sacrament 
that binds together prayer and gift within the terms of the liturgy and the discourse surrounding 
it. The central conflict of the passio is that the emperor Decius wants bishop Sixtus and then 
Laurence, his arch-deacon, to offer lac and its accompanying prayer to his gods.  Sixtus responds 
to this command: “Ic symle geoffrode 7 gyt offrige mine lac þam ælmightigum gode. 7 his suna 
hælendum criste. 7 þam halgum gaste: hluttre onsægednysse 7 ungewemmede”8 (I have always 
offered and will always offer my lac to the Almighty God and his son, Jesus Christ, and the Holy 
Ghost, a pure sacrifice and undefiled).9  Sixtus’ conflict is inherited by Laurence, who faces the 
additional challenge that the Romans now also want the church’s treasure from him.  Laurence’s 
martyrdom, and the prayer that accompanies it, emphasize the personalized nature of Christian 
lac, in which the martyr offers himself to a God who personally responds to his gift. 
In both of these passiones lac is a more explicit concept and concern than prayer seems to 
be, and in both cases what differentiates Christians from pagans is to whom they offer their lac.  
Bartholomew’s passio more often speaks of the Indians offering (“offrian”) to Astaroth than 
praying and places no emphasis on the words that typically accompany the lac (except in the 
case where the lac is given specifically to get an answer to a question).  But lac and prayer are 
the same thing: the Indians petition for the healing of their souls through the lac they offer.10    
Likewise, Laurence’s passio focuses far more on the lac than on the words, although it is clear 
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 CHI.29, ll.14-6. 
9
 Sixtus’ statement resonates with James 1:27: “religio munda et inmaculata apud Deum et Patrem haec est visitare 
pupillos et viduas in tribulatione eorum inmaculatum se custodire ab hoc saeculo” [Religion clean and undefiled 
before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation: and to keep one's self 
unspotted from this world].  If this connection can be made, it puts sacrifice at the center of religion, just as it is at 
the center of this life.  Laurence’s struggle (bequeathed on him by Sixtus) is to protect the “treasure” of the church, 
which he does by dispersing the literal treasure to the poor, and then presenting the people of the church as God’s 
treasure.  Furthermore, Laurence’s sacrifice of himself is presented as a parallel of the Eucharistic sacrifice, as will 
be discussed later. 
10
 The conflation of the two is evident when Bartholomew points out that their devil cannot answer their prayers, 
which have, up to this point, been more usually referred to as lac: “Ac þes deofol þe binnon eowrum temple wæs is 
gebunden. 7 ne mæg nateshwon andwyrdan. þam ðe him to gebiddað” (CHI.31, ll. 106-8) [But the devil who was 
within your temple is bound, and cannot at all answer those who pray to him]. 
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that both things are meant.11  In fact, the Eucharistic model that is so central to Laurence’s passio 
prominently folds the two together.  According to Enrico Mazzo, “Since the beginning of 
Christian history (chap. 9 and 10 of the Didache, for example), the word ‘eucharist’ has referred 
to two things: on the one hand, the bread and wine, and on the other, the eucharistic prayer.”12  In 
both passiones, lac and prayers are the same thing: a petition for healing, or a statement of 
allegiance. 
Basil’s Life, in contrast, is less concerned with lac than with belief.  Many of the 
episodes in this life deal with anxieties surrounding true geleafa (belief, faith): how one 
recognizes the true geleafa (faith) objectively, how one recognizes geleafa (belief) in others, and 
how one knows if sins are forgiven.  The saint’s prayer mediates between the subjective aspect 
of geleafa and the exterior world: guaranteeing the true faith before humans, and confirming 
humans’ belief before God and the world.  In spite of the complicated nature of belief, it is 
largely presented as allegiance to God and is marked by whom one turns to with petitions.  Thus, 
the youth in the central episode of the Life who bargains his soul away to the devil sees belief as 
something to be traded for favors.   
In each of these lives, the Christian gift is presented as a counter-balance to the too-
explicit pagan13 gift that functions either to turn gift-giving into exchange, or to assert the 
individuality, if not independence, of the two parties exchanging.  Thus, the lives reveal the 
essentially relational nature of the gift for Ælfric, and, therefore, the nature of prayer.  Following 
Mauss, gift-theory most commonly represents gift-giving as a cycle where the first gift invites a 
return gift,14 which – to keep the boundaries between gift and exchange clearly defined – cannot 
be made either in kind or immediately.  The return-gift, when made, also invites a further return, 
which again must be delayed.  Bourdieu notes that delay is what, from the subjective point of 
view, removes the gift from the economic sphere: “The interval inserted between the gift and the 
counter-gift is an instrument of denial which allows a subjective truth and a quite opposite 
                                                 
11
 Sixtus needs to “gebigedum cneowum gebiddan 7 heora lac offrian” at the temple of Mars (CHI.29, ll. 62-3). 
12
 Mazzo, The Eucharistic Prayers of the Roman Rite (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1986; 2004), 45. 
13
 The youth in Basil’s life is not a pagan, he is an apostate, but for simplicity’s sake … 
14
 Mauss is critiqued for this.  Osteen, paraphrasing Rodolphe Gasché, writes: “In figuring the gift as a circle, then, 
Mauss reduces it to an economic exchange” (“Introduction: Questions of the Gift,” 7). To counter this, Osteen 
argues for focusing on a “different set of norms … a set founded upon spontaneity rather than calculation, upon risk 
instead of reciprocity, upon altruism in place of autonomy” (7). 
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objective truth [the economic function of the gift] to coexist.”15  But the very gap between the 
“subjective” and “objective” perspectives that Bourdieu notes and names as “denial” (the gap 
between the discourse and the praxis of the gift) is the productive site where the relationship is 
maintained.  The very act of deferral is what keeps the relationship from balancing out and 
enables it to continue.  The terms or expectations of this relationship are not and cannot be 
clearly spelled out without the relationship degenerating into a type of commodity exchange: 
because of the vagueness of the terms of the relationship each party relies on the good will and 
generosity of the other.  And because of this, a failure to return gifts can be seen, not merely as a 
failure in manners, but as a species of deception.  As Maxims I puts it, “lean sceal, gif we leogan 
nellað, þam þe us þas lisse geteod”16 (return must be made, if we do not wish to deceive, to him 
who ordained us these favors).   
The modern notion of the “free” gift fails entirely to grasp this concept.17  The “free” gift 
seeks to preserve the essential autonomy and independence of both parties to the exchange by 
insisting that gifts should be essentially free.  In this, theorists such as Derrida and Bourdieu see 
the distance between the discourse of the gift (unconstrained and unconstraining) and the 
practice of the gift (a gift calls forth a return) as a fault, a problem to be solved.  Bourdieu 
“solves” the problem by positing misrecognition, Derrida by denying the possibility of a gift at 
all.  However, if the purpose of gifts is actually to create and maintain relationships, the space 
between discourse and praxis is the most important thing of all.  The lack of explicitness makes 
the gift-cycle an enactment of trust.  Put another way, the actual gift given is trust.  Within the 
circle made by the gift-cycle is space wherein the relationship can develop.  As Lucifer’s 
example shows, a circle can be confining, or, as the saints in these lives show, it can be infinite. 
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 Bourdieu, “Selections from The Logic of Practice,” 200. 
16
 ASPR III, l. 70. 
17
 As an example of modern popular notions of the gift: recently the online magazine Slate’s advice columnist, 
Prudence, fielded a question about whether an engaged couple should accept a $50,000 wedding gift from the 
groom’s ex-girlfriend, which was supposed to be used to pay for the couple’s eventual children’s college education.  
While a number of readers’ comments seconded Prudence’s advice that the gift should be refused because of the 
strings that come attached to all gifts, a disturbingly large number of people urged them to take it and then cut off all 
ties with the donor on the grounds that gifts are “free” (“Sour about Sugar Mama,” September 9, 2010, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2266604/). 
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PAGAN LAC 
Within the passio of Bartholomew, lac establishes a relationship between devils and the 
humans who petition them.  The devil that inhabits the idol 
derode manna gesihþum: 7 heora lichaman mid mislicum untrumnyssum awyrde. 7 
andwyrde him þurh ða anlicnysse. þæt hi him heora lac offrian sceoldon. 7 he hi gehælde: 
ac he him ne heolp mid nanre hæle: ac þa ða hi to him bugon þa geswac he þære 
lichamlican gedrecednysse. for þan ðe he. ahte þa heora sawla. þa wendon dysige men 
þæt he hi gehælde: þa ða he ðære drecednysse geswac.18 
[injured people’s sight, and afflicted their bodies with various infirmities, and answered 
them through the idol, that they must offer to him their lac, and he would heal them.  But 
he did not help them with any healing, but when they had bowed to him, then he ceased 
their bodily affliction because he owned their souls.  Then foolish people thought that he 
healed them when he ceased their affliction.] 
The exchange portrayed here is a tricky one, and not only because the devil is “healing” an 
affliction he causes.  He seems to be presenting lac and healing as commensurate.  Lac and 
healing have agreed-upon values (in which the value of a lac is one healing) with clear 
obligations set forth, and there is no particular reason to think that the idol or the petitioner need 
have further claim upon each other once the transaction is complete.  But a petition does not, in 
fact, function the same way a commodity does.  Thus, the type of exchange presented is 
ambiguous: is this a commodity exchange or a gift relationship?  The devil does, in fact, gain 
some right to the petitioners.  Partly this is because when petitioners turn to devils for healing, 
they transfer their souls out of God’s protection.  But Bartholomew also later explains more 
clearly that this exchange makes the Indians subordinate to the devils as gods:  
Nu deð se deofol mid his lotwrencum þæt ða earman men geuntrumiað: 7 tiht hi þæt hi 
sceolon gelyfan on deofolgyldum. þonne geswicð he þære gedrecednysse 7 hæfð heora 
sawla on his anwealde þonne he cweðað to þære deofollican anlicnysse þu eart min 
god.19  
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 CHI.31, ll. 12-7. 
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 CHI.31, ll. 102-6. 
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[Now the devil with his deceits brings it about that he weakens wretched humanity and 
induces them that they must believe in the idol.  Then he ceases from afflicting them and 
has their souls in his power, when he says to the diabolical idol, “You are my god.”] 
Like Adam and Eve’s “obedience” to the devil when they ate of the fruit of the tree, the Indians’ 
offerings are a promise of allegiance as they turn to the devil for favors.   
The theology of the exchange between devil and humans cannot, it seems, literally be 
true: the Indians’ souls should already be forfeit through Adam’s sin which transferred Adam 
and all his heirs into the power of Satan; they are not previously in a relationship where they 
could expect God to protect them by possessing their souls.  In some ways, then, the Indians’ 
situation with Astaroth typologically reproduces Adam and Eve’s fall.  However, as 
Bartholomew explains, the devil’s ability to afflict these people does show some sort of power 
over them to begin with:   
Se awyrigeda deofol syððan he ðone frumsceapenan man beswac. syððan he hæfde 
anweald ofer ungelyfedum mannum. on sumum maran on sumum læssan; On þam maran 
þe swiþor syngiað: on þam læssan ðe hwonlicor syngiað.20 
[The cursed devil, after he had deceived the first-created one, then he had power over 
unbelieving people, over some more, over some less: more over those who sin much, and 
less over those who only sin a little.]  
The devil manifests his power over fallen humanity by afflicting their bodies, but the Indians’ 
severer sin of turning to Astaroth in their affliction in some sense legitimizes the devil’s power 
through an implied and more personal declaration of allegiance which gives the devil authority 
over their souls.  Thus, the relationship is not understood to be over once lac are given and 
healing effected, but to be ongoing.  The Indians’ offering-accompanied petitions reenact the Fall 
for this particular generation and this particular community.  Like Eve’s fall, this one too is based 
on deception, but that fact does not mitigate the fact that they have turned away from God to 
enter into a relationship with another god characterized by the asking and granting of favors.  
“Ungelyfedum” means “unfaithful” as much as it means “unbelieving.” 
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 CHI.31, ll. 98-102. 
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 The Indians’ relationship with their devil is fundamentally a false one.  The devil first 
tricks people into petitioning him by afflicting them – a parody and inversion of God’s gifts.  
Whereas God’s gifts cause people to turn to him in gratitude, the devil’s “gift” of illness (or, 
contrariwise, his taking away of their health) cause them to turn to him in desperation.21  When 
they think he has answered their petition, in reality he has not given something good, but taken 
away something evil.  The devil gains their souls by continually taking, not by giving. 
In contrast to the active and conversational nature of the relationship between the Indians 
and the devils in Bartholomew’s passio, the gods in Laurence’s passio are shown to be passive 
and silent.  In Laurence’s case, the emperor Decius wants Christians to offer lac to the Roman 
gods in an obvious statement of allegiance.  In this passio, however, lac seems to create little 
sense of obligation between devotee and god.22  The Roman gods are never appealed to for 
particular favors, nor do the Romans seem to have any sense that they owe the gods anything but 
whatever physical lac they offer– certainly not their lives, and not even, apparently, their service.  
The implied way such lac seem to work is actually to free the Romans from further responsibility 
to their gods.  There is no sense of personal connection or obligation beyond the offering of 
lac.23  Decius, in fact, sees Sixtus’ refusal to offer lac as a challenge to his own political power 
rather than as an affront to the gods: “gif þes bealdwyrda biscop acweald ne bið. syððan ne bið 
ure ege ondrædendlic”24 (if this bold bishop is not killed then our fear will not be dreaded).  
There is no further sense that his ege is a result of the gods’ gift in response to people’s 
sacrifices.25  Furthermore, Mars is completely absent from the story.  When Sixtus calls upon 
God to destroy part of his temple, there is no response from Mars, or any sense of the presence of 
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 As is the case in Beowulf when the pagan Danes turn to idols after Grendel’s depredations begin. 
22
 This, of course, would not have been true within the Roman religion, but we’re not talking about it as it was but as 
it is here portrayed. 
23
 Whether or not the deaths of the Christians themselves function as a lac to the gods is more ambiguous, but it does 
not seem to be so.  Sixtus is killed before the temple of Mars, but this seems more a matter of convenience than 
anything else: “hat hi eft to þæs godes temple martis gelædan: 7 gif he nellað to him gebigedum cneowum gebiddan 
7 heora lac offrian. underfon him beheafdunge on þære ylcan stowe” (CHI.29, ll. 61-3) [Command that he be led 
again to the temple of the god Mars, and if he will not pray to him on bent knees and offer his lac, perform his 
beheading in that same place].  Laurence, who similarly refuses to offer to Mars, is killed in Decius’ dungeons. 
24
 CHI.29, ll. 59-60. 
25
 Obviously, the two would have been very closely connected within the Roman system of emperor-worship, but 
the god named in this passio as the object of sacrifice is specifically Mars, not the emperor’s own cult, and this is 
background information that an Anglo-Saxon audience might not be expected to know. 
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an animating power at all.26  The pagan gods are silent and uninvolved in the lives of their 
devotees, even though offering lac is still obviously a declaration of allegiance. 
 In both passiones the gift-relationship between humans and pagan gods is shown to be in 
some way dysfunctional.  In Bartholomew’s passio humans abandon God’s protection, lured by 
the simple-seeming exchange of lac for healing.  The issue of the clear benefit the Indians expect 
(and seem to get) is a sort of explicitness in the relationship that will be problematized in the Life 
of Basil as well as in the coda Ælfric adds to Bartholomew’s passio, examined later in this 
chapter.  In Laurence’s passio humans offer to gods who do not respond, but the gods’ non-
responsiveness gives humans freedom to follow their own pursuits of power or money. 
 
CHRISTIAN LAC: LAURENCE 
The absence of any sort of reciprocal relationship between gods and humans for the 
pagan Romans contrasts strongly with God’s support for his martyrs in Laurence’s passio.  The 
central conflict of Laurence’s passio contrasts the pagan offerings to their gods with the things 
that the Christians offer to their God.  In contrast to the unspecified pagan lac, Christian lac are 
multiple: the Eucharistic offering that Sixtus makes to God, the deaths of the martyrs, the alms 
the church gives for the poor, and the people gathered into God’s kingdom.  Christian lac are, 
above all, personal. 
When Sixtus is first commanded to offer to Mars, he refuses, saying that he offers his lac 
to the Almighty God.  Laurence later chides him for leaving him (Laurence) behind for 
imprisonment and then martyrdom, saying “Næs þin gewuna þæt ðu buton þimun diacone gode 
geoffrodest”27 (It is not your custom that you offer to God without your deacon), clarifying that 
the lac Sixtus is talking about is chiefly understood as the Eucharistic offering, at which 
Laurence, as Sixtus’ arch-deacon, would normally assist him.  Laurence’s statement also 
indicates that the directionality of the Eucharistic sacrifice is imagined as being from humans to 
God.  This clarification is important, because the directionality of the Eucharist is usually 
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 “ða beseah se biscop wið ðæs temples. 7 þus cwæð; ðu dumba deofoldgyld. þurh ðe forleosað earme men þæt ece 
lif: towurpe þe se ælmihtiga godes sunu; ða mid þam worde tobærst sum dæl þæs temples mid færlicum hryre,” 
(CHI.29, ll. 65-8) [Then the bishop looked toward the temple and said thus: “You mute idol, through you wretched 
me lose eternal life; may the Son of the Almighty God overthrow you.  Then with these words the temple part of the 
temple burst with a loud noise]. 
27
 CHI.29, ll. 30-1. 
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understood as being dual, both from God to humans and from humans to God.  Mazzo words it 
this way, although his formula is overly simplified: “The bread and wine are God’s gift, given to 
human beings by Christ at his last meal; Christ himself is God’s gift to human beings.  The 
eucharistic prayer, on the other hand, rises from human beings to God.  It is our gift in exchange, 
our response to God’s gift.”28  It commemorates Christ’s offering of himself to humanity, but 
through the Eucharistic response of thanksgiving, it also serves as a return-gift to God. 
Furthermore, offering the Eucharist to God is seen as part of the way the Church intercedes for 
the world.29  From the Carolingian period on there was a strong tendency to see the mass as a gift 
given by humans to God in order to gain a counter-gift from God.30  The passio of Laurence 
                                                 
28
 Mazza, The Eucharistic Prayers of the Roman Rite, 45.  Mazza’s statement that the “bread and wine are God’s 
gift” is, however, misleading.  Within the liturgy of the mass, the bread and wine are presented as the offerings of 
the people to God, which is transformed into the body and blood of Christ as a response to the celebrant’s prayer 
(see Josef Jungmann, The Mass of the Roman Rite: Its Origins and Development, vol. 2 [New York: Benziger 
Brothers, 1955], part IV.1.1-9).  Furthermore, since the time of Cyprian at least, the Eucharist as a whole has been 
understood as the offering of the Church to God, both as a response to his gifts, and to obtain his favor.  This does 
not, however, change the essentially reciprocal nature of the Eucharist; rather, the issue of directionality is a matter 
of emphasis that varies according to time and place (see n. 29 below). 
29
 Ælfric seems to understand the same directionality in CHI.3 when he speaks of “huselhalgung” as one of the 
spiritual lac people give to God: “Ure gastlican lac sint ure gebedu. 7 lofsang. 7 huselhalgung 7 gehwilce oðre lac þe 
we gode offriað. þa we sceolun mid gesibsumere heortan. 7 broðorlicere lufe gode betæcan” (ll. 164-6) [Our 
spiritual offerings are our prayers and hymns and attendance at mass and whatever other offerings that we give to 
God, which we should entrust to God with peaceful hearts and brotherly love.]  The directionality of the Eucharist 
has, it seems, always been dual.  In earliest Christian practice the Eucharist was thought of as thanksgiving 
(eucharist = Greek “thanksgiving”) from men to God in commemoration of Christ’s sacrifice, but also as a gift from 
Christ to men as spiritual food.  Christ’s status as both God and man allows for this dual directionality; it is this 
same special status that is substitutionary atonement appeals to for the efficacy of Christ’s work – Christ’s sacrifice 
is as man on behalf of men to repay the debt that they owe God.  At the same time, the fact that Christ can do this at 
all is because of his divinity, a gift from God to men.  The directionality of the Eucharist in particular instances is 
thus a matter of emphasis.  Irenaeus talks about it as a sacrifice that the church offers to God (Adversus Haereses 
IV.18.1).  Cyprian also presents it as a sacrifice from humans to God; the redeemed offer the cup in memory of 
Christ (Epist. 63.2.1 and 17.1); the priest takes the place of Christ in offering the sacrifice to God (Epist. 63.14.4).  
Cyprian also draws the interesting connection between the Eucharist and martyrdom in teaching that the Eucharist is 
an invitation to martyrdom and a preparation for it (Epist. 58.1 and 63.15).  On the other hand, Ambrose calls the 
Eucharist a divine gift and emphasizes that, through it, Christ feeds believers (De Mysteriis VIII.46).  In modern 
Catholic teaching, its directionality from God to men is emphasized.  Joseph Ratzinger argues against understanding 
the Eucharist as a sacrifice from men to God, emphasizing the directionality from God to men: “It is to this very 
question that the Eucharist offers us an answer.  First of all, it says this to us: God himself gives to us, that we may 
give in turn.  The initiative in the sacrifice of Jesus Christ comes from God” (God is Near Us: The Eucharist, the 
Heart of Life [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003], 43 (ital. orig.)).   
30
 For a study of the Eucharist as a gift to God that explores its social and political value, see Mayke de Jong, 
“Carolingian Monasticism: the Power of Prayer,” in The New Cambridge Medieval History, vol. 2, ed. Rosamond 
McKitterick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 622-53: “It was widely believed that a Mass could be 
a gift to God: to express gratitude, to beg for assistance or to placate impending wrath … The central ritual of the 
Church had become a gift (munus), for which a counter-gift (remuneratio) was to be expected” (648).   
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represents the Eucharist as a gift from humans to God, and in doing so, it preserves the standard 
way sacrifices are offered to gods – from the people to God, instead of reversing it, a gift from 
God to the people.  Within Laurence’s passio this is significant because it means that there is no 
essential difference in the function of the sacrifices to the Roman gods or to the Almighty God.  
Each represent the same relationship of devotees offering lac to their god(s).  As is the case 
within the life of Bartholomew, what is important here is to whom one sacrifices.  At the same 
time, the passio’s presentation of the martyr himself as a parallel to the Eucharistic offering 
resists the reduction of the gift to a balanced munus/remuneratio exchange. 
As Laurence’s statement above begins to show, the Christians’ lac is not only the 
Eucharistic sacrifice offered before the throne of God, it is also the lives of the martyrs.  
Laurence’s speech continues and makes this clear: “Geswutela þine mihte on þinum bearne 7 
geoffra gode þone þe ðu getuge. þæt ðu þy orsorglicor becume to þam æþelan wulderbeage”31 
(Reveal your power in your son and offer to God the one whom you trained so that you may 
come less sorrowfully to the noble crown of glory).  This idea is repeated later when Decius 
wants Laurence to offer to his gods: “decius cwæð þa to þam godes cyðere: geoffra nu urum 
godum; laurentius andwyrde; Ic offrige me sylfne þam ælmihtigan gode on bræðe wynsumnysse. 
for þan ðe se gedrefeda gast is gode andfenge onsægednys”32 (Decius said then to God’s martyr, 
“Offer now to our gods!”  Laurence answered: “I offer myself to the Almighty God in pleasant 
odor because the afflicted spirit is a welcome sacrifice to God).  In contrast to the unspecified, 
impersonal pagan lac, the Christians’ lac is personal, a sacrifice of themselves made to please 
God. 
At the same time, at the beginning of the passio there is not much focus either on God’s 
gifts to humans, or on the reward they expect to receive from him for their faithful service.  For 
example, before his death Sixtus comforts Laurence: “Min cild geswic þines wopes. æfter þrim 
dagum þu cymst sigefæst to me. to þam ecan life”33 (My child, cease your weeping.  After three 
days you will come to me secure in victory, to the eternal life).  While Sixtus holds out hope of 
eternal life, it is not presented as a reward directly from God in recognition of Laurence’s 
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 CHI.29, ll. 31-3. 
32
 CHI.29, ll. 209-12. 
33
 CHI.29, ll. 39-40. 
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service.34  Rather, what is emphasized is the close tie of loyalty and affection between Laurence 
and Sixtus.  The ties between Christians and those who become Christians prove to be most 
important and enduring, and, it turns out, this “treasure” is part of the lac that people like Sixtus 
and Laurence offer to God and for which they are rewarded.  This can be seen in the suggestion 
Laurence makes that there is a reward – or at least joy – for Sixtus in Laurence’s martyrdom, 
“Geswutela þine mihte on þinum bearne 7 geoffra gode þone þe ðu getuge. þæt ðu þy orsorglicor 
becume to þam æþelan wulderbeage”35 (Reveal your power in your son and offer to God the one 
whom you trained so that you may come less sorrowfully to the noble crown of glory).   
That the treasure of the church is its people becomes a theme developed in the early 
stages of Laurence’s trouble with Decius.  After Laurence’s offer to die with Sixtus, Sixtus sends 
Laurence away to distribute the treasures of the church to priests, the poor, and widows.36  This 
manifests the close relationship between sanctity and almsgiving that we see continually 
throughout Ælfric,37 and it also allows a brief glimpse into Laurence’s place within the 
community of Christians.  The almsgiving again comes up at the moment of Sixtus’ death when 
Laurence cries out: “ne forlæt þu me for þan ðe ic aspende þære cyrican maðmas swa swa ðu me 
bebude”38 (Do not abandon me!  For I spent the church’s treasures just as you commanded me!).  
In one respect this is a plot device: Decius’ men hear mention of treasure and their desire for it is 
what gets Laurence in trouble.  The Romans’ single-minded pursuit of earthly treasure causes 
them to torture Laurence. But this device also allows Laurence to reveal that the true treasure of 
the church is its people.  When Laurence is eventually imprisoned a guard named Hippolytus 
converts and gains a dual sight when he is baptized: he sees that the church’s treasures are not 
the material goods the Romans have been trying to get, but the “unscæððigra manna sawla on 
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 Because of this, the ties between people function rather like alms in CHI.18, binding the community of Christians 
together in a cycle of loyalty, allowing the deferral necessary to keep a gift from slipping into the category of 
commodity. 
35
 CHI.29, ll. 31-3. 
36
 CHI.29, ll. 40ff. 
37
  Almsgiving seems to be the number one way that saints manifest their sanctity or the seriousness of their 
conversion.  That this is so in saints’ lives from varying original places (for instance, Basil, Oswald) and is a 
constant in teaching also shows that it is common to early Christianity as a whole, not unique to Ælfric or even the 
Western church. 
38
 CHI.29, ll. 69-70. 
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gode blissian”39 (innocent souls of men rejoicing in God).  Laurence repeats this to Decius’ first-
in-command, Valerianus, when he subsequently demands the treasure: “On godes þearfum ic hi 
aspende. 7 hi sind þa ecan maðmas. þe næfre ne beoð gewanode”40 (I spent it on God’s needy, 
and they are the eternal treasure which will never be diminished).  Loyalty to God is manifested 
through his people’s loyalty to each other, as Christians encourage one another and die with one 
another.  Thus, again, the Christians’ focus is shown to be on the personal and relational ties 
resulting from their common service of God, as contrasted with the pagan Romans’ focus on 
power and treasure. 
But the true revelation of God’s servants’ closeness with him is shown in the prayers 
Laurence prays at his death.  Like the Eucharistic prayers, these consecrate Laurence’s sacrifice 
of himself.  During his tortures Laurence prays six short prayers, a rather notable amount of 
prayer for a saint.  The prayers underscore the continuing theme of the passio, of the closeness 
between the Christian God and his people.  The effect of these multiple short prayers is to 
emphasize that God is someone Laurence can turn to in times of trial.  It should be noticed that, 
so far in this passio, there has been little mention of prayer apart from its place accompanying 
lac, both in the pagan offerings and as it accompanies the sacrifice of the mass, and then later 
when Laurence marks a blind man with the sign of the cross to heal him,41 arguably a type of 
prayer.  Often, the line between all these acts – the mass, almsgiving, martyrdom, and prayer – is 
hard to place insofar as all of them enact the relationship between devotee and god, all of the 
Christian acts are involved in the petition for salvation, and all of them are considered forms of 
offering.   
Laurence starts praying after he is beaten and when he is first tortured.  In the first torture 
episode, he prays three times; in the second one (ending in his death), three times again.  The 
prayers are interspersed with defiant statements directed toward Laurence’s torturers.  It is 
tempting to think that defiance represents the face Laurence presents toward his torturers, while 
the prayers represent his subjective experience of the situation and represent more fully his 
suffering, but this is not exactly the case.  These first two prayers do represent Laurence’s 
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 CHI.29, ll. 102-3. 
40
 CHI.29, ll. 113-4. 
41
 CHI.29, ll. 48-9. 
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suffering in a way that his brave and combative responses to Decius cannot.  Laurence has this in 
common with the praying saints in OE poetry, Andreas and Judas, both of whose prayers come 
from a position of suffering.42  To some extent, then, they are a plot device representing 
Laurence’s suffering to the narrative’s audience.  But within the world of the narrative they also 
represent Laurence’s suffering to God, making it, through the medium of prayer, a part of the 
sacrifice of his death. 
The first two prayers do ask for God’s support in Laurence’s situation: “Hælend crist god 
of gode gemiltsa þinum ðeowan. for þan ðe ic gewreged þe ne wiðsoc: befrynen ic þe 
geandette”43 (Jesus Christ, God from God, have mercy on your servant, because when accused I 
did not renounce you, when questioned I acknowledged you); and “Hælend crist þu ðe 
gemedemodest: þæt ðu to menniscum menn geboren wære. 7 us fram deofles þeowte alysdest: 
onfoh minne gast”44 (Jesus Christ, you who humbled yourself so that you were born to human 
people and delivered us from the devil’s servitude, receive my spirit).  The second prayer is 
clearly a martyr’s prayer, echoing as it does Jesus’ final words, and both of them ask for God’s 
mercy or support in Laurence’s suffering.  Furthermore, both appeal to the relationship that 
exists between Laurence and God: the first one especially appeals to the loyalty that Laurence is 
manifesting in the face of suffering and on this basis asks for God’s mercy.  The second appeals 
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 Old English saints more usually operate in the “imperative” mood, as John P. Hermann observes about Juliana 
(“Language and Spirituality in Cynewulf’s Juliana,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 26:3 [1984]: 263-81, 
273).  Juliana, we are told, prays in her prison cell, but the implication is that she is praying the normal nightly 
prayers.  Not even in the face of immanent death does she pray to God – not even anything so common as “God, 
receive my spirit.”  Rather, she denounces her tormentors to the end.  Guthlac (of Guthlac A) also appears most 
comfortable in the declarative.  Even when he is caught up in his most severe trial at the mouth of hell, he states his 
belief in God’s favor rather than asking God for it.  This, in fact, is a general trend when saints face their opponents.  
An exception to this is Andreas, who has long bouts of prayer when he thinks he is going to die at the hands of the 
Mermedonians.  But Andreas is a rather odd portrayal of a saint (and he does not, in fact, die).  Judas, tortured by 
Elena to reveal the whereabouts of the true cross, also prays, confessing his belief in God.  Elena prays to know the 
whereabouts of the true cross, but her more effective means of information seems to be torturing Judas.  To sum up 
with a generalization lacking nuance: the saints who pray, pray in weakness.  Old English narrative – and Ælfric is 
no exception to this – is usually more interested in presenting saints as strong than weak. 
43
 CHI.29, ll. 146-8.  The opening of the prayer is essentially condensed from the Creed: “Ic gelyfe … on ænne 
Crist, Hælend Drihten, þone ancennedan Godes Sunu, of ðam Fæder acenned ær ealle worulda, God of Gode, Leoht 
of Leohte …” (Benjamin Thorpe, The Homilies of the Anglo-Saxon Church, 596). “Ic þe andette” is common in the 
Psalms. 
44
 CHI.29, ll. 157-9.  The idea of Christ being born of humanity and thereby releasing humans from the devil’s 
bondage is of course an encapsulation of the random theory of salvation.  Ælfric uses some version of this phrase 6 
times in his homilies.  “Deofles andweald” is a much more common phrase, often used by Ælfric but used by others 
also. 
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to Christ’s humanity and the fact that Christ has already delivered humanity from the devil.  
Furthermore, both of these prayers echo creedal language; they therefore serve as evidence of 
right belief as well as evidence of true – faithful – belief.  Finally, Laurence’s address is more 
personally and intimately to Jesus Christ, rather than (as in the Latin) calling him more formally 
“lord.”45 
God’s support of Laurence is at times represented quite literally.  Twice when Laurence 
prays as he undergoes torture from Decius’ men, God responds.  God’s first response is to 
Laurence’s death-prayer, in reply to which a voice is heard from heaven saying, “Gyt þu scealt 
fela gewinn habban on þinum martyrdome”46 (You must still have much strife in your 
martyrdom).  While this “comfort,” as Decius terms it,47 seems hardly encouraging, it not only 
echoes Sixtus’ earlier assurance,48 but God’s voice also stands in contrast to the silence and 
remove of the Roman gods.  After this point, the tone of Laurence’s prayers changes.  No longer 
do they ask for God’s mercy.  Rather, the following prayer asks for God to reveal himself as a 
testimony to observers: “Drihten god. fæder hælendes cristes: sy þu gebletsod þe us forgeafe 
þine mildheortnysse; Cyð nu þine arfæstnysse þæt ðas ymbstandendan oncnawan þæt ðu 
gefrefrast þine þeowan”49 (Lord God, Father of Jesus Christ, be you blessed, who forgave us 
with your mildheartedness; show now your mercy so that those standing about know that you 
comfort your servants).  In response to this prayer, one of the soldiers standing nearby believes 
and tells Laurence he sees “godes engel standende ætforan þe mid handclaðe: 7 wipað ðine 
swatigan leomu”50 (God’s angel standing before you with a hand-cloth, and he wipes your 
sweaty limbs).  God’s direct, physical comfort administered through his angel serves as the 
central response to Laurence’s prayer, a point that is emphasized the more both because at this 
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 In the Latin, both prayers begin “Domine Iesu Christe” (Godden 244). 
46
 CHI.29, ll. 160-1. 
47
 “frofor,” l. 162. 
48
 “þe gerist maran campdom on þinum gewinne; We underfoð swa swa ealde men scortne ryne þæs leohtran 
gewinnes. Soðlice þu geonga underfehst miccle wulderfulran sige æt þysum reþan cyninge” (CHI.29, ll. 36-8) [to 
you a greater struggle in your conflict is fitting.  We receive, just as old men, a short course of lighter struggle; truly.  
Truly, you young will receive greater glorious victory from this cruel king]. 
49
 CHI.29, ll. 165-8.  This is one of Ælfric’s rare uses of “Drihten” to refer unambiguously to the first person of the 
godhead.  In fact, in Ælfric’s homilies, these Drihten is paired with God only 7 times; 6 of these times are 
translations from the Bible or a reference to the Old Testament, the seventh is St. Swithun’s life.  Here, obviously, 
Ælfric translates directly from the Latin. 
50
 CHI.29, ll. 170-1. 
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point Decius ceases torturing Laurence for the day, and also because of the formal characteristics 
of the prayers.  The first two begin “Hælend Crist,” the last three begin with praise and 
thanksgiving. 
The final three prayers occur the next time Laurence’s tortures begin.  They are all 
prayers of thanksgiving that illustrate the claim Laurence makes to Decius, paraphrased from 
Psalm 50, that “se gedrefeda gast is gode andfenge onsægednys”51(the afflicted spirit is an 
acceptable sacrifice to God) and further invoke the idea that Laurence’s mouth will declare the 
praise the Psalmist mentions in verse 1752 as part of the complete sacrifice that is Laurence’s 
death.  First Laurence prays, “Sy þe lof drihten for þan ðe þu eart ealra þinga god”53 (Be praise to 
you, Lord, because you are God of all things); after more tortures he prays, “Hælend crist ic 
þancie þe þæt ðu me gestrangian wylt”54 (Jesus Christ, I thank you that you will strengthen me).  
Finally, just before his death, he says, “Hælend crist. Ic þancie þe mid inwerdre heortan. þæt ic 
mot faran into þinum rice”55 (Jesus Christ, I thank you with inward heart that I can go into your 
kingdom). 
In these cases Laurence thanks God for future gifts as though they have already been 
received.  After the last prayer, he dies.  If the first two prayers represent Laurence’s suffering 
before God, making his suffering part of his gift to God, the last three prayers complete the gift-
cycle and express Laurence’s sense of God’s return-gift to him.  His assurance comes from the 
closeness between suffering Christian and God manifest through God’s audible and visible 
interventions in Laurence’s passio.  The types of lac the Romans offer their gods are less 
complete than the total lac of body and spirit that Laurence offers (partially quoted above): “Ic 
offrie me sylfne þam ælmihtigum gode on bræðe wynsumnysse. for þan ðe se gedrefeda gast is 
gode andfenge onsægednys”56 (I offer myself to the Almighty God in a sweet odor, for the 
afflicted spirit is an acceptable sacrifice to God).  Furthermore, in referencing this verse from one 
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 CHI.29, ll. 211-2.  Psalm 50:19 is “sacrificium Dei spiritus contribulatus cor contritum et humiliatum Deus non 
dispicies” [A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit: a contrite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise]. 
52
 “Domine labia mea aperies et os meum adnuntiabit laudem tuam” [O Lord, thou wilt open my lips: and my mouth 
shall declare thy praise]. 
53
 CHI.29, l. 204. 
54
 CHI.29, ll. 216-7. 
55
 CHI.29, ll. 219-20. 
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 CHI.29, ll. 210-12. 
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of the penitential Psalms in this situation, Laurence associates himself both with the holocaust 
that the Psalmist rejects in verse 1857 and with the more acceptable sacrifice of an afflicted spirit 
in the verse he more directly quotes.  
This picture of closeness between God and devotee is not uncontested.  Decius’ preferred 
response to Laurence’s prayers is to accuse him of “drycræft.”  Decius’ recognizes the power of 
Laurence’s prayers, indicating that Laurence’s prayers apparently have some immediate effect in 
allowing him to withstand Decius’ tortures.  Usually “magic” is defined oppositionally: the 
magician appeals to a power that those who name this “magic” do not recognize as legitimate.  
That is, for Christians, magic appeals to the devil’s power; for pagans, magic appeals to God’s 
power.  This is, in part, how Decius seems to understand magic.  After God’s voice is heard 
comforting Laurence, Decius responds: “Romanisce weras gehyrde ge þæra deofla frofor. on 
þissum eawbræcum. þe ure godas geyrsode ne ondræt. ne þa asmeadan tingregan”58 (Roman 
men, did you hear the comfort of the devils for this lawbreaker, who angers our gods, and neither  
dreads them nor the carefully planned torments?).  But Decius attributes the power of the 
“drycræft” to Laurence: “Ic geseo þæt ðu þurh ðinum drycræfte þas tingregan gebysmerast”59 (I 
see that you mock these torments through your sorcery), as though Laurence controls a power 
that responds to him on account of his words.60  Decius also, at another point, thinks that 
Laurence is putting his confidence in the treasures he supposedly has: “Wenst þu la þæt þu beo 
alysed mid þinum hordum fram þisum tintregum?”61 (Do you really expect that you will be 
released from these torments by your treasures?).  Thus, Decius’ understanding replicates his 
focus on power and the material wealth that he desires to gain by destroying the church. 
Laurence’s passio so strongly ties lac and prayer to sacrifice that Laurence’s prayers 
become a part of that sacrifice.  In the same way that Laurence was accustomed to assisting with 
the prayers and offering of the mass, he offers himself.  In displaying his inweard heort, a 
thankful response to God’s former gifts, the prayers consecrate his offering.  They are not a gift 
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to God in exchange for salvation; rather, they appeal in gratitude to his past gifts and trustingly 
look toward being welcomed to join with the guiltless throng of the heavenly host. 
 
CHRISTIAN LAC: BARTHOLOMEW 
In both Bartholomew and Laurence’s passiones, the conflict is focused around lac, and 
while, in both cases, such lac are obviously given to the deity to whom one submits and thus 
serve symbolically as a sign of allegiance, in each life the internal logic of the lac, and thus the 
way that prayer functions, operates with subtle difference.  Central to Laurence’s passio is the 
difference between the personal nature of Christian lac and the corresponding personal 
relationship between Christians and God and Christians and each other, and pagan lac with its 
sense of distance from the pagan gods, giving the pagans a correspondingly different focus on 
power and material wealth.  In Bartholomew’s passio, lac are given to the devils in order to get 
them to grant favors to the petitioners, but the same kind of lac are not similarly given to God.  
Rather, the relationship between petitioners and God is mediated through the figure of a saint 
notable for his prayer.  Lac serve to entangle the deceived heathen within a relationship with 
devils; petition functions symbolically to mark whom one serves.  The given text of 
Bartholomew’s prayer connects the power of the saint to correct belief and establishes the 
relationship upon which his request for mass healing is based.  But his prayer also ties the 
creedal belief to the power of God to heal/save, and although Ælfric clarifies that God is 
primarily interested in saving sinful humanity, this right relationship with God symbolized both 
through patient prayer for mercy in sickness and through “God’s words” spoken over plants, 
shows that the power of prayer resides in whom one is praying to, not in precise understanding of 
the words one is saying. 
If giving of lac to idols forfeits the precators’ claim to protection from God, how then do 
those who have given their allegiance to devils return to God’s kingdom, and what role does the 
saint have in this?  In Bartholomew’s passio, power for hælu resides in the figure of the saint.  
This power is a result of his close relationship with God manifest through his frequent prayer to 
God, and the power of his prayer and, more usually, his commands, to have effect on the world. 
Bartholomew’s presence in Astaroth’s temple is enough to bind the devil so that he can no longer 
speak or heal (though the sick are still afflicted).  Confused, the Indians go to a nearby idol, once 
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again offering lac to him to establish a relationship before even posing their question: why 
cannot their god answer them? 62  The devilish inhabitant of an idol called Berith informs the 
Indians that their devil is bound because of the presence of Bartholomew, a “freond þæs 
ælmihtigan godes”63 (friend of the Almighty God).  Berith’s devil goes on to give a detailed 
description of Bartholomew’s appearance, which includes: “hund siðon he bigð his cneowa on 
dæge. 7 hund siþon on nihte. biddende his drihten; his stemn is swilce ormæte byme: 7 him farað 
mid godes englas þe ne geþafiað. þæt him hungor derige. oððe ænig ateorung”64 (a hundred 
times he bends his knees in the day and a hundred times at night praying to his Lord.  His voice 
is like a great trumpet, and he goes with God’s angels which do not allow that hunger harass him 
or any weariness).  One of Bartholomew’s defining features is that he continually65 petitions his 
Lord.  Although, as is typical, the content of his prayers is not given, they are described in a 
disciplined way, as something he continually and faithfully does as part of the structure of his 
life.  Furthermore, these prayers are mentioned in such a context that shows they are a marker of 
Bartholomew’s close relationship to his Lord.  In contrast to Laurence’s suffering (which 
suffering brings Laurence all the more victory in his gift of himself and prompts God’s 
comforting presence in his life), what is emphasized here is that Bartholomew does not suffer 
because of his relationship with God.  In contrast to the Indians’ prayer to their gods, 
Bartholomew’s is continual; he does not pray because he is afflicted, although his relationship 
with God does protect him.  So shaken is Berith’s devil by Bartholomew’s power that he then 
asks a favor from his petitioners: “Ic bidde eow þæt ge hine geornlice biddon. þæt he hider ne 
gewende”66 (I pray you that you zealously ask him that he not come hither).  Bartholomew’s 
habit of praying is part of what marks his relationship with God, and this relationship is the 
source of his power. 
Because of Bartholomew’s close connection to God, his prayer itself also has effect upon 
the devil in a direct way.  Bartholomew’s presence is revealed when a devil67 afflicts a madman 
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into crying out: “Eala þu godes apostol bartholomee. þine gebedu geangsumiað me 7 ontendað”68 
(O you, God’s apostle Bartholomew!  Your prayers afflict me and burn).  Bartholomew responds 
by commanding the devil to be silent and come out of the madman.  In light of Thomas D. Hill’s 
article on a similar theme in Solomon and Saturn I, it seems that what causes the devil such pain 
is the fervency (oratio fervens) of Bartholomew’s one-hundred-times-a-day prayer.  In this case, 
the irritating nature of the prayer to the devil is more of a side-effect of Bartholomew’s prayer 
than an intended result.  Although Bartholomew’s close connection to God manifest through 
prayer is the source of his power, he more usually commands devils to do his bidding than he 
prays for God’s intervention.  In addition to Bartholomew’s response to this particular devil, he 
also binds the devil afflicting the king Polymius’ daughter,69 and he commands the devil to come 
out of Astaroth.70 
After the Indians recognize their error when the devil is revealed, they are able to return 
to God’s protection, not through lac, but through attempted obedience.  Bartholomew offers to 
intercede for the afflicted with the true God, their Creator,71 if they will overthrow the idol.  
Although they are not able to do this, they try.  After Bartholomew commands the spirit to leave 
and crush the idol, the people cry out: “an ælmihtig god is þone þe bartholomeus bodað”72 
(There is one Almighty God whom Bartholomew preaches!).  Thus, although the people do not 
offer lac to God in the same way they had to Astaroth, they do attempt to fulfill Bartholomew’s 
condition for him to intercede for them to God, and they acknowledge that God is the Almighty 
God before he prays, although their moment of belief comes afterward.  
Bartholomew’s prayer is a rather long précis of the Gospel (essentially, a creed), which 
then references Jesus’ promise to grant petitions prayed in his name, and is finally followed by 
the request of the moment: 
Se apostol ða astrehte his handa wið heofonas weard þus biddende; þu ælmihtiga god on 
þam ðe abraham gelyfde. 7 isaac 7 iacob. þu ðe asendest þinne ancennedan sunu. þæt he 
us alysde mid his deorwurþum blode fram deofles þeowdome. 7 hæfþ us geworht þe to 
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bearnum; ðu eart unacenned fæder: he is sunu of þe æfre acenned. 7 se halga gast is æfre 
forðstæppende of þe 7 of þinum bearne: se forgeaf us on his naman þas mihte þæt we 
untrume gehælon 7 blinde onlihton hreoflige geclænsian. deoflu afligan. deade aræran. 7 
cwæð to us. soð ic eow secge: swa hwæt swa ge biddað on minum naman æt minum 
fæder. hit bið eow gitiðod: nu bidde ic on his naman. þæt ðeos untrume meniu sy 
gehæled: þæt hi ealle oncnawon þæt ðu eart ana god on heofonum 7 on eorþan. 7 on sæ. 
þu ðe hælðe geedstaþelast þurh þone ylcan urne drihten. se þe mid þe 7 mid þam halgan 
gaste. leofað 7 rixað on ealra worulda world.73 
[The apostle then stretched his hands toward heaven, thus praying, “You, Almighty God, 
on whom Abraham believed, and Isaac, and Jacob; you who sent your only begotten Son, 
so that he redeemed us with his precious blood from the devil’s slavery, and have made 
us your children; you are the unbegotten Father, he is the Son of you ever begotten, and 
the Holy Spirit is ever proceeding from you and from your Son.  He gave us this power in 
his name, that we heal the infirm, and enlighten the blind, cleanse lepers, drive out devils, 
raise the dead, and he said to us, ‘Truth I say to you, whatever you ask in my name from 
my Father, it will be granted you.’  Now I ask in his name that this infirm crowd be 
healed, so that they all know that you alone are God in heaven, and on earth, and on the 
sea, you who establish healing/salvation through our same Lord, he who with you and 
with the Holy Spirit lives and rules for all ages.”] 
This prayer is ostensibly addressed to God.  Insofar as creeds function as prayer, stating the 
correctness of the believer’s faith and thus the basis upon which his relationship with God is 
established, this prayer operates in the same way.  As such, it establishes the relationship upon 
which the request he is about to make is based, crucially reminding God of Christ’s promise that 
prayer in his name will be answered.  Bartholomew also gives a reason why God would want to 
answer this particular request: to confirm the people in the belief that he is the true God.  But 
even more crucially, this prayer is for those listening to it, both the Indians, who need instruction 
in the content of the faith they are about to embrace and for whom this is a performance of that 
faith, and also for those hearing Ælfric’s sermon.  In this case, Bartholomew’s prayer establishes 
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his connection with the true faith, the one that the audience affirms each time they recite their 
own creed.  Bartholomew’s prayer ties creedal belief to the power of God, who brings both 
bodily healing and spiritual salvation (hælð) through Jesus’ sacrifice. 
After Bartholomew’s prayer the people are healed and an angel appears and sanctifies the 
temple, and then manifests the devil in his true, hideous image before banishing him to the 
wastelands.  It is at this point that Polymius, his family, and all his people “gelyfde on þone 
soðan god”74 (believe in the true God) and are baptized.  After this point Bartholomew runs afoul 
of Polymius’ brother Astryges and is summarily martyred.75  But for Polymius, belief is the 
response to these miracles, not their pre-condition.  It is the figure of Bartholomew, mediating 
between God and man, and manifesting the truth of the true faith, that makes this belief possible.   
 
PRAYER IN THE LIFE OF ST. BASIL 
 The Life of St. Basil has a more complicated textual history than the passiones of 
Bartholomew and Laurence: the original was in Greek and compiled probably in the seventh 
century, and thus reflects several different stages of Christian practice already.76  Toward the end 
of the ninth century it was translated into Latin three times, probably in the Carolingian court.77  
Therefore, the Life is long and complex and carries various strata of meaning.  Whereas the 
passiones of both Bartholomew and Laurence focus on lac to portray the relationship between 
people and their gods, prayer is more central to the life of St. Basil.  While no direct prayers are 
given, prayer resolves the conflicts of every major episode.  Thus, prayer fluidly interacts with 
the different concerns manifest in the text.  For instance, when Basil prays to receive the liturgy 
of the mass from God himself, in the Greek context this is centrally important in establishing the 
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authority of the main Greek liturgies.  The Carolingian Latin translators, however, might have 
found value in the way this episode speaks to the debates of their day concerning the nature of 
the real presence.78  Additionally, the Greek hagiography and the Latin vita (a close translation) 
both contain actual prayers of Basil’s that Ælfric’s version excises.  The interests of the Greek 
hagiographer were evidently different from Ælfric’s own.   
 Within the Eastern church Basil is a central figure, active in the defense of orthodoxy 
against the Arian heresy (unnamed, in Ælfric’s life), and the creator of one of the Greek liturgies.  
The vita begins with a summary of the key elements of Basil’s importance for the Eastern 
church: 
Ergo quomodo magister noster pastor et resonatus in orbe, caelestium uirtutum collocator 
ac angelicorum ordinum comminister, magniloquus ecclesiae praedicator, solida 
orthodoxorum dogmatum culmina, naturam rerum existentium expressit; inimicum 
trintatis Iulianum apostatam deiecit; Valentis os blasphemum obstruxit; arrianorum 
debellauit malam gloriam; christianorum plane corroborauit rectam gloriam.79 
[Therefore I shall record how our pastor was a man great in every way, and a preacher of 
the heavenly virtues heard throughout the earth, a servant of the angelic orders, an 
eloquent spokesman of the Church, and a solid peak of orthodox doctrines who explained 
the nature of existing things, cast out that enemy of the Trinity, Julian the Apostate, shut 
the blasphemous mouth of Valens, vanquished the wicked boast of the Arians, and 
thoroughly strengthened the true boast of the Christians.]80 
Basil’s teaching could be taken as reliably orthodox; he was a key figure in the struggle against 
Arianism and in protecting the church from hostile secular power such as Julian’s, as is shown 
through his interactions with Julian and Valens.  He presents the superiority of Christian belief to 
pagan philosophy through his ability to explain the nature of existing things, a major concern in 
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the early chapters.  In addition, through Basil’s course of studies in Egypt and Jerusalem, he 
unites the major eastern centers of Christianity.  Finally, Basil receives his liturgy directly from 
God, and several subsequent miracles testify to the power of this liturgy.  Perhaps because of 
this, the Latin life gives multiple instances of Basil’s actual prayers.   
 Basil is not the same sort of figure for Ælfric.  Consequently, most of the sections 
detailing Basil’s abilities in Greek philosophical thought and literary culture are removed.  The 
ones that remain tend to focus more on the idea of wisdom; this is especially evident in Basil’s 
show-down with Julian.  Although Ælfric excises most of Basil’s prayers, the source of Basil’s 
liturgy remains important as a testimony to the power of the liturgy,81 even though Ælfric 
mentions that Basil’s liturgy is not used in the Western church.  Prayer – and the true belief it 
mediates – remains a central concern in the Life.  What comes to the fore in Ælfric’s version is a 
concern for belief that is continually mediated through the figure of the saint.  While content is 
an important part of this belief, what seems to be more important is the relationship established 
through it, a relationship in which believers show their loyalty to God, while God responds with 
his mercy, protection, and healing/salvation. 
 The extent to which prayer is central to this Life and the ways in which it functions can 
be seen from the following outline.  Ælfric’s life contains 17 chapters in which prayer solves a 
central problem in eleven of them; Basil’s earthly intercession is manifest in an additional 
chapter: 
 Chapter 2: At Basil’s baptism he prays for a sign from God to confirm his faith. 
 Chapter 4: Basil prays for a liturgy in God’s own form of words. 
 Chapter 6: Basil intercedes for a poor woman with a nobleman, and then for the  
nobleman with the emperor. 
 Chapter 7: Basil gets the better of Julian in a gift-exchange, then prays to God to avert  
Julian’s anger. 
 Chapter 9: Basil prays for healing for Valens’ son in what is a contest with the Arians. 
 Chapter 10: Basil gains a church back from the Arians through prayer. 
 Chapter 11: Basil intervenes through prayer in the case of a young man who has sold his  
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soul to the devil. 
 Chapter 12: The mass reveals the honorable conduct of a priest, and Basil’s prayer heals a  
leper. 
 Chapter 13: A Syrian hermit Ephrem prays to know about Basil’s excellence; Basil prays  
that Ephrem might miraculously be granted a knowledge of Greek. 
 Chapter 14: Basil and Ephrem (by turns) pray for a woman’s sins to be forgiven (this  
story is finished in Chapter 16). 
 Chapter 15: Basil prays for his life to be prolonged so that his Jewish doctor might come  
to belief. 
Structurally, Corona notes that Ælfric’s rearrangements of the vita – moving related episodes 
next to each other, for instance – make the life appear “a logically unified continuum, without the 
‘patchwork’ effect characteristic of the Vita Basilii.”82  She notes that this rearrangement leads to 
a longer section of the text that perhaps shows concerns about kingship through Basil’s dealings 
with Julian and Valens (chapters 7-10),83 but she does not address the larger structure of the text 
as a whole. 
 Ælfric gives two structural cues that lead to a three-fold division of the life and place the 
proto-Faustian84 story of chapter 11 at the center of the concerns of the text.  The first is the way 
he begins each chapter of the text.  In the first section after the Prologue (chapters 2-6), the 
chapters are very loosely linked by time or place: “Hi comon ða siððan” (ch. 2), “Þa gehadode” 
(ch. 3), “Þa æfter litlum fyrste” (ch. 4), “He eode æfter mæssan” (ch. 6).  The exception to this is 
chapter 5, which begins, “Sum Iudeisc man.”  In this case, the episode is thematically linked to 
the one before, in which Basil is given his liturgy by God.  In the following chapter, the efficacy 
of this liturgy is seen through a Eucharistic miracle witnessed by a Jewish man who then 
converts.  The following chapter is quite loosely linked temporally to the two Eucharist chapters: 
it happens afterward.  However, chapter 6 also shows that Basil’s intercession is just as 
efficacious among men as it is supposed to be with God.  The second section concerns the two 
emperors.  Each chapter begins with a marker of time: “On sumum dæge” (ch. 7), “Efne þæs 
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ymbe seofan niht” (ch. 8), “Eft on sumne timan” (ch. 9), and “Eft on oðrum time” (ch. 10).  
Finally, in the third section, each chapter begins with a person: “Sum arwurþe þegn” (ch. 11), 
“Basilius se mæra” (ch. 12), “Effrem wæs gehaten” (ch. 13), “Sum swiðe welig wif” (ch. 14), 
“An æþele læce” (ch. 15), and a turn back to the woman: “We willað nu ful secgan” (ch. 16).  
Chapter 17 is the epilogue. 
 The second structural cue is seen if one focuses on prayer.  Prayer in the first section 
establishes Basil as a rightly believing possessor of God’s words whose intercession is 
efficacious.  The second sections’ prayers show Basil’s ability to protect the church against 
apostates and heretics, and the final sections’ prayers show his ability to intervene in the lives of 
those who come to him.  Structurally, chapter 11 is the pivot of the Life (it is also the longest 
episode).  The previous section shows him triumphing against human adversaries; this one shows 
him triumphing against the devil himself – a devil who has the forethought and cleverness to get 
those whom he seduces to sign a binding contract with him. 
 In chapter 11, at the instigation of the devil, a young man falls in love with a convent-
bound woman and makes a bargain with the devil in order to gain her.  As has been the case in 
the other saints’ lives examined, asking for favors from the devil forfeits the petitioner’s soul.  
Throughout, the relationship between the young man and the agents of the devil is mediated 
through money and through contract, establishing distance and (through the contract) a 
relationship of suspicion and mistrust.  Their contract-mediated relationship is in contrast to the 
prayer-mediated relationship restored between the young man and God through the saint and the 
young man himself that void the contract.  
The young man first approaches a sorcerer: “and behet him sceattas gif he mid his 
scinscræfte him þæt mæden mihte gemacian to wife”85 (and promised him money if he with his 
magic could make that woman his wife).  The young man is thus not proposing the type of 
exchange that leads to the creation of mutual bonds.  The sorcerer, however, acts as a 
intermediary, taking the youth to his master, the devil.  Between the sorcerer and the devil there 
evidently is a relationship based upon mutual favors.  But this is not the sort of relationship that 
either the youth or the devil proposes to replicate between themselves: the youth has a very 
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specific favor he wants to gain, and the devil sets a very clear price for that favor: “se deofol 
befran þone dweligendan cnapan gif he wolde on hine gelyfan and his Hælende wiðsacan siþþan 
þe he gefremode his fulan galnysse”86 (the devil asked the erring youth if he wanted to believe in 
him and reject his Savior after he fulfilled his foul lust).  While the youth explains what he wants 
to the sorcerer, the devil – without having heard or promised the youth anything – asks him “gif 
he wolde on hine gelyfan and his Hælende wiðsacan”87 (if he wanted to believe in him and reject 
his Saviour).  But at this point devil has given the youth nothing to believe – no promise, 
although he goes on: “siþþan þe he gefremode his fulan galnysse”88 (after he fulfilled his foul 
lust).  There is an implicit promise here, but the belief is to come after the devil has done the 
deed – that is, what is being proposed is not belief in the intellectual sense, it is allegiance.  This 
“gelyfan” is opposed to the “wiðsacan” of Christ that the youth is supposed to do.  Belief is 
opposed, not to unbelief, but to rejecting.  The youth agrees to this conditionally: “gif he his lust 
gefremode”89 (if he fulfilled his desire).  That is, for the youth, belief is something exchanged for 
service. 
 Perhaps this is the reason why the devil mistrusts him:  
“Ge synd swiðe ungetreowe, 
þonne ge min behofiað þonne helpe ic eow 
and ge wiþsacað me eft, and cyrrað to eowrum Criste 
se þe is swiðe mildheort and mildelice eow underfehþ, 
ac writ me nu sylf willes þæt þu wiðsace Criste 
and þinum fulluhte, and ic gefremme ðinne lus, 
and þu beo on domesdæge fordemed mid me.” 
Ða awrat se earming mid his agenre handa 
swa swa se deofol him gedihte þone pistol.90 
[“You are very untrustworthy, when it pleases you then I help you, and you will reject me 
afterward, and turn to your Christ, who is very mild-hearted and will mildly receive you.  
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So write me now of your own will that you reject Christ and your baptism, and I will 
satisfy your desire, and you will be damned with me on Judgment Day.”  Then the wretch 
wrote the letter with his own hand just as the devil dictated to him.] 
The devil tries to make his claim on the young man’s soul absolute through the contract that 
serves as a guarantee of the young man’s intention, especially as it is written personally in the 
youth’s own hand.  Insofar as the contract is dictated by the devil, the young man adopts and 
enacts the words and conditions the devil gives him.  Through this, the contract stands as a 
contrast to and inversion of the relationship that should exist between the youth and Christ, a 
relationship mediated by prayer.  That is, the youth adopts and enacts the words the devil gives 
him, writing them in his own hand as a testimony that they reflect his own intention.  But a 
contract-negotiated relationship is one founded, not on love, loyalty, and the joy of the gift, but 
rather in mistrust and suspicion, as each party negotiates to get out of what he wants.91 
 The youth marries the young woman, but he eventually realizes his deception.92  He turns 
to Basil, who asks him if he wants to return to Christ.  The youth confesses he does: “ac ic ne 
mæg, þeah ic wille, forþanþe ic wiðsoc Criste and on gewrite afæstnode þæt ic wære þæs 
deofles”93 (but I cannot, even though I wish it, because I rejected Christ and affirmed in a writ 
that I was the devil’s).  Basil assures him that (as the devil had predicted) Christ is merciful – 
“gif þu mid soðre dædbote gecyrste eft to him”94 (if you with true penance turn again to him).  
The contract was supposed to stand as a guarantee of intention to make sure the devil gets his 
due, but the intention is falsified by the young man’s change of mind and Christ’s mercy.  This 
does leave two problems: one, the contract still exists.  Two, there is a disquieting sort of fluidity 
in the character of a man who sees belief as something to be exchanged for service. 
Prayer solves these problems.  Basil locks the youth away for three days and prays for 
him.  At the end of that time he returns, and the man reports that the devils frightened and 
                                                 
91
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the details of the bargain have been worked out before the issue of belief comes up.  The sorcerer proposes the 
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threatened him.  Basil responds: “Ne beo ðu afyrht, gelyf soðlice on God”95 (Do not be 
frightened; believe truly in God).  But, at this point, what marks true belief in God?  Partially it is 
the young man’s willingness to undergo penitential suffering, to “face his demons” (they appear 
to him as he is locked away) in his place of solitude and enact his belief that God will indeed be 
merciful.  That is, the exchange between the youth and the devil was marked by a statement of 
specific obligations for each party to fulfill.  There is no such specificity in the young man’s 
return: all he wants is to be taken back; all Basil promises is that God will do so.  But the 
penitential stability that the youth must show also, in some way, heals his character, standing as a 
new marker of intention.  The youth’s intention is not marked by dead words written on a page, 
but more dynamically through the continually iterated promises of prayer. 
The figure of the saint stands as a guarantee, both of God’s mercy, and of the youth’s true 
belief.  Thus, it is Basil’s prayer (already shown to be efficacious through the power of the mass 
God has given him) that the passage emphasizes.  After fourteen days of prayer, the youth 
reports himself quite well, and says, “todæg ic seah hu ðu overswiðdest þone deofol”96 (today I 
saw how you overcame the devil).  Basil gathers the whole community for one more night’s 
vigil.  After a night of prayer the devil appears with the writ.  Basil responds by threatening to 
pray until he gives up the letter.  After a time of praying the kyrie, the letter falls out of the air 
and Basil tears it up.  Here the written word, although it is given to assure the devil he will get 
his due, becomes false through penance and the saints’ prayer – not a record of the youth’s true 
state or intention.  It is this prayer that reveals and forms the true state of affairs, loosening the 
hold the devil has on the youth and bringing stability to his changeable heart.  The episode ends 
with Basil teaching him “hu he lybban sceolde on Cristes geleafan”97 (how he should live in 
Christ’s faith). 
 Subsequently, Basil is also called upon to help a penitent woman who has written all her 
sins down on a paper, sealed it with lead, and then asked Basil to erase the sins through his 
intercession.  Basil’s initial prayer erases all the sins but one; however, the episode involves a 
complicated tag-team prayer between Basil and Ephrem as she tries to get the last, most heinous 
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sin erased.98  This is eventually resolved after Basil’s death.  Like the youth’s situation, however, 
it involves a written record of sin that is destroyed through the saint’s prayer and the penitent’s 
own penitential practice.  The point conveyed is that God is not one who keeps record of sins; his 
mercy is mediated through the spoken words of prayer and the guarantee of the saint. 
 Because of this, the first prayer in Basil’s life takes on special significance.  Just before 
Basil is baptized in the Jordan, he falls down on the ground “and mid wope gewilnode sum gewis 
tacen æt Gode his geleafan to trymminge”99 (and with weeping desired a certain sign from God 
to confirm his belief).  Why this weeping desire for a sign?  Is Basil concerned that he does not 
truly believe, or that he might not believe in the right thing?  That is, is he concerned about the 
subjective aspect of his belief, or the objective nature of the faith he is trusting?  Finally, is Basil 
concerned for himself at all, or does he seek this sign as a testimony for others?  As he is 
baptized fire and a dove come from heaven in a sign to rival Christ’s own.  Ælfric reports, not 
Basil’s response to the sign, but the response of the bishop baptizing Basil: he “wundriende þæs 
tacnes”100 (wondered at the sign).  But within the concerns of the Life as Ælfric retells it, it 
seems more likely that what Basil seeks is confirmation that his geleafa has been accepted, that 
God recognizes him as one of his own. 
 In the Life of St. Basil, prayer mediates between the murky inner world, the subjective 
aspect of geleafa and the exterior world, the objective aspect both of what one has believed in 
and how one acts.  However, it is Basil’s prayer that has the particular power to reveal and 
confirm true belief, not necessarily the prayer of ordinary people.  The power of Basil’s prayer to 
confirm belief is manifest again and again – not through the healing miracles more normal in a 
saint’s life, but through the obvious efficacy of his prayer in recognizing those who have 
believed “soðlic on Gode.”  In Basil’s Life the efficacy of the subjective aspect of belief is 
rigorously upheld, over-determined, one might say.  The trueness of another person’s belief is 
something that no one else has direct confirmation of, since it is interior.  The Life of St. Basil 
goes to great lengths to show both that the faith is true, and that individual belief is knowable, 
through the mediatory power of a saint and the enactment of prayer.  In addition, prayer and 
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belief establish a relationship that allows trust to be enacted between God and Christians.  They 
turn to him for protection and for forgiveness, not, like the young man with the devil, trading 
belief for specific favors, but approaching God in the hope of good things. 
 
CONCLUSION: WHAT TO PRAY FOR AND WHAT TO EXPECT IN RETURN 
At the end of the Ælfric’s passio of Bartholomew he turns to discuss a Christian 
understanding of disease and infirmity.  While the devils cease afflicting those whose souls they 
have, God afflicts his chosen with disease: “he beswincð mid untrumnyssum his gecorenan swa 
swa he sylf cwæð; þa ðe ic lufie ða ic þreage 7 beswinge”101 (he afflicts with sickness his chosen, 
just as he himself said: “Those whom I love, those I correct and afflict”).  The devils afflict in 
order to gain souls.  God afflicts those whom he already has.  Ælfric lists various reasons why 
God might choose to do this, but it is clear that, unlike the devil, God cannot be bought off with 
lac – bodily healing is not necessarily among the favors God gives.  Thus, suffering has another 
purpose:  
Gif se synfulla bið gebrocod for his unrihtwisnysse. þonne gif he mid geþylde his drihten 
herað 7 his miltsunge bit: he bið ðonne aþwogen fram his synnum þurh ða untrumnysse: 
swa swa horig hrægel. þurh sapan; gif he rihtwis bið he hæfð þonne maran geþingcðe 
þurh his brocunge gif he geþyldig bið; Se þe bið ungeþyldig 7 mid gealgum mode ceorað 
ongean god on his untrumnysse. he hæfð twyfealde geniþerunge. for þan ðe he geycð his 
synna mid þære ceorunge 7 þrowað na þe læs.102 
[If the sinful one is afflicted for his unrighteousness, if when he with patience praises his 
Lord, and asks for his mercy, he will then be cleansed from his sins through the sickness, 
just as a dirty garment is through soap.  If he is righteous, he has the greater honor 
through his affliction if he is patient.  He who is impatient, and with sad mind complains 
against God in his sickness, he has a two-fold condemnation, because he adds to his sins 
with the complaining, yet suffers nonetheless.] 
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The prayers for mercy (“miltsunge bit”) that the sick man offers, combined with the sickness, 
help to bring about his cleansing.103  Without prayer, the sickness is only sickness; the prayer to 
God gives it its purifying power.  But there are several elements to this praying: praising God 
with patience, and praying for mercy.  In this case “mid geþylde … herað” seems to function as a 
petition-gift (as praises often do) to accompany the request for mercy.  This puts the exchange 
squarely within the allegiance paradigm for prayer, where the sinner requests miltsung on the 
basis of the relationship established by the herung.  But the petitioner cannot dictate the terms of 
the mercy shown him.  The healing is transferred from the physical to the more important 
spiritual realm.  God shows his miltsung and answers the request in the way he sees best, not 
through physical healing but through purification.  In a way, this clarifies the intention of the one 
praising God – he is not doing so just to gain healing (or claiming that he can dictate its terms) 
but as an expression of subordination to God’s will. 
 In his eagerness to spiritualize prayers for healing, Ælfric at this point comes very close 
to the free gift; however, in this case the gift is freely given by God’s devotees to God with no 
expectation of return.  That is, those who turn to idols for healing might end up losing their souls 
at the end of all things, but at least they will gain healing.  Trading the promise of salvation later 
for health now might be a deal people are willing to make.  But those who turn to God for 
healing are promised nothing: if the precator is sinful, God might not heal him; if he is righteous, 
God might not heal him.  The gift as a material thing or benefit that God might give in return for 
service disappears.  The “disappearing gift,” however, leaves space between gift and counter-
gift.  If God does not heal (or if God’s martyrs die, or if God’s apostates are received back 
without clear conditions defining their relationship), then to gain nothing from God, and yet still 
believe and serve him, shows the truest service of all because it proves one serves, not for one’s 
own enrichment, but purely as a response that shows one recognizes the honor due God.  
However, this response in turn brings honor to the one serving (or, in this case, the one suffering 
patiently through affliction).  Consequently, and paradoxically, God’s non-gift allows Christians 
to earn the honor that comes from serving someone honorable just because they recognize his 
value.  In a value-system where a person’s worth is measured by loyalty, their own 
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honorableness is recognized by the reward of eternal salvation – a moment when the faithful are 
allowed through the gates and seated at the high table of the eternal feast. 
 Do saints’ prayers tell us anything about the real practice of prayer?  They are molded 
both to the situation the saints find themselves in and to the needs of the narrative.  However, as 
Byzdl shows, these prayers tend to follow the same structure as prayers found in prayerbooks.104  
Furthermore, the saints’ prayers, while technically not set prayers, are still very conventional 
language, adapted from snatches of Psalms and liturgical texts.  Yet, while saints’ lives show 
saints praying “spontaneously,” these are neither normal situations nor people.   
What these prayers do show is a deep interiorization of biblical and liturgical texts that 
seems to mark an ideal of prayer appropriate to ideal Christians.  Bartholomew, Laurence, and 
Basil are all notably praying saints: Basil solves the main conflicts in his text through prayer and 
receives his liturgy from God, Laurence habitually assists with the mass, Bartholomew is notable 
for praying one hundred times a day and then throughout the night.  In this way, although no 
attention is paid to the subjective efficacy of prayer, these are men who have internalized the 
structures of formal prayer, and who also externalize the models presented in prayer in their 
lives.  At the same time, because their stories are shaped narrative, it is hard to say the saints 
have internalized prayer so much as that their lives have been made by the hagiographers to 
conform to the ideals expressed in prayer.  In this way, it is actually the authors of the texts who 
are shown to have internalized the structures of prayer rather than the fictionalized characters of 
the saints themselves.105  Furthermore, while saints might function as models for prayer, just as 
likely they give the devout, not so much a model of prayer, but actual prayers they can pray, and, 
of course, an intimate of God to whom they can turn with their own problems. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Hond sceal heofod inwyrcan,     hord in streonum bidan, 
gifstol gegierwed stondan,     hwonne hine guman gedælen. 
Gifre biþ se þam golde onfehð,    guma þæs on heahsetle geneah; 
lean sceal, gif we leogan nellað,     þam þe us þas lisse geteod. 
– Maxims I, ll.67-701 
[The head must direct the hand, the hoard await in the treasury,  
the gift-seat stand prepared for when men may disperse it.   
Eager for it is he who receives the gold, of that the man on the throne has sufficient; 
return must be made, if we do not wish to deceive, to him who ordained us these favors.] 
 
Our Prayers besiege God, … but our praises prescribe in God, we urge him, and presse him with 
his ancient mercies, his mercies of old: By Prayer we incline him, we bend him, but by Praise we 
bind him; our thanks for former benefits, is a producing of a specialty, by which he hath 
contracted with us for more. – John Donne2 
 
By virtue of the structure of this project and the way that Bede and Ælfric neatly bookend 
the Anglo-Saxon period, it would be easy to read Ælfric against Bede, to situate them too neatly 
as complements to or foils for one another.  While Bede was one of the authorities Ælfric names 
as a source for his Catholic Homilies, none of his homilies on prayer is particularly indebted to 
Bede.3  This conclusion, therefore, is intended to clarify some ways in which Bede and Ælfric 
complement each other and some further ways in which this neat contrast does not work, 
allowing us to consider each author on his own terms. 
First of all, Bede and Ælfric write in different languages.  As far as the careful 
transmission of doctrine goes, Bede has the advantage of writing in Latin, the language of the 
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Church.  Because Ælfric writes in Old English, he has the challenge, as he was well aware, of 
translating foreign cultures and concepts into Old English.4  Gratia, for instance, came with 
multivalent levels of meaning, from its social resonances and philosophical valences as well as 
the precise doctrinal meanings that had been hammered out through the fires of controversy.  
Thus, we face the question of to what extent gifu – which in Old English never could have meant 
the continual dependence of lower forms on higher forms (as gratia did in Neo-platonic 
philosophical discourse) – is the same thing as gratia, or (as mentioned in Chapter 1) ben or 
gebed are the same as oratio.  To some extent we also face this challenge in Bede, who would 
not have had the same fields of reference for gratia as did Augustine, but because their language 
is the same, in Bede’s case, potential semantic shifts caused by different cultural assumptions are 
harder to detect.  In Ælfric, however, the Old English words that translate Latin doctrinal and 
spiritual concepts contain the possibility of introducing new ideas into the discourse of prayer, 
and it becomes possible to see the way he forecloses potentially problematic readings that these 
words might introduce.5 
Second, our two authors’ differing audiences lead them to emphasize different concerns.  
Bede’s audience – and especially his audience for his prayer sermons – was monastic.  Thus, 
Bede’s teaching on prayer is situated within a monastic tradition of prayer, and the concerns of 
people devoted (in either sense) to pursue the salvation of their souls in a monastery and within 
regular life.  Ælfric’s audience, on the contrary, was mixed.  As we have seen, his sermons on 
prayer often particularly address lay people, both rich and poor,6 who would have had neither the 
same practice of or training in prayer as Bede’s audience.  In fact, while it is easy to say for 
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 Ælfric’s own prefaces to his biblical translations show his concern about translation issues.  While he shows some 
awareness of the problem of semantic and syntax issues in translation, his greatest concern seems to be the potential 
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5
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McGrath traces the concept of justification through its translation from language to language.  He focuses primarily 
on Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, of course, but briefly discusses the term in OE (gerihtwisung) on pp. 60-61. 
6
 A particularly clear example of this is CHI.19 which contains a standard catechetical explication of the LP. 
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certain that Bede’s audience followed a monastic rule, and therefore kept to a cursus of the 
Divine Office, it is very difficult to say with any certainty what Ælfric’s expectations were for 
lay practice of prayer.  We know that he expected lay people to know both the LP and the Creed, 
although in which language is a little harder to say.7  It is also difficult to say what he expected 
them to do with it.  In early Christian practice all Christians were to pray the LP three to seven 
times daily, but in Ælfric’s time there is little evidence to indicate one way or the other what 
expectations were for lay people.8  Certainly, Ælfric encouraged them to pray the LP in their 
daily lives,9 but Ælfric’s sermons record no evidence of prayer at set times being expected of lay 
people.  Lay people would – presumably – have prayed the LP whenever they came to church.  
The extent of congregational participation can be hard to gauge.10  As today, there would have 
been a range of piety.  Exceptionally pious (and well-educated) lay people might have kept set 
times of prayer and used prayer books.11  Many other people would have known the LP, and 
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 “Ælc cristen man sceal æfter rihte cunnan ægþer ge his pater noster ge his credan” (CHI.20, ll. 2-3) [Every 
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argues that this particular sermon was designed for preaching to a congregation, but continues, regarding a particular 
section of the sermon that includes the line quoted above: “[I]t seems possible that Ælfric intended these parts of his 
text to apply primarily to a small, exclusive group from amongst his audience, that is the monks and clerics” (Old 
English Homilies from MS Bodley 343, EETS o.s. 302 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993], 29).  As an 
interesting side-note, Irving sources this sermon to Augustine.  In Augustine’s teaching such an idea would have 
applied to lay people. 
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 See the sermons of Caesarius of Arles, who seems to have felt himself content if his congregation was not lying 
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 We have, for instance, the example of King Alfred’s piety as told in Asser’s Life of King Alfred (see Scott 
DeGregorio’s article on his piety, “Texts, Topoi, and the Self.”  Additionally, Ælfric’s work was encouraged by a 
layman, Æðelweard (mentioned in the OE preface to the Lives of Saints as having requested the series, see Wilcox, 
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of lay popular spirituality, one is limited to the practices of a certain group of lay persons, those educated in the 
monastic schools” (“Penance in Transition: Popular Piety and Practice,” in Medieval Liturgy: A Book of Essays, ed. 
Lizette Larson-Miller, Garland Medieval Case Books 18 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1997), 121-63, 122), and 
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many of them would have used it often – as what we would think of as a charm, if in no other 
way.  The best sources to examine for lay piety are the penitentials, but, again, what percentage 
of the lay population might be confessing to a priest and committed enough to carry out penances 
assigned is a difficult question.12  All of this is a far cry from the monastic congregation to whom 
Bede preaches.  This leads to one of the key differences between Bede and Ælfric, which is that 
Ælfric is much less concerned with what we have been calling “purity” in Bede, the congruence 
of words, thoughts, and deeds.  Ælfric is concerned about clænysse (“cleanness, purity”), but the 
concept does not come up very frequently in his teachings on prayer.  Additionally, while Bede 
uses language developed within the orbit of Neo-platonism (desire, love, etc.), as we have seen 
in Chapter 3, Ælfric systematically strips that sort of thing out of his sources as he adapts them to 
his own purposes. 
The third point involves the particular orientation toward and understanding of the “holy” 
that was developed in Chapter 3, but marks a point of differentiation between Ælfric and Bede.  
The prayer coming out of the Egyptian desert and the early monasteries, and the prayer taught by 
people like Augustine and Cassian influenced by Neo-platonic structures of thought, might be 
termed sanctus-oriented.  Going back to the root of the word sanctus, the primary idea is set-
apartness.  Within this tradition, the practice of prayer sets people apart from the pollutions, the 
distractions, and the desires of the world and reorients their desire away from the impermanent 
material world toward the eternal spiritual realm.  Bede’s theory of prayer shares the language 
and goals of sanctus-oriented prayer; however, insofar as ideas of purity are related to an 
understanding of the holy, Bede’s imagined precator is not oriented to the same extent toward 
sanctity but rather wholeness: congruence of words, thoughts, and deeds all integrated within the 
petition for salvation.  Thus, Bede’s orientation toward the holy blends ideas of set-apartness 
                                                                                                                                                             
Allen Frantzen affirms this in the context of Anglo-Saxon penitential practices (The Literature of Penance in Anglo-
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with wholeness.  While Ælfric is concerned about clænnysse (here meaning “cleanness, purity” 
more generally, not particularly chastity), his teaching on prayer is not particularly sanctus-
oriented, yet it almost completely reflects an attitude that we might label halig (“holy”).  Ælfric’s 
repeated emphasis in his teachings on prayer is on the community, in the way rich treat poor, and 
the way the poor pray for the rich.  The OE semantic field of halig, including as it does salvation 
(hælu), healing (hælu), and wholeness (hal), richly evokes a fully functioning community 
oriented around the salvation-bringing/healing/wholeness of prayer.  All of this is to say that, 
while comparison between Bede and Ælfric is inevitable (and, at times, illuminating), both 
theories of prayer need to be taken on their own terms. 
Fourth, quite aside from the different expectations of piety that come with Bede and 
Ælfric’s differing audiences, almost 300 years of changing trends in prayer separate them.  As I 
have noted in Chapter 1, spontaneous prayer was briefly part of early Christian practice, but 
prayer quickly became more and more formal as antiquity gave way to the medieval – this was 
true in Bede’s day and remains true in Ælfric’s.  Formal prayer has a tendency to reify, to be 
seen as thing with particular powers and properties of its own.13  As we have seen, Ælfric’s 
teachings on prayer often tend to view it as more of an objective thing than do Bede’s.  In 
addition, penitential practices pioneered by the Irish, such as the tariff system and commuted 
penance,14 and the gradual substitution of repeated prayers for the Psalter, all also tended to put a 
quantifiable value on prayer; that is, so many LPs stood for so many Psalms, or so many of a 
particular kind of prayer expiated a particular kind of sin.  This also tends to reify prayer by 
making it more easily an object of exchange itself among people, not just between people and 
God. 
As prayer tends to reify and become an object of exchange itself, this leads to the fifth 
point: the efficacy of prayer, whether subjective or objective, is one of the key points of contrast 
                                                 
13
 The most striking example of a prayer with its own properties and powers (and, indeed, personality) is the Pater 
Noster sequence in Solomon and Saturn (see Daniel Anlezark, ed. and trans., The Old English Dialogues of 
Solomon and Saturn).  Stephen Harris discusses more normal ways that prayer could be seen to have its own power: 
“There is evidence to suggest that a liturgy was thought to cohere not only symbolically or thematically, but also 
supernaturally. … [A] properly executed liturgy could positively affect earthly and heavenly reality.”  He later ties 
prayer and the liturgy together: “The affective power of liturgy is not categorically distinct from the affective power 
of prayer, since liturgies are comprised in part of prayers” (“The Liturgical Context of Ælfric’s Homilies for 
Rogation,” 147).  The same way of thinking is manifest in many of the Anglo-Saxon charms and remedies. 
14
 See Angenendt, “Donationes pro anima,” 135-6. 
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for Bede and Ælfric.  In fully subjective prayer the discipline of praying itself brings about the 
change in the precator; the presence or existence of the divine does not matter for the discipline 
of prayer to “work” on – bring about the desired change in – the precator.  Its operation is 
personal and private, within the mind of the one praying.  Prayer is “spiritual” in the sense that it 
works in the spirit or soul or psyche, the “inweard heort,” of the one praying.  Because of this, 
prayer can be secularized into a sort of meditational practice; subjective prayer is, then, not 
usually read by moderns as “superstitious,” and those with materialist commitments can thus find 
value in this kind of prayer quite aside from any supernatural content.  Within Christian 
conceptions of prayer, no prayer is fully subjective; in the end it matters to the precators that 
there is a God existing who hears and answers prayer.  There is no particular reason subjective 
prayer must be form-bound; however, as we have seen, for writers like Bede, Cassian, and even 
Augustine the form is an important part of prayer’s efficacy.  The words of prayer are considered 
to come from God, and the internalization and externalization of these words brings about 
transformation.  What is particularly interesting about Bede is the way he situates subjective 
prayer within a gift-cycle so that it enacts a relationship with God based on generosity and 
gratitude freely given on both sides.  For Bede, God does not respond out of compulsion, he 
initiates out of gratia; humans do not respond to God out of obligation, but out of gratia, and 
God rewards this response with further gratia.  Gratiam pro gratia thus personalizes prayer and 
the relationship with God in a way not typically found within other early authors whose theory of 
prayer is strongly subjective, such as Cassian and Augustine, but who have more abstract 
conceptions of God. 
Fully objective prayer, on the other hand, works not on the petitioner but on either the 
divine (to cause the granting of favors) or even on the material world itself through the power of 
the form or words of the prayer.  Fully objective prayer also need imply no particularly close 
relationship between the precator and the divine because of the power of the words themselves; it 
is spiritual in the sense that it acknowledges the primacy of a spiritual realm in which spiritual 
beings (who need not be fully personified) act in and upon the material world.  Thus, this type of 
prayer often shades toward the magical: it reflects an expectation that the words or formula of 
prayer can have effect upon (the animating spirits of) the material world.  No Christian prayer is 
fully objective, either.  Even in the most objective, superstitious-seeming cases (praying over 
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herbs, for instance) it is a personified God’s power that is being called upon to activate healing or 
protection.  Objective prayer tends to have a necessarily closer association with form, both word 
formulas and ritual forms.  
In allowing prayers over herbs or while traveling, Ælfric’s theory of prayer is closer to 
the objective end of the spectrum.  Even in his most “subjective” representation of prayer, 
CHI.10, the way he adapts Gregory’s thought presents prayer as operating upon Jesus – not in a 
magical or necessary way, but through request – and it is then Jesus’ response to the precator that 
brings about change.  However, while prayer is certainly more objectively efficacious for Ælfric, 
I have come to think, as I conclude this project, that this terminology resulted from a too-neat 
binary with Bede and does not quite fit Ælfric’s theory of prayer.  For Ælfric, prayer changes or 
declares the status of the one praying – from subject of the devil to subject of God.  This change 
is not a subjective change of reformation within the heart as a result of the discipline of prayer, 
nor is it exactly brought about by God objectively, since it is a response to his gifts and a 
recognition of his rights.  Rather, it is a declaration of the precator’s allegiance.  That is, the 
asking of favors only occurs within a relationship in which the expectation is “lean sceal … þam 
þe us þas lisse geteod” [return must be made … to him who ordained us these favors], as Maxims 
I has it.  The very act of praying implies that the precator means to return lean for lisse in a 
trustworthy fashion.  In this way, prayer is more like a vow (which, oddly enough, also takes us 
back to Cassian),15 and thus more like performative language.  Prayer changes (or reiterates) the 
status of the one praying and formalizes intent through the formality of the language – in this 
case, the intent to be subject to God. 
My sixth point is that, to the extent prayer is situated within a reciprocal relationship, it 
unavoidably interacts with the doctrine of grace.  Augustine’s theology of grace, which both 
Bede and Ælfric worked within, directly resists the idea of reciprocity; and the idea that humans 
might compel God to do their own will is one that our authors never admit (or, in the case of 
Ælfric, admit only to resist).  But Bede and Ælfric do imagine the human/divine relationship as 
essentially reciprocal, in which humans respond to God’s gifts in grateful service, for which 
                                                 
15
 In Conference IX.xii.1 Cassian’s taxonomy of prayer includes prayers, thanksgivings, etc. (the list is from I 
Timothy).  Prayer, he says, is a vow, in which we promise things to God.  He takes this idea from the meaning of the 
Greek word for prayer, euche, which means both prayer and vow (both the taxonomy of prayer and prayer as vow is 
also in Origen). 
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service God is expected to reward them.  Bede engages this doctrine directly, presenting gratia 
as a cycle that binds humans to God and vice-versa.  While Ælfric also teaches about grace16 and 
sees its function as similarly embedded in a reciprocal cycle of grace and merit, he does not 
invoke grace as explicitly in the way he talks about prayer.  Rather, Ælfric tends to focus more 
on obedience (gehyrsumness) and merit (geearnung).  Thus, while both Bede and Ælfric invoke 
gift-giving structures, and while both present a version of grace in which humans cooperate with 
God to gain salvation, each author’s view of grace is inflected with a different conception of the 
human relationship to God.  Thus, as a marker of this relationship, humans turn to God with their 
needs.  But prayer functions in a complex way: either as a return-gift to God, or as petition 
presenting needs – primarily the need for salvation.  The same prayer can function in both of 
these ways at the same time.  Not only that, prayer, in the way it mediates between interior and 
exterior, between the spiritual and the bodily, between individual and community, has enormous 
transformative potential, giving its practitioners new ways of imagining and enacting the self.  
Thus, for Bede, whose idea of salvation is an ongoing process of inner and outer reform 
culminating in purified people worthy of the kingdom of heaven, prayer is the key element of 
reform, as the words of prayer are interiorized and exteriorized in thought and action.  But 
because, for Bede, the subject of prayer’s petition is salvation, integrated prayer helps to bring 
about the transformation for which the petitioner begs. 
Seventh, the language Bede uses to talk about prayer and the human relationship with 
God is what we might – with all the caveats of Chapter 2 in mind – call affective.  That is, it has 
a certain emotional content, even though, as I have argued, this emotion is an ideal product of 
prayer not a cause of it.  Even without the emotional language, Bede’s presentation of the gratia-
relationship is an intimate one in which humans and God shower gratia upon each other.  
Furthermore, even though his conception of the individual is within the praying community and 
adopts the language and “desire” of the church, Bede still gives place to the individual, primarily 
through the women he uses as examples of precators: Mary, the three women at the tomb, and 
the gentile mother.  These elements stand out in contrast to Ælfric, so much so that, in 
comparison to Bede, the orientation of prayer in Ælfric might seem to be impersonal and non-
                                                 
16
 See Kleist, Striving with Grace, chapter 7. 
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intimate.  But to compare Bede with Ælfric in this way warps both Bede, in making him seem 
more affective and individualist than he was, and Ælfric, in making his prayer seem colder and 
more remote than it was. 
Thus, my eighth and final point: even though Bede’s idea of prayer leaves more room for 
consideration of the individual in prayer, Bede and Ælfric both situate the praying Christian in 
relationship to the community.  In contrast, scholarship focused on devotion tends to center on 
the individual and individual forms of prayer, seeking out and emphasizing individual, interior, 
and emotive devotional practices.  As Allen Frantzen’s article arguing for the presence of 
affective prayer in Anglo-Saxon England demonstrates, part of the reason for this is a desire to 
seem relevant to later fields invested in a sort of teleology of the individual by which all earlier 
forms of religious experience are judged.17  Thomas Bestul’s work demonstrating continuity 
between the Anglo-Saxon tradition and Anselm shows another reason for a recuperative sort of 
focus: a desire to resist the exclusion of the Anglo-Saxon Era from the Middle Ages by creating 
a link from the “Dark Ages” to the medieval period.18  But in both these cases the authors move 
from later forms of piety to earlier forms.  This creates a sort of blindness in which the only 
forms of prayer worth studying seem to reflect (or proto-reflect) later forms, especially the 
emotive experience arising in the individual’s response to God.  Then again, as John Donne (of 
all people!) indicates, earlier forms and attitudes of devotion persist much later than we like to 
give them credit for: “You would scarce thanke a man for an extemporall Elegy, or Epigram or 
Panegyrique in your praise, if it cost the poet, or the orator no paines.  God will scarce hearken to 
sudden inconsidered, irreverent prayers.”19 
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 Frantzen, “Spirituality and Devotion in the Anglo-Saxon Penitentials.”  His article sets up for the two following 
articles in the same issue, DeGregorio, “Affective Spirituality”; and Christina M. Heckman, “Imitatio in Early 
Medieval Spirituality: The Dream of the Rood, Anselm, and Militant Christology,” Essays in Medieval Studies 22 
(2005): 141-53. 
18
 Bestul, “St. Anselm and the Continuity of Anglo-Saxon Devotional Traditions”; “The Book of Cerne and the 
English Devotional Tradition”; “St Anselm, the Monastic Community at Canterbury, and Devotional Writing in 
Late Anglo-Saxon England.” 
19
 Quoted in John Donne, The Prayers of John Donne, 17.  For an examination of the persistence of ritual form in 
the period, see also Ramie Targoff, Common Prayer: The Language of Public Devotion in Early Modern England 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
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While Bede is usually one of the authors trotted out to indicate the presence of 
individually oriented affective piety,20 I have argued that this is an essentially anachronistic 
reading of his work.  In fact, the focus on individual piety in the study of devotion tends to 
emphasize independence and exceptionality too much – the very things that the practice and 
discourse of gift-exchange discourage.  Not only that, it focuses on the very thing – 
independence – that warps or destroys the sense of identity formed within gift-structures.  For 
Bede, the precator adopts the words and practice of prayer performed by the Church, conforming 
himself to those words as he prays, and thus forming a coherent “self” within the community out 
of the ritual actions and words he continually performs.  Nevertheless, this does not preclude a 
sense of the precator’s favored intimacy with God: for Bede the gift-cycle of gratiam pro gratia 
that humans participate in with God expresses this intimacy.  The way that Bede’s precators are 
encouraged to identify themselves with Mary’s position in relation to God, receiving God’s gifts 
and, through this, bringing Christ forth into the world partly expresses the extreme sense of 
honor that this relationship carries.   
The way that Ælfric’s teachings present prayer as a performative statement of allegiance 
does not lead to the same scholarly temptations (which is, perhaps, why Ælfric’s teaching on 
prayer has largely avoided scrutiny).  In contrast to Bede, Ælfric develops the praying 
community’s relationships to each other more fully in his teachings on prayer.  Scholars who 
study questions of ritualized prayer, the gift, and community in the period in which Ælfric writes 
tend to observe the ways that exchanges involving prayer between individuals and institutions 
contribute to the consolidation of power in the hands of the institutions (and those running 
them).21  Put another way, Ælfric’s emphasis on obedience, and his insistence that the praying 
relationship should be centered on and submissive to the will of God, gives God’s agency 
primacy.  But who speaks for God?  With our modern suspicion of authority and hierarchy, we 
tend to observe individuals and institutions gaining power as they appropriate the agency 
assigned to God within the prayer relationship.  Yet Ælfric sees a fundamental equality within 
                                                 
20
 See, for example, DeGregorio, “Affective Spirituality.” 
21
 For examples of this type of focus see Mayke de Jong, “Carolingian Monasticism; and Angenendt, “Donationes 
pro anima.”  For a more nuanced look at the way that gifts and prayer form community (although one that largely 
focuses on the upper ranks of society), see Megan McLaughlin, Consorting with Saints: Prayer for the Dead in 
Early Medieval France (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
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the prayer relationship that binds the community together.  While this is perhaps more ideal than 
realized, in CHI.18, he teaches a model of society where human obligations to each other are 
recognized as familial bonds oriented around a gift-economy in which all people, rich and poor, 
can participate because they all have the same divine father and they all have something to give.  
Furthermore, within relationships formed by gift-giving, agency is more diluted because the 
more powerful are just as bound by the moral imperatives of generosity and reciprocity as the 
weak.  Thus, even though Ælfric emphasizes God’s superiority over humans, he also insists that 
God will honor those who honor him. 
 
Within the relational and communal context in which both Bede and Ælfric situate 
prayer, the free gift – the gift where nothing is expected in return, and no obligation is incurred 
between parties, the gift that allows people freedom to continue being their own, independent, 
autonomous beings while still, somehow, being accepted into community and remaining the 
recipient of gifts22 – is profoundly dysfunctional.  In some sense, the gap between discourse and 
praxis in the gift allows the gift to be a test of the recipient’s moral character.23  The recipient is, 
in fact, under no legal obligation or threat of force to return a gift accepted – that she does (or 
does not) becomes a reflection of her character and of the way she views the relationship 
involved.  Thus, according to Maxims I, receiving a gift with no intention of returning it is 
actually deceptive, not because the recipient refuses to engage in the economic exchange of 
gifts,24 but because the recipient refuses to recognize the symbolic content of the gift, accepting 
the benefit but rejecting the person.  Contrariwise, the gift freely given can be insulting insofar as 
the donor does not recognize obligation either.  The free gift undermines communal ties, creating 
distance and an unbridgeable chasm between donor and recipient.  
We can see why the Augustinian formulation of God’s grace (unconstrained by 
constraining) might be resisted by Bede in his formulation of the prayer-enacted gratia-
relationship between human and God: for Bede, both humans and God recognize their 
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 Paul Simon’s take on the subject reflects this view: “And I may be obliged to defend / Every love every ending / 
Or maybe there’s no obligations now, / Maybe I’ve a reason to believe / We all will be received / In Graceland” 
(“Graceland” from Graceland [Warner Bros., 1986]). 
23
 The gift exchange between Basil and Julian in LSI.3 functions exactly this way. 
24
 Much of the theoretical response to Mauss focuses on gift-exchange as primarily an economic exchange, a way to 
circulate wealth. 
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obligations to one another.  In Ælfric’s focus on the communal nature of prayer, the way alms 
become a gift the poor can return through prayer also gets rid of the free gift implicit in 
Augustine’s purity-based notion of almsgiving, thereby allowing alms and prayer to work for the 
salvation of the whole Christian community.  As we saw in CHI.31, Ælfric also came close to 
restoring an idea of the free gift (this time from humans to God) in his insistence that God need 
not answer prayers for healing.  In this case, it almost seems that the pagan gods are the ones 
who honor the gift-relationship inherent in petition.  But what Ælfric actually does is restore the 
discourse of the gift while still expecting reciprocity: humans serve God freely because he is 
worthy of honor.  God, being honorable, rewards those who show themselves honorable through 
serving him.  The words and works of prayer both ask God to grant salvation as a gift, and 
perform the grateful service to God for which salvation is the reward. 
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